The caring enterprise: a sociology of corporate social involvement in Britain and Italy by Marinetto, M. & Marinetto, M.
 
 
 
 
 
WestminsterResearch 
http://www.westminster.ac.uk/westminsterresearch 
 
 
 
The caring enterprise : a sociology of corporate social 
involvement in Britain and Italy 
 
Michael Marinetto 
 
School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Languages 
 
 
 
This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of 
Westminster.  © The Author, 1995. 
 
This is a scanned reproduction of the paper copy held by the University of 
Westminster library. 
 
 
 
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of 
Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a 
wider audience.  Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or 
copyright owners. 
Users are permitted to download and/or print one copy for non-commercial 
private study or research.  Further distribution and any use of material from 
within this archive for profit-making enterprises or for commercial gain is 
strictly forbidden.    
 
 
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, 
you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: 
(http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/). 
 
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail 
repository@westminster.ac.uk 
2O23Th7X )cc ". P 
THE CARING ENTERPRISE 
A SOCIOLOGY OF CORPORATE SOCIAL 
INVOLVEMENT IN BRITAIN AND ITALY 
MICHAEL NLARINETTO 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements of the University of Westminster 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
July 1995 
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my father-in-law 
and dear friend, Harry Hughes 
Contents 
Acknowledgements 
Abstract 
1 Introduction: Themes and Issues in the Study of 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Defining corporate social responsibility 
The search for an explanation 
The managerial thesis 
The contingency thesis 
Corporate responsibility and philanthropy in and across 
capitalist societies 
A methodological framework 
PART IA HISTORY OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 
2 The Early Foundations of Commercial Philanthropy 
The guild system of the Middle Ages 
The merchant class and the relief of poverty 
The humanitarian impulse and business philanthropy 
Humanitarian industrialists 
Victorian philanthropy: Nonconformist and Liberal credos 
A auestion of Dublic versus Drivate welfare 
3 The New Corporations and their Responsibilities 
The beginnings of the corporate economy and 
enlightened businesses 
Industrialists, corporations and university education 
The modern corporate economy 
Corporate social action in postwar society 
The 'modern era' of corporate social responsibility 
Business and society in the age of the New Right 
PART II THE MODERN ERA 
4 Rejuvenating Local Economies through Enterprise 
Local economic decline and the response of government 
and business 
Business involvement in the local enterprise movement 
Urban policy and the corporate contribution 
The City Challenge partnership: the case of BAT 
Industries and the London Borough of Lambeth 
Prospects for economic regeneration 
The intermediary role of local enterprise agencies 
Direct intervention 
A concluding assessment 
5 Befriending the Environment 
Annus veridis: the greening of society 
Capitalism and the environment 
Business-environment agencies and the voluntary sector 
Improving environmental performance 
The greening of finance and environmental reporting 
The greening of consumerism 
1 
24 
61 
103 
146 
PART III CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY IN ITALY 
6 Civic Activism and the origins of Industrial 
Philanthropy in Italy 
Civic activism in the pre-industrial age 
Guilds in the city-republics of medieval Italy 
The crisis of communal Italy 
Spanish domination and the rise of the Christian 
loan banks 
The new wave of benevolent institutions 
Commercial philanthropy in the age of modernisation 
Industrialisation and philanthropy 
The changing status of private capital 
The Fascist period and the dopolavoro 
7 State-Private Enterprises and Social Action 
The enlightened state enterprises in the 
postwar period 
The state holding sector and social action 
State subsidiary and specialist enterprises 
The mobilisation of private capital 
The Mezzogiorno and private industry 
A more expansive social role for business? 
9a 8 The Aesthetic Motive: Corporate Patronage of 
Cultural Heritage in Italy 
The state and the preservation of cultural heritage 
The advertising industry and cultural heritage 
Commercial enterprises as the new cultural patrons 
The public banks and their cultural responsibilities 
9 Conclusion 
The development of corporate philanthropy 
Affirmative social action versus the negative 
injunction 
Appendix: Research Materials 
General details on fieldwork interviews 
List of British companies and organisations that partook 
in the study and brief descriptions of their activities 
List of Italian companies and organisations that partook 
in the study and brief descriptions of their activities 
List of fieldwork interviews for the British phase 
List of fieldwork interviews for the Italian phase 
References 
British company documents and 
Italian company documents and 
References of texts, articles 
189 
233 
276 
312 
334 
347 
publications 
publications 
and government publications 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to record my gratitude to the many people that 
helped me during the course of this thesis. First of all I would 
like to mention my supervisor, Robin Theobald, who was of great 
assistance during the course of this research. Robin carefully 
guided the research work and offered me a great deal of sound 
advice during the drafting stage. I should also like to mention 
my second supervisor, John Stanworth, who made insightful 
comments on draft chapters. He also kindly provided me with some 
of the research money at his disposal for my study trips to 
Italy. I would also like to thank Nick Zaf iris., Head of the 
School of Economic and Business Studies, for offering financial 
assistance for my travelling expenses to Italy. 
This research was carried out at the University of 
Westminster between 1992-95 in the School of Economic and 
Business Studies. I am grateful to all the staff in the School 
and in the University for providing a conducive environment in 
which to conduct my work. Special thanks goes to all the staff 
at Riding House Street library for all their assistance. My 
thanks also extends to the computing staff at Wells Street who 
helped with my word processing inquiries. 
The research was supported by the Quintin Hogg Scholarship 
fund. I am grateful to the University of Westminster for 
administering the Scholarship. I would also like to thank the 
Norman Hart Educational Foundation which kindly contributed to 
my travelling expenses for my first research trip to Italy. 
This research would not have been possible without the many 
individuals in companies and organisations that gave up their 
time to be interviewed about their work. I am particularly 
grateful to those company representatives from British Telecom, 
Shell UK, Unilever, BAT Industries, and their various 
subsidiaries. I would also like to thank representatives from the 
following organisations who agreed to be interviewed: the Policy 
Studies Institute, Business in the Community, Lambeth City 
Challenge, LENTA (London Enterprise Agency), Association for 
Business Sponsorship of the Arts, Action Resource Centre, 
Charities Aid Foundation, Brixton Enterprise Centre. 
There are numerous people who were integral to the Italian 
phase of my research. Bryn Jones at the University of Bath 
provided me some very useful contacts. In Italy, I was assisted 
by Professor Mirella Giannini at the University of Bari, who led 
me to some useful people and gave me a place to stay while in 
Bari. Dr Maurizio Brioni from Reggio-Emilia helped me beyond the 
call of duty, even introducing me to Tobias Smollett's Humphry 
clinker and giving me four volumes of Gramsci Is Prison Notebooks 
in the original Italian. Giuseppe della Rocca of Main Management 
and Beatrice Lentati were also invaluable. I would like to extend 
a special thanks to all those representatives from Fiat, 
Olivetti, ENI and their subsidiaries who agreed to be interviewed 
and for tolerating my clumsy Italian. I would like thank those 
that I interviewed from the following banks and small companies: 
Banca di Roma, Banca Popolare di Milano, Angelini 
Pharmaceuticals, Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, Cariplo, Fratelli 
Dioguardi, Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino. My gratitude 
also extends to those representatives from the Associazione 
Mecenati Italiani, BIC Liguria, BIC Trieste, Comitato (Comitato 
per lo Sviluppo di Nuova Imprenditorialital Giovanile), 
Fondazione Adriano Olivetti, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli. 
Some other acknowledgements to friends and colleagues are 
also in order. My thanks to Mohammad Nafissi, Noel Parry and 
Aidan Rose from the University of North London who helped me 
during the latter stages of the thesis. A word of gratitude must 
also go to all the staff at the sociology department of York 
University who gave such a good grounding in academic sociology. 
My final acknowledgements are reserved for my family. 
Without their support the production of this thesis would have 
been a more arduous task. My mother and father, Teresa and 
Giovanni Marinetto, deserve a special mention for their loving 
care. I would also like to thank my cousin Maria Bez for her 
constant encouragement. My parents-in-law, Harry and Betty 
Hughes, deserve a special mention for their support. I am deeply 
saddened that Harry was not around to see this work completed. 
My final and most significant acknowledgement goes to wife Debbie 
who was a constant source of encouragement. She was loving and 
gracious throughout the production of this work. Any mistakes are 
of course my own. The credit for any achievement is shared. 
Abstract 
This thesis examines corporate social responsibility initially 
in Britain, where there has recently been a conspicuous growth 
of interest in business social involvement, and Italy. Corporate 
social responsibility is defined here as business engagement in 
the wider community in order to contribute towards the general 
well-being of society. Our analysis employs a hybrid methodology: 
we employ a variety of sources, namely, historical texts, 
secondary studies and detailed case studies of corporate social 
programmes based on in-depth interviews of relevant personnel and 
the study of company documents. 
Our aim in this study is to provide a general explanation 
of why companies go beyond their commercial remit to become 
engaged in communitarian and philanthropic action. A socially and 
politically informed analysis is furnished: we place this area 
in its historical and political context, without losing sight of 
the role played by economic forces. Any explanation of 
contemporary advances in corporate social responsibility needs 
to stress the role of the modern state in society, and, more 
specifically, the development of relations between the state and 
the business community. It is argued that, in Britain, as a 
response to the political and economic crisis of the 1970s, the 
links between the business and state sectors became ever closer. 
This, as we shall demonstrate, created the institutional 
opportunities for active business involvement in society in areas 
such as environmental protection, small firm development and 
urban regeneration. Italy has seen less political impetus given 
to active corporate involvement in society. The most significant 
achievements, though, have come from within the state sector. 
A final consideration of our social analysis is that we 
attempt to analyse the contribution of the private sector to 
wider society. This is especially pertinent because, in Britain, 
corporate responsibility has come to be seen as a private 
solution to public problems. We show, using original case study 
material, that there are limits to what companies can achieve on 
a social front. We conclude that corporate social responsibility 
must emphasise the need for companies to observe social and legal 
restrictions in their pursuit of commercial goals, rather than 
necessarily engaging actively in social action. 
1 Introduction: Themes and Issues in the Study of 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
The central purview of this thesis is to examine corporate social 
responsibility by considering initially British society where, 
in recent years, there has been a conspicuous expansion of 
interest in this field; but, later in this analysis, the focus 
switches across societies to Italy. In theory, this should be a 
straightforward and uncomplicated task. As defined by British 
company law, the public company is primarily responsible and 
accountable to its owners, who, in effect, are the shareholders 
(Donnelly, 1987). Directors, as the custodians of shareholder 
assets, are under no legal obligation to use company resources 
for activities unrelated to the overarching objective of 
maximising financial returns. 
The traditional view of company responsibilities has its 
philosophical advocates. Latter-day liberal economists Milton 
Friedman (1962) and Frederick Hayek (1969) argue that, apart from 
creating wealth, businesses have no wider social obligations. 
These theoreticians introduce an important notion, borrowed from 
Adam Smith, into the contemporary debate on corporate social 
responsibility: that the selfish pursuit of profit has beneficial 
repercussions for the rest of society. This argument is based on 
the concept of the 'invisible hand', first introduced by Adam 
Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Goyder, 1987). This 
concept provides a metaphor describing the process whereby the 
accumulation of wealth is automatically redistributed for the 
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benefit of wider society through consumption and investment. 
Hence it follows that a business, by seeking to fulfil its 
commercial obligations, secures its own survival and contributes 
to the overall wealth and prosperity of society (Levitt, 1979). 
We would expect the classical view of corporate 
responsibility to have widespread credence and support in modern 
capitalist economies. However, the classical view, with its 
unswerving commitment to profit-making above all other 
responsibilities, has been firmly challenged from various 
quarters. American business leaders and academic writers, to all 
intents and purposes, were the progenitors of the contemporary 
debate on corporate social responsibility. Indeed, the likes of 
Friedman, Hayek, and Levitt were galvanised into producing a 
critique of corporate philanthropy by the advent of what Epstein 
terms the "'modern era" of interest in corporate social 
responsibility, in the United States (1989, p. 585). The 'modern 
era' was signalled by the Supreme New Jersey Legislature ruling 
in 1950 that firms should be allowed to make contributions for 
the purposes of social betterment; and the debate was later given 
scholarly credence when New York academics Bowen (1953) and Clark 
(1957) published their seminal apologias on the social 
responsibilities of companies (Walton, 1982). From the middle of 
the 1960s to the mid-1970s, a consensus regarding the importance 
of company-led social action emerged among leading American 
businesses (Epstein, 1989). By the 1980s, the corporate social 
responsibility debate in the United States moved onto the 
strategic terrain as business managers and academics examined how 
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businesses should respond to social problems and the possible 
benefits for mainstream commercial activities. 
In postwar Britain, ef f orts to reconcile the commercial and 
social responsibilities of f irms witnessed brief advances in the 
early 1960s. The Jenkins Committee on Company Law Reform in 1962 
maintained that charitable gifts by businesses would be 
acceptable before the law courts because they endear those 
companies involved to the public (Sheikh, 1990). The modern 
debate on corporate social responsibility did not gain any real 
prominence until the 1970s, when business executives, academics 
and government ministers used various platforms to pontificate 
on the wider responsibilities of business. Undoubtedly the 
spectre of America, where, by this date, corporate responsibility 
was a mature research field in university departments (Epstein, 
1976,, p. 215; Jones, 1983), held a definite bearing on early 
British discussions of corporate philanthropy (see Fogarty, 
1966). These developments also established an important precedent 
for the expansion of corporate social involvement during the 
1980s,, where companies actively participated across a wide range 
of areas. For those practitioners researching corporate 
responsibility, initially in America (Jones, 1980) and later in 
Britain (Beesley and Evans, 1978), the subject matter under 
scrutiny generated several problems of definition. 
Defining corporate social responsibility 
So far, we have worked with an implicit definition of corporate 
social responsibility, and, in so doing, assumed that the reader 
already holds a definition of the term that is congruent with its 
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present usage. This is a problematic assumption, not least 
because, as writers on the subject have observed, a definitive 
version of the concept does not exist. Hargreaves and Dauman 
describe the predicament as a matter of lone man: one definition, 
(1975j, p. 15); and McAdam (1973) notes that there are over one 
hundred and f if ty potential areas where a company might disclose 
information of a social nature (cited in Gray et al., 1987). 
The concept is elusive, but it has not stopped researchers 
from trying to come up with an operational definition of 
corporate social responsibility. One of the most useful attempts 
to define the subject area comes from Hargreaves and Dauman 
(1975). The authors provide a procedural explication of the term, 
with three distinguishable levels of responsibility. The first 
level covers 'basic responsibilities", referring to technical and 
mundane obligations, such as paying taxes and ensuring scrupulous 
dealings with customers. Secondly, forganisational 
responsibilities" are intended to secure the well-being and needs 
of those under the aegis of the company,, whether employees,, 
suppliers, managers or shareholders. When a company adopts 
'societal responsibilities', the third level in the 
classification, it becomes involved in the wider community in 
assisting the creation of a 'healthy overall environment' 
(Hargreaves and Dauman,. 1975, p. 19). What distinguishes societal 
responsibilities from the other two categories is the emphasis 
on transcending the confines and operations of the company in 
order to contribute directly towards the welfare and prosperity 
of society. 
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From this examination, the aim of this study is not to f ocus 
on those responsibilities within the parochial animus of the 
company - welfare and social services for employees, pension 
schemes, health and safety - but on those directed specifically 
at the community. Here, our analytical interests coincide with 
Hargreaves and Dauman's third level category or what the CBI 
(1973) terms a company's responsibilities to 'society at largef - 
the government, national and local communities. 
Providing a definition of the concept is not the only 
problem generated by this particular field of research: there is 
also the pressing analytical matter of explaining why the 'modern 
era" of corporate responsibility rose to prominence in Britain 
during the 1970s. Although there are reasons, often specific to 
individual business organisations, that determine their 
involvement in philanthropic activities, there are general 
factors which help create an interest in corporate social 
responsibility within the private sector and expand the 
opportunities for corporate-led social action. When it comes to 
making decisions about corporate social responsibility, a company 
does not operate in a social vacuum. In this respect, it is 
influenced by broader developments. The main predicament for the 
present study is to try and pinpoint these general factors. 
The search for an explanation 
There have been some laudable attempts by social scientists to 
locate corporate philanthropy and social action in a wider social 
context. Most notably these have come from managerial theorists 
who link corporate social responsibility to the rise of 
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industrial society and those researchers who see corporate 
philanthropy as a functional-defensive strategy on the part of 
commercial organisations. Our aim now is to outline these 
theories and examine whether they provide a satisfactory 
theoretical framework for understanding the emergence of 
corporate responsibility, especially with regard to Britain. 
The managerial thesis 
The managerial thesis is the generic term applied to a distinctly 
American tradition of social science research popularised during 
the 1950s and 1960s. This intellectual trend spawned a 
substantial body of literature on the nature of capitalism in the 
postwar era, and the role of business institutions within society 
(see Jones, 1983). More importantly, it seems, initially, to 
provide the most hopeful theoretical grounding for understanding 
the way interest in corporate social involvement emerges. 
The main assertion of those working in the managerial 
tradition is this: the material basis of class distinctions in 
capitalist society - the close, umbilical relationship between 
the ownership and control of capital - has been made redundant 
by the modernising forces within the postwar economy and society. 
Galbraith (1974) argues that the emergence of new technology, 
coupled with the wider distribution of share ownership, resulting 
from the growth of business enterprises beyond personalised, 
familial ownership, has severed the links between the ownership 
and control of capital. In the new industrial state, non-owning, 
salaried managers preside over the operations of business 
organisations. For Galbraith, the convergence of capitalist 
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societies towards a common industrial structure, replete with 
advanced technologies, has made it imperative for non-partisan, 
technical specialists to assume control of commercial 
enterprises. 
According to other theoreticians, the rise of managerial 
specialists as a result of the divorce between the ownership and 
control of the means of production in capitalist societies has 
facilitated a greater interest in wider social issues (Ewing, 
1970). As non-propertied controllers of the means of production, 
managers no longer have a vested interest in the narrow, 
instrumental pursuit of financial gain. Consequently, the leaders 
of industry can aspire to broader social and humanitarian 
objectives. Kaysen has argued that the new managerial class of 
modern corporations, as it is no longer the agent of 
proprietorship, is responsible to a broader constituency of 
interests: 'Its responsibilities to the general public are 
widespread: leadership in local charitable enterprises, concern 
with factory architecture and landscaping, provision of support 
for higher education, and even research in pure science, to name 
a few" (1957, p. 313). A similar point was made by Berle (1959) 
who argued that, with the separation of ownership and control, 
the private company has become accountable to a broad range of 
in erests. 
The difficulty with the theoretical claims made by 
managerial theorists is that they do not furnish an entirely 
satisfactory explanation for the prevalence of corporate social 
responsibility both historically and in contemporary society. 
These misgivings stem from the arguments put forward by 
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managerial theorists regarding the development and nature of 
modern capitalism. Historically, the transition from familial 
ownership of commercial units to large, impersonal, shareholder- 
owned companies has not facilitated a greater sense of social 
duty among the managerial cadre of the business community. Rather 
evidence shows that this development has concretised the 
objectives of expansion and prof it-making. Indeed, some theorists 
operating within the managerial tradition have argued that 
company managers , in the context of modern ownership structures , 
are less likely to acquire communitarian ideals than use their 
authority to cater for their own material interests (see Scott, 
1985, pp. 19-20). The reason why economic considerations have 
come to the fore in this way is that,, with the expansion of 
shareholder entities, the links between the ownership and control 
of these enterprises has remained intact. The only changing 
feature is the identity of the owners: the family enterprise of 
the Industrial Revolution,, where individuals owned and controlled 
their enterprises, was replaced in the twentieth century by an 
impersonal, shareholder system of ownership, mainly dominated by 
powerful institutional shareholders (Scott, 1986). In legislative 
and political terms, rather than creating a dispassionate class 
of managerial technocrats, the dominant form of capital ownership 
in modern society has reinforced the rights of property holders 
and prioritised the objective of maximising financial returns on 
capital investments. 
However this critique of the managerial thesis still leaves 
unaddressed one of the central objectives of our study: tc 
understand and explain the flourishing interest surrounding 
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corporate responsibility in Britain. On the whole, the literature 
that has expressly tackled this subject lacks useful insights. 
Much of it has been characteristically practical in emphasis, 
either advising managers on how to organise social action 
programmes or providing voluntary groups with ideas on corporate 
fund-raising (Clutterbuck, 1981; Knox and Ashworth,, 1985; Norton, 
1987,1989; Carmichael and Drummond, 1989; Clutterbuck and Snow, 
1990; Fogarty and Christie, 1990; Christie et al. , 1991). 
Although most of these writings have been bereft of analytical 
vigour and valuable observations, there are some notable 
illuminations by British theoreticians and researchers. The most 
interesting texts are those that have conceptualised social 
responsibility as a contingent response by corporations in the 
face of economic and political instability. 
The contingency thesis 
For subscribers of this thesis, commercial survival in modern 
society is contingent upon enterprises becoming willing to 
address social problems. Writing from their experience of 
pioneering a corporate social programme for IBM in Britain, 
Hargreaves and Dauman (1975) view social responsibility as an 
indispensable element of modern business strategy because 
commercial activities and the external environment have coalesced 
into an interdependent and dynamic relationship. One influential 
feature of contemporary society, mentioned by the authors, 
concerns the increasing size and importance of the central state 
bureaucracy: the state apparatus controls institutions and 
functions vital to the reproduction and maintenance of society, 
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whether it is the provision of health, educational services or 
the safeguarding of industry. Hence, unless businesses are 
prepared to actively participate in society, their influence and 
position will be marginalised. Hargreaves and Dauman are not 
alone in expressing concerns over the level of state involvement 
in society and the possible repercussions for business activity. 
A number of texts and reports written in the 1970s, during a time 
of economic and political crisis, argued for self-imposed social 
regulation, instead of government intervention to protect the 
wider social good (Ivens, 1970; CBII 1973; Beesley, 1974; BIM, 
1974; Kempner et al., 1974; Beesley and Evans, 1978). 
Hargreaves and Dauman (1975) further argue that modern 
commerce is taking place in a rapidly degenerating social 
environment: finite energy resources, hyperinflationary 
pressures, urban poverty and industrial disputes have undermined 
the aims and philosophy of the liberalised market. The panacea 
offered by the authors is for business organisations to invest 
their resources in social and community action: I ... we find that 
the long-term prof it-making potential of every individual company 
and of free enterprise as a whole, and indeed their very 
survival, will be jeopardised unless all companies substitute 
their token handouts . of ten made with muddled motives ,f or heavy 
investments in public and social affairs' (Hargreaves and Dauman, 
1975, p. 39) . 
The above arguments are mainly prescriptive in their intent, 
yet they provide a theoretical framework for understanding the 
"modern era' of corporate social responsibility in Britain. The 
hypothesis that is forwarded is very much in the tradition of 
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American writings on the subject (Ackerman, 1975; Logsdon et al., 
1990). The central claim of these writers is that interest in 
corporate responsibility is essentially symptomatic of commercial 
organisations responding to their social environment as a way of 
securing legitimacy and commercial success. 
There may be some validity to the contingency view: when 
corporate responsibility came to the fore in Britain during the 
mid-1970s, there was a deep economic and industrial relations 
crisis, which, for the private sector, was exacerbated by the 
possibility of increased government scrutiny over commercial 
activities (see Chapter 3) . But there are questions over whether 
these strategic responses by the business sector to wider social 
events sustained the expansion of corporate social responsibility 
throughout the 1980s. While the contingency thesis is undoubtedly 
correct in its assertion that enterprises are required to modify 
and adapt, organisationally, to changes in society, it is prone 
to conceptualising the relationship between society and business 
organisations in functionalist terms. Harvey et al write as such: 
, 'Corporations are treated as if they simply adapt to their 
"environments" . and writers try to relate corporate social 
responsibility mechanisms and responses to organisational 
characteristics and effectiveness with the apparent lack of 
appreciation of "structural" conflicts of interest implied in 
their unitarist themes, ' (1984, p. 157). The contingency view 
simplifies the agency of business organisations in society. 
Corporations, as organisational bodies, may be forced into 
adopting defensive strategies to external events. Yet these very 
same organisations, particularly large corporations that have 
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extensive resources at their disposal, can assert their own 
interests - with varying degrees of success - and negotiate with 
other institutions (Utton, 1982). The aim of this study is to go 
beyond this simplistic functional theory, and to provide a fuller 
explanation of corporate philanthropy. 
Corporate responsibility and philanthropy in and across 
capitalist societies 
Our contention is that interest in corporate social 
responsibility can be best understood by recourse to a socially 
informed analysis. We will furnish this by recourse to a sharper, 
more focused examination of the political and social 
circumstances, giving rise to a general interest in corporate 
social responsibility. As part of this analytical strategy, a 
historical examination will be made in Chapters 2 and 3 of the 
emergence of the modern capitalist economy in Britain, linking 
it to the rise of business classes and commercial agencies. The 
main aim of these chapters is to elucidate how the various stages 
of modern social and economic growth - firstly through the 
expansion of localised commercial units as a result of 
industrialisation, and then the emergence of the large, 
corporate -owned, industrial conglomerates - helped determine the 
social and philanthropic aspirations of commercial agents and 
institutions. 
In terms of tracing the emergence of corporate social 
involvement in contemporary British society, a vital 
consideration is the relationship between enterprises and other 
relevant institutional agents, especially the state apparatus. 
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This institutional relationship often acts as the conduit for 
political, economic and social factors to influence the 
philanthropic interests and the social obligations of business 
institutions. Owing to the concentration of the business sector 
in Britain, the government has traditionally established direct 
relations with commercial institutions. During the 1970s, this 
trend accelerated as both government departments and businesses 
made provision for closer relations (Grant, 1993). It is the 
argument of this study that these closer ties between business 
and government, together with radical changes in the balance 
between private and public provision of social services, have 
facilitated greater awareness of corporate responsibility and 
opened up opportunities for private intervention in areas of 
society which, since the Second World War, have largely come 
under the remit of public authorities. The issues covered in the 
second part of study - Chapters 4, and 5- evoke this analytical 
strategy. Each chapter examines, in turn, those areas of society 
- urban and local economic renewal, and the environment - where 
corporate social responsibility and involvement features most 
prominently. These chapters demonstrate how close links between 
government and business, and an explicit government agenda to 
expand the opportunities for corporate involvement in social 
policy, are undoubtedly responsible for the interest expressed 
by the British business community in wider social issues. 
Analysing corporate involvement in society, through a close 
scrutiny of the interplay between government and commercial 
agencies, has implications for public policy. This point has 
further salience because of the paradigmatic shift in political 
13 
governance. Increasingly, policy-makers have adopted private 
sector mechanisms to organise the public services and to devise 
solutions for modern social problems (see Beck, 1983 for business 
influence on education reforms; and Strong and Robinson, 1990, 
pp. 22-6 for business contribution to NHS reforms). This, in 
turn,, has expanded the opportunities for corporate engagement in 
social and community action. The current emphasis placed by 
legislators and advocates of corporate responsibility on the 
positive contribution that the private sector and market 
mechanisms can make to social policy is scrutinised during the 
course of the chapters in the second part of our study. As part 
of this analysis, we will examine some of the most popular areas 
of corporate involvement - namely, urban regeneration and the 
environment - using actual examples generated from fieldwork 
research. In Chapter 4, the focus of our analysis turns to 
corporate involvement in the rejuvenation of local economies and 
the communities of urban, inner city areas. This sphere of 
intervention holds considerable import: it formed one of the 
central causes that gave impetus to the modern era of interest 
in corporate responsibility from the mid-1970s onwards. on the 
other hand, in Chapter 5 our analysis turns to the question of 
business involvement in protecting the environment. Corporate 
interest in green issues, as a distinct expression of corporate 
responsibility, is a recent phenomenon - one that must be seen 
in the context of rising environmental awareness in society and 
the contribution of industry and modern commodity production to 
ecological degradation. Significantly, business contributions to 
environmental protection has underlined the importance of firms 
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qmm 
monitoring the wider social impact of their commercial 
activities. 
As we have already mentioned, the objective of this thesis 
is not simply to concentrate on Britain, but to examine corporate 
responsibility across societies by focusing on Italy. Some of the 
themes covered in the course of the first two sections will be 
critically examined in the context of corporate social 
responsibility in Italy, constituting the third part of our 
study. Although there is a growing body of cross-cultural 
research on corporate social involvement (Dierkes, 1980; Rey, 
1980; Farooq Khan and Atkinson, 1987; Orpen, 1987), very few have 
studied Italy (see Mauksch,, 1982, ch. 5; Lentati, 1991). The 
objective of analysing corporate social involvement in Italy, and 
contrasting it with Britain, is to examine more fully the 
argument at the centre of our study: that the general development 
of corporate philanthropy is contingent upon proximate social and 
political factors within society, especially the political status 
of the business sector and its relationship to government. 
The dominant expressions of corporate philanthropy within 
a particular society are largely shaped by wider social, 
political and economic considerations, which, at the same time, 
are specific to that national configuration. However, the 
proclivity of recent academic research has been to overlook 
differences between capitalist states and subsume features of 
distinct societal entities under general movements in the global 
capitalist economy. One of the main underlying themes of the 
third section of our study is that, while global economic 
integration has undermined the autonomy of individual nation- 
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states, social processes and political events, specific to 
nation-states, continue to have an influence over the way 
capitalism operates in different regions of the world. Hence, in 
accordance with theoreticians such as Worsley (1983), it is 
argued that the distinct historical and political paths chartered 
by societies should not be discounted -a salient point when 
trying to understand corporate-led social action in capitalist 
societies. 
As part of this analytical objective, we trace the 
historical origins of business philanthropy in Italy (Chapter 6). 
It is shown that traders and commercial institutions, such as the 
guilds, were active in the civic communities of pre-industrial 
Italy. The industrialisation of Italy, however, did not result 
in a greater expansion of industrial philanthropy, as was the 
situation in Britain. While some isolated instances of industrial 
philanthropy began to emerge in the early years of the twentieth 
century, as Italy's economic prospects improved, it was the state 
that played a central role in both the economy and society. This 
has important repercussions f or our analysis in Chapter 7, which 
looks at the nature of modern corporate philanthropy. The main 
point here is this: because of various political and economic 
factors that we shall examine, state owned and controlled 
corporations assumed a prominent part in Italian society during 
the early postwar period. These companies have been at the 
forefront of reforms and brought social considerations into the 
commercial sphere. It is clear that the issue of corporate social 
responsibility has become dominated by public enterprises in 
Italy, but the private sector gradually - through economic and 
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political mobilisation - has assumed responsibilities in specific 
social areas. Unlike the situation in Britain, the philanthropic 
corporations of Italy operate in isolation with little support 
from within the business community or government. Despite this, 
the cause of preserving Italy's cultural heritage, as we shall 
outline in Chapter 8,, has elicited active support from the 
business community. Such proactive intervention has come to 
resemble the development of corporate activism in Britain and 
America during the past twenty years. 
methodological framework 
As we have seen, theoretical discussions concerning the 
relationship between business and society have been in 
circulation since the 1950s. A corresponding body of empirical 
research on corporate social action and philanthropy has emerged 
only in recent years, predominantly from American academic 
institutions. Much of this early research employed quantitative 
methodologies, mainly statistical forms of analysis and surveys 
(Post and Andrews, 1982). Aldag and Bartol (1978), in a review 
of studies on corporate social performance, found that 
researchers, particularly those working in a quantitative 
empirical tradition, have utilised a variety of devices to 
measure business sensitivity towards social action and 
philanthropy. The measures included the following indices: 
responsiveness versus non-response to social surveys; proportion 
of lines in annual reports devoted to social responsibility; 
independent ratings of social responsiveness; and pollution 
ratings. The variable ways in which these studies have 
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operationalised social responsibility demand some caution when 
it comes to interpreting their results (Aldag and Bartol, 1978, 
168). In terms of gauging social responsibility, these taken- 
for-granted measures are susceptible to the influence of other 
variables: they could be measuring activities other than 
corporate social responsibility, such as the attempts being made 
by a company to improve its image or attract ethical ly-conscious 
consumers. 
To construct a methodology that produces valid source 
material, Harvey et al (1984) suggest that empirical research in 
this field should adopt a qualitative case study approach over 
survey research methodologies. Indeed, Post and Andrews (1982) 
note that, while quantitative analysis is still prevalent in 
corporation-society research, there is an increasing number of 
qualitative-based studies that use the case approach in which a 
detailed examination is made of a limited number of instances 
concerning the area under study (see Shenfield, 1971; Neubeck, 
1974; Ackerman, 1975; Merenda, 1981; Harvey et al., 1984). This 
does not discount the utility of the survey approach, for some 
important general findings about corporate social action in 
Britain have been garnered through this research method (see 
Adams et al., 1991) . However, a number of researchers have looked 
to qualitative methodologies because they are better able to deal 
with important questions about corporate social involvement and 
the many complex issues that are generated by this field. 
These research activities have established a significant 
corpus of literature, from which new analytical questions can be 
generated. Such literature demonstrates that the design of a 
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study - the number of companies included in the research, the 
type of organisations contacted in the course of the study, and 
the choice of method to obtain empirical information - has an 
important bearing on the type of areas or issues covered during 
research. In the present study, the primary question is not one 
of scrutinising the specific reasons why businesses embark on 
social programmes. Because of the distinctive nature of corporate 
social involvement in Britain and Italy, the main preoccupation 
of this study is to analyse the social, politico-economic and 
historical factors responsible for creating a general interest 
in corporate social action and shaping the dominant expressions 
of corporate philanthropy within these societies. In addition, 
questions about the consequences of corporate social involvement 
for wider society will also be considered. In view of this, the 
aim in constructing a research strategy for the present study has 
been to adopt a hybrid methodology, utilising a combination of 
primary sources, based around detailed research of the social 
interventions organised by companies, and secondary material. 
In terms of gathering empirical material, we have attempted 
to carry out detailed examinations of the social and 
philanthropic activities garnered from a relatively small number 
of corporations, with extensive social and philanthropic 
commitments. This was mainly achieved by conducting in-depth 
interviews with a number of relevant personnel from each of the 
institutions chosen for the research (see Appendix for further 
details). Moreover, company literature relating to the field 
corporate philanthropy was examined (see bibliography of company 
documents). As we have noted above, the advantage of such 
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qualitative analysis over survey methods is that it furnishes 
detailed information about corporate social involvement, and it 
is better able to deal with some of the complex issues covered 
in the study. 
The actual number of firms involved in the study was 
different for the British and Italian phases of the research. In 
order to furnish the qualitative evidence required for carrying 
out detailed case studies of company practices, much of the 
primary material for the British part of the research was based 
on four major British corporations: BAT Industries, British 
Telecommunications (hereafter, BT) , Shell UK (hereafter, Shell). 
and Unilever (see Appendix for a brief profile and an outline of 
the commercial activities of each company). The four 
organisations that agreed to participate in the research were all 
major British corporations, each involved in distinct commercial 
activities - but mainly confined in the service and commodity 
industries - and which, since the early 1980s, had cultivated an 
active concern with the issue of corporate responsibility. During 
this period, all four corporations institutionalised their 
philanthropic initiatives, allowing them to expand their social 
interventions. Symptomatic of this was the way that these 
companies formalised social and charity policies. For each 
institution, several managers and company personnel responsible 
for administering community affairs and social action programmes 
were contacted and interviewed. 
In the Italian phase of the research, a similar methodology 
was employed. However, the main difference was that the actual 
number of commercial organisations used for the research was 
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larger - around twenty-four - in order to compensate for the 
dearth of company publications, official information and 
secondary research on corporate social involvement. In addition, 
a number of non-business organisations relevant to the area under 
study were contacted. Overall, this enabled us to produce a 
general picture about the nature and incidence of corporate 
social involvement from primary evidence. Greater emphasis, 
though, was placed during the course of the research on the 
larger companies, such as Fiat, Olivetti, ENI and SIP. 
In the main, the companies represented in the study are 
among some of the largest enterprises in Europe, with interests 
in a wide variety of areas, numerous operating concerns under 
their control and profits in the billions. This reflects the 
general development of corporate philanthropy in modern society. 
Research shows that larger firms are more likely than smaller 
f irms to be actively involved in philanthropic and social action 
(Useem, 1987, p. 341). The findings regarding size reflect the 
fact that corporations have the financial wherewithal at their 
disposal to expend resources on communitarian and social 
initiatives, unrelated to commercial activities (Aldag and 
Bartol, 1978, p. 173). Furthermore, most of the companies 
included in the research, although spanning a wide variety of 
sectors, are broadly confined to the commodity or service 
industries rather than primary industries. Fry et al (1982) note 
that the service sector is more likely to adopt social and 
charity giving programmes because it has a higher level of 
contact with the wider public than primary industries. 
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Thus,, from previous research (see Aldag and Bartol, 1978; 
Useem, 1987), the companies that have been selected for the 
present study seem representative of the type of businesses which 
normally become embroiled in philanthropic and social action. But 
it could be argued that our reliance on detailed studies of a 
relatively small number of organisations, while offering in-depth 
and accurate information, does not provide a sound basis for 
making wider assertions or generalising on a broader range of 
cases. A number of strategies, though, can be used in order to 
make general assertions from the research material and to check 
the typicality of these detailed case studies (Hammersley, 1992). 
In the present study, we have used a hybrid methodology, whereby 
the empirical evidence is supplemented by a variety of other 
sources - historical studies, statistical information, and 
research completed on similar areas. This has enabled us both to 
substantiate our findings and, more importantly, link our study 
to social, historical and political developments. We also 
conducted secondary interviews where possible with 
representatives of non-profit making organisations that had 
participated alongside companies - especially those included in 
the research - on social projects or had been the beneficiaries 
of corporate support. This allowed us to gain alternative 
viewpoints, and to look behind the information provided by 
official reports, as a way of assessing the contributions of 
businesses to social schemes. 
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PART IA HISTORY OF CORPORATE 
PHILANTHROPY IN BRITAIN 
2 The Early Foundations of Commercial Philanthropy 
What follows is not purported to be a definitive or final 
authoritative history of business philanthropy and social 
involvement in Britain, for histories are themselves 
reconstructions (Tudor, 1989). This does not mean that any 
attempt to write a history of the said phenomenon would 
inevitably be rendered too partial to have any analytical 
utility. Within the obvious limitations afforded by historical 
sources - both primary and secondary - we can nevertheless begin 
to examine the conditions and ideas that have guided business 
philanthropy throughout the ages. Certainly, such a history is 
necessary; much of the literature on corporate social 
responsibility has characteristically lacked historical insight, 
apart f rom a scattering of texts that have traced the development 
and expansion of business philanthropy in the United States 
(Walton, 1967, ch. 2; Handel, 1982, ch. 4; McCarthy, 1982; 
Bremmer, 1988, ch. 8; Dobkin Hall,, 1989; Mitchell, 1989; see 
Cannon, 1992, ch. 2 for a British perspective). 
Historical scrutiny of this sort can provide the basis for 
comparing the incidence and relative extent of corporate social 
involvement at distinct temporal junctures, and, by implication, 
in different social settings. Our historical analysis in this 
chapter focuses on the early origins of business philanthropy, 
starting with the guilds of the Middle Ages through to the 
philanthropists of late Victorian Britain, and ending in the 
post-Second World War period. Following the civic interventions 
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of the merchant and trade guilds of the Middle Ages, business 
philanthropy during the Tudor and Elizabethan period centred 
around the endeavours of individual company owners , many of them 
inspired by religious doctrines; these religious influences, 
though, were by no means universal and were subject to 
modification over time. Indeed, after the seventeenth century, 
the rise of religious humanitarianism exercised significant 
influence over philanthropic activities of business owners. The 
point about this examination is that commercial philanthropy in 
this period was driven by a combination of social, economic and 
ideological factors, which came to be encompassed in the 
responses of company owners to developments in wider society. 
Business leaders were prominent contributors to the private 
system of welfare, predominantly viewed - especially in the 
Victorian period - as the most efficient and politically 
acceptable way to tackle poverty. After the Industrial 
Revolution,, reformers, including some notable industrialists, 
began campaigning for a statutory system of welfare provision as 
poverty and deprivation seemed to escalate. It was not until the 
twentieth century, however, that the public provision of welfare 
services became available on a more comprehensive basis. Hence, 
in the closing sections of this chapter, we explore how the 
development of public services helped to redefine the social role 
of industrialists. 
The guild system of the Middle Ages 
Possibly the earliest historical recollection of commercial 
organisations contributing to the well-being of society can be 
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traced to the guild system of the Middle Ages. As a trade 
regulating body, the guild was not unique to medieval Europe; 
similar organisations existed in ancient Rome and Greece and the 
continent of Asia. In medieval Europe, though, the guild system 
was ubiquitous, and the dominant institutional means for 
regulating trade. 
The foremost organ of this system was the guild merchant. 
As a central association of town merchants, including artisans 
who sold their products directly, the guild merchant was granted 
monopoly powers over trading activities. This organisation 
appeared soon after the Norman conquests and spread rapidly 
thereafter throughout England. The earliest known guild reference 
in a town charter is that of Burford (1087-1107). By the twelfth 
century, around 100 towns in England and 70 in Ireland and Wales 
contained a guild merchant (Lipson, 1937). Originally the town 
burghers organised themselves into guild merchant associations, 
but membership was opened up to traders, even to those hailing 
from neighbouring towns. In terms of its function, the guild 
organisation was distinct from the municipal body,, which was 
responsible for governing the town, raising taxes, and devising 
legal regulations. The guild merchant, by contrast, under the 
auspices of municipal officers, presided over commercial 
activities within medieval town communities. To this end, it 
would systematise markets, fix prices and wages,, arrange communal 
purchases, impose regulations over its members, collect tolls and 
discipline any violations of its regulations. 
In addition to their commercial responsibilities, guild 
merchants carried out a number of social functions: they 
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organised relief for the poor, funerals, prison visits and care 
for the sick; members of the merchant guild also benefited from 
mutual assistance during times of adversity. In an age where the 
Christian religion constituted an integral part of social life, 
guildsmen did not separate their commercial responsibilities from 
their religious and moral obligations towards safeguarding the 
well-being of the local community. If anything, the craft guilds, 
originally integrated within the merchant guild until they 
steered an independent course af ter the expansion of trade in the 
in the twelfth century, showed an even greater commitment to 
charitable and religious activity. Many craft guilds began as 
religious fraternities, becoming involved in commerce only at a 
later date (Clune, 1943). Once partaking in trade, the craft 
guilds acted as Christian inspired mutual aid associations: they 
protected wages and secured reasonable prices for commodities and 
materials. Apart from guaranteeing mutual assistance for members, 
the craft guilds handed out doles to local inhabitants, with a 
variety of causes being adopted by the guilds. In some instances, 
members were obliged to make weekly contributions for the relief 
of the poor. Other craft associations obtained funds through ad 
hoc tax measures. At Winchester, an officer was employed by the 
guild of St. John to collect two handfuls of corn from every 
market trader as a way of funding care facilities for the poor 
(Clune,, 1943f pp. 74-5). The craft guilds also founded 
almshouses, schools and hospitals through bequests made by their 
members. 
As part of their religious commitments and obligations to 
the community, the merchant and craft guilds subjected their 
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commercial and economic activities to rigorous moral scrutiny. 
Tawney describes how the subjective moral guidance of the guilds 
contrasts with the commercial strategies of modern enterprises: 
'An age in which combinations are not tempted to pay lip-service 
to religion may do well to remember that the characteristic, 
after all, of the medieval gild [sic] was that, if it sprang from 
economic needs, it claimed, at least,, to subordinate them to 
social interests, as conceived by men for whom the social and the 
spiritual were inextricably intertwined' (1984, p. 40). The 
guilds, in bringing ethical standards to trade activities and to 
protect the public from dishonest merchants, introduced 
regulations to determine a just price for goods being sold by 
guild members. Although unrestrained free trade was regarded at 
variance with the interests of the community, competition was not 
suffocated by regulations or the monopoly position of guilds 
within local town economies (Clune, 1943). In several instances, 
traders outside the guild fraternity were given access to markets 
on major trade days. Moreover,, if the guilds abused their 
monopoly privileges, the municipal authorities would import 
products, especially staple products like food, from other 
localities. 
Still, the strict regulations over trade provided a 
necessary bulwark against some of the commercial infidelities of 
the day, such as artificially inflating prices by manipulating 
the market. As a way of preventing excessive price increases, the 
merchant and craft guilds organised communal purchases of 
commodities to be sold of f at f ixed rates. In certain districts, 
the guild office held the exclusive right to deal in particular 
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commodities, and any profits subsequently made found their way 
into the communal purse. of importance in this regulatory armoury 
was the payment of a toll by external traders. Indigenous town 
guildsmen had to scrutinise carefully the actual payment of 
tolls; it was a punishable offence -a fine or even expulsion - 
for guildsmen to establish commercial relations with toll evaders 
(Clune, 1943). However, the monopoly and regulatory powers of the 
guilds, which were used to scrutinise trade and commerce 
according to moral criteria, were not inviolable. By the 1300s, 
the regulatory control enjoyed by the guilds over trade was 
beginning to diminish, a factor that led to the eventual 
dissolution of the guild system (Ashley, 1894). 
In contemplating the dissolution of the monopoly and 
regulatory power of the guilds, commentators have attributed this 
to the expansion of parochial town economies after the twelfth 
century. The conclusion reached is that the protective barriers 
of town economies and the internal self-sufficiency of the guild 
system proved incompatible with the first stirrings of the modern 
economy, which required open markets, and access to capital. 
There is some justification for making this argument: the 
pressures building up against the guild system began to gain 
impetus between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries -a period 
that coincided with a liberalised and expanded trade market. This 
expansion of trade struck at the heart of the intricate system 
of regulations presided over by the guilds. Thus, some towns 
passed special charters so that external traders could avoid toll 
payments and other restrictions. The regulatory and 
administrative authority of the guilds was further undermined by 
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the signing of trade agreements with foreign powers, the most 
prominent being the statute of Edward III in 1335,, allowing 
foreign merchants to trade without restriction in England 
(Ashley, 1894, pp. 83-4). All these developments contributed to 
the breakdown of local economic regulations - the very raison 
d-'etre and source of authority for the guilds. 
On a temporal scale,, however, it would be a misplaced 
assumption to suggest that the decline of the guilds coincided 
directly with economic growth. To begin with, the guild system 
from the time it was first instituted had been subject to market 
pressures. Indeed, even with economic and political pressures 
bearing down on the guild system from as early as the 1300s, it 
still maintained a pre-eminent role within the public arena up 
to the seventeenth century, as the authorities relied on guilds 
as sources of emergency taxation (Hickson and Thompson, 1991). 
Moreover,, the livery companies of the City of London, which 
originated from the medieval guilds, continued to operate after 
the seventeenth century, mainly as charitable bodies (Ditchf ield, 
1904) . 
Undoubtedly, the penetration of local town economies by non- 
guild and foreign traders eroded the administrative and economic 
powers of guild organisations. But such economic explanations 
tend to neglect the importance of political developments: it was 
the wider transfer of economic power from the guild masters and 
journeymen to the new class of merchant entrepreneurs, through 
the assistance of economic growth after the seventeenth century, 
which resulted in guild regulations and monopoly powers being 
actively dismantled by local authorities. Roll (1992) notes how 
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joint-stock colonial companies deposed the original, guild 
operated, export merchant companies. Moreover, the specialised 
craft guilds, established in new urban locations (Cunningham, 
1922),, were eventually usurped by embryonic commercial 
enterprises controlled by wholesale merchants and semi-industrial 
capitalists. By attaining a secure foothold in the economy, this 
new socio-economic grouping was ideally placed to chip away at 
the regulatory powers of guild monopolies. A particular set of 
regulations that became the locus of entrepreneurial concern were 
those that existed to protect wage labourers , such as fixed wages 
and the prohibiting of Sunday and night work. The first volume 
of Karl Marx's (1976) magnum opus, Capital, catalogues in detail 
how industrial owners embarked on the task of stripping away 
these protective regulations in order to intensify the 
manufacturing process to maximise commercial returns. 
With the break up of the guild system, the dominant model 
of business philanthropy in the Middle Ages, characterised by the 
collective intervention of traders and merchants on behalf of 
their localities, was gradually transformed. The wealth generated 
by merchant activity,, at the expense of guild restrictions, 
created a class of independent traders who could adopt 
philanthropic causes on their own terms; in this respect, 
commercial philanthropy was transformed into a more 
individualised activity than it was under the guild system. 
Andrews comments with regard to this point: 'Wealthy individuals, 
too, were beginning to make their own gifts, for purposes of 
their own devising. As the individual became philanthropist, 
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giving took on individuality - sometimes constructive, sometimes 
merely amusing' (1950, p. 37). 
The merchant class and the relief of poverty 
Merchants played a vital part in the economic and social affairs 
of pre-industrial society. They used the newly created wealth at 
their disposal for alms and other forms of poverty relief. These 
contributions, far from being marginal, carried some weight in 
a society experiencing increased vagrancy and deprivation. 
One of the main causes of mendicancy in this period was the 
commercialisation of agricultural production in the pre- 
capitalist epoch of the sixteenth century (Tawney, 1967). Under 
the monarchal system of medieval society, the lord would allow 
farmers to use his land as a way of building paternal ties with 
tenants (Birnie,, 1955, p. 72). By contrast, much of the land 
freed after the confiscation of church property during the 
Reformation was purchased by city merchants as a commercial 
investment. The rules of lucre that came to govern agriculture 
transformed the whole milieu of rural communities: the 
substitution of arable farming for the more profitable, but the 
less labour intensive activity of sheep grazing, together with 
general increases in farm rents, resulted in wholesale evictions 
of tenants from their land (Birnie, 1955). The only option for 
unemployed agricultural workers was to obtain employment in town 
areas; but the fledgling cotton industry of the town economies 
did not have the capacity systematically to absorb rural migrants 
into the workforce (Ashley, 1914). 
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The emasculation of church property during the Reformation 
had put pay to any ecclesiastical-led movement against the social 
vagaries of the sixteenth century. Indeed, throughout the 
medieval period, church institutions, especially the monasteries, 
failed to utilise the resources at their disposal for the relief 
of poverty (Hartridge, 1930). Even though a number of poor laws 
were passed during the Elizabethan era (1561-1600), government 
measures against deprivation proved generally insufficient and 
sparingly enforced (Eden, 1928). The impotence of both church and 
government allowed private charity to become the dominant 
institutional vehicle for providing welfare services and social 
security measures (Hartridge, 1930, p. 156). If the main 
contributors to private charity are broken down in terms of 
occupational status, the members of the emerging merchant class 
were among the foremost benefactors. 
This assessment can made with a degree of confidence because 
of the findings from Jordan's (1964) historical survey of 
charitable involvement by social classes during the pre- 
industrial period. While not constituting a universal analysis 
of the subject, Jordan's survey of charitable giving from 1480 
to 1660 is highly comprehensive. Jordan examines the extent of 
charitable giving - defined as donations made to non-profit 
organs involved in some area of social welfare - across ten of 
the major English counties at the time - Bristol, London, 
Yorkshire, Lancashire, Hampshire, Kent, Norfolk, Somerset, 
Worcestershire and Buckinghamshire. Using historical records 
originating from these ten counties, Jordan generated a sample 
of 34,963 donors, which collectively gave a total of E3,102,696 
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between 1480 and 1660,, with 82-'. 'D of this total generated by 
endowments. As part of the historical archives that were 
consulted, Jordan analysed the wills left by donors, which gave 
an indication of charitable giving across the main social groups 
- yeomen, merchants.. professionals, clergy - in this period 
(Jordan, 1964, ch. 2). Although the urban merchants constituted 
a small socio-economic group, the stature of this class was 
evident by the f act that it assumed much of the charitable burden 
in this period. The figures obtained by Jordan are self- 
explanatory. Included in the survey are 369 merchant donors whose 
estates can be accurately valued, and are located in the ten 
counties referred to earlier. This group gave away 17.25% of its 
wealth to charitable causes, compared to the next highest of 
7.12% given by the upper gentry. The merchants might have 
constituted one-tenth of all sample donors, but its donations 
constituted around 43% of the total endowed by all the groups in 
Jordan's archival survey (Jordan, 1964, p. 349). 
If we analyse the final destination of these donations, an 
influential pattern emerges. Jordan estimates that 40% of 
merchant charitable giving from the sample was used to furnish 
the needs of the poor; but in contrast to previous ages, the 
merchants distanced themselves from direct almsgiving and 
deliberated over the benefactions that they made. Most of their 
charitable donations came in the form of large capital 
aggregates. These sums were carefully distributed to furnish 
permanent welfare facilities for the most vulnerable groups in 
society and towards facilities, such as hospitals, for 
rehabilitating the poor. As a result of the methods adopted by 
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merchant traders, important advances in charitable action were 
instituted by the end of the Elizabethan period, the most 
conspicuous, as we have seen, being the replacement of 
personalised almsgiving with endowments and long-term 
benefactions. 
The commitment of this class to traditional religious causes 
proved less marked, as merchants were more concerned with secular 
issues. The percentage given by the merchants in Jordan's sample 
towards the support of religious activities amounted to 13% of 
the total benefactions furnished by this socio-economic grouping, 
making the merchants the most secular category in the survey 
(Jordan,. 1964,, p. 387). By contrast, the conservative husbandmen 
dedicated 44% of their benefactions for ecclesiastical purposes. 
This distancing from the mainstream church is reinforced by 
Jordan's observation that one of the religious causes favoured 
by merchants was the funding of Puritan lectureships - as a 
sectarian religious group, the Puritans distrusted the 
ecclesiastical authorities of the realm. 
If Weber's Protestant Ethic thesis is anything to go by, the 
active support of Puritan religious activities by merchants 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries comes as no 
surprise, for this strand of the Protestant faith sanctioned both 
wealth creation and charitable action. The argument put forward 
by Weber is that Protestant doctrines, notably the concept of the 
calling (1985, ch. 3) and the Calvinist teaching of 
predestination (1985,, ch. 4), exalted a diligent approach to 
work, which, in turn, facilitated the creation of wealth. As a 
result, the members of the emerging merchant class were likely 
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to adhere to these credos, which largely supported and provided 
some justificatory logic for their lifestyle. But while the 
Protestant f aith gave its merchant adherents af reedom to pursue 
material gain, it condemned the pursuit of wealth for its own 
sake and the enjoyment of possessions through luxurious living. 
Puritan religious ideals generated a conflict within the 
individual believer: it was perfectly legitimate to endeavour for 
material prosperity, but wealth was perceived to be a temptation 
(Weber,, 1985, p. 172). Authors have pointed out that charitable 
activities provided a solution to this moral conundrum, as they 
demonstrated an individualfs righteous stewardship over wealth 
(Handel, 1982). Indeed, during the seventeenth century, a 
considerable welter of literature was produced, valorising the 
ideals of charity and benevolence (Jordan, 1961, pp. 406-7). In 
addition, as a relatively new socio-economic configuration at the 
time, merchants were uncertain of their status, and they relied 
upon charitable activities to improve their social position. This 
can partly explain the significant charitable contribution made 
by this socio-economic group, outstripping, as Jordan 
demonstrated, the benefactions of other social classes. 
During the latter part of the seventeenth century, certain 
doctrinaire strains of the Protestant faith, such as Puritanism 
which provided merchants with a persuasive rationale for 
philanthropic action, began to wane as a religious force. 
However, business involvement in society and philanthropic action 
generally continued to flourish beyond this date, partly because 
private charity had expanded considerably. But another reason for 
this was the growing influence of humanitarianism through all 
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sections of society, but especially the higher, wealthier, 
reaches of the occupational ladder. Humanitarianism, though 
inspired by religious convictions, assumed largely secular 
preoccupations: it encouraged individuals to empathise with 
suffering and poverty. This inspired merchants to intervene on 
behalf of the less fortunate, hence, in order to understand and 
elucidate the social context encompassing philanthropic 
activities in the years leading to the Industrial Revolution, it 
will be necessary to trace the origins of humanitarian thought. 
The humanitarian impulse and business philanthropy 
The declining influence of Puritanism and its replacement during 
the eighteenth century with humanitarian religious ideals had a 
profound affect on those with charitable aspirations in society, 
including merchant and trading classes. While humanitarian 
thought is viewed as diametrically opposed to the doctrinaire 
teachings of Calvinism, its origins can be traced within and not 
without the Protestant movement. In Weber's thesis, Protestantism 
declines as a result of the forces of secularization and 
rationalisation after the eighteenth century. But historical 
evidence suggests that Weber failed to negotiate the development 
of Puritan thought after the seventeenth century (Campbell, 
1987) . By carrying out this very examination, Campbell finds that 
a reaction within the Calvin-inspired Puritan movement against 
some of the its strict doctrinaire excesses - predestination 
especially - and its logical consequences, largely undermined 
Puritanism as a force in society. 
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The first major break with Calvinism took place in the 
Puritan communities of Holland during the 1850s. In contrast to 
what had gone before, Arminianism, as this revolt against 
Calvinism was known, advocated the notion of free will rather 
than predestination as the basis of salvation. The influence of 
this new doctrine went beyond Holland: by the mid-seventeenth 
century Arminian-inspired philosophy was widespread in England. 
Thus,, in 1660, with the accession of Charles II to the throne - 
the Restoration - and the Arminian-influenced Anglo-Catholic 
, 'Laudian' Party gaining power, Puritanism was clearly in decline. 
Further opposition against Calvinism came from the liberal 
scholars of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, known as the Cambridge 
Platonists. The Platonists, as indicated by their nomenclature, 
drew upon philosophical writings to construct an alternative 
theological doctrine to Calvinism. While they originated from a 
Puritan background and retained some of its moral earnestness, 
they rejected predestination, the idea of divine foreordination 
in salvation -a doctrine that stood at the very heart of 
Calvinist doctrine (Cragg, 1968). Instead,, these influential 
scholars stressed the goodwill, love and grace of God. But what 
gave the Platonist theology popular credence, especially among 
the clergy, was its critique of the empiricist tradition, 
represented by the likes of Thomas Hobbes. The ensuing doctrinal 
fracas between these philosophical camps led to an increasing 
emphasis by religious spokesmen on ideas of morality and the 
inherent goodness of man against Hobbes's view of the egoistic 
individual driven by self-interest (Campbell,, 1987). As Owen 
acknowledges . charitable ef f ort in general took its cue f rom this 
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ambiguous, yet, at the same time, popular ethic of Christian 
sentimentalism rather than the uncompromising theology of 
Puritanism: 
Modern humanitarianism took its rise in the course of 
the century [seventeenth century], and the benevolence 
and sensibility associated with it, though sometimes 
no more than emotions which it was fashionable to 
display, had a good deal to do with forming the social 
temper of the time ... Yet it is impossible to miss the 
compassion with which certain members of the middle 
and upper classes could view the misfortunes of the 
lower or to suspect the disinterestedness of their 
efforts to mitigate them. (1964, p. 14) 
This new humanitarian sensibility was largely responsible 
for the most conspicuous achievements in philanthropy after the 
Restoration. A quintessential example of where humanitarian 
ideals inspired progress in charitable action was the hospital 
movement. Unlike the medical institutions of the Middle Ages, 
which functioned essentially as almshouses, eighteenth century 
medical institutions catered for the sick and physically 
incapacitated. The clientele of these new hospitals consisted 
mainly of the burgeoning number of sick-poor located 
predominantly in urban centres, where rapid population growth, 
coupled with poor sanitation, resulted in the spread of epidemics 
and disease. Many of those who responded to the plight of the 
sick-poor by establishing specialist inf irmaries were religious- 
inspired humanitarians. In fact, humanitarian clerics, such as 
Reverend Dr. Alured Clarke of Winchester and the Reverend Philip 
Doddridge of Northampton, were responsible for initiating the 
building of new hospitals in their respective localities. In 
London, the five general hospitals established during the 1719- 
1746 period allied humanitarian action to new methods of 
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charitable fund-raising, such as charitable societies and 
subscription lists. 
The prevailing orthodoxy in religious thinking and 
charitable action found some faithful adherents within the 
business community, which by this point was based around merchant 
activity and small semi-industrial units mainly engaged in 
textile production. Humanitarianism was undoubtedly a factor in 
the philanthropic activities of the entrepreneur, Thomas Firmin. 
Although born into a strict Puritan family background, Firmin was 
a typical seventeenth century philanthropist: throughout his 
lif e,, pietistic and moral values produced an ingrained 
sensitivity to human distress that demanded some sort of 
restorative action. Well into his career, as the owner of a 
successful mercer company in London, Firmin abandoned his strict 
Calvinistic upbringing and opted instead for liberal religious 
beliefs. His involvement in philanthropy began when he provided 
raw materials to London's working poor, after a plague in 1665 
left many of them without a livelihood. By the 1670s, Firmin had 
progressed to running a job creation scheme. Here, poorer members 
of the community were employed as spinners, thereby creating 
between 1,600 to 1,700 jobs. 
Humanitarian industrialists 
Humanitarianism continued to exercise a dominant influence over 
the social activities of proprietors during the years leading to 
and following industrial isation. More: certain entrepreneurs that 
aspired to humanitarian religious ideals, especially Quakerism, 
were responsible for some of the most extensive and generous 
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demonstrations of philanthropy during this turbulent period of 
British history. 
Throughout this period of transition, it was in the urban 
centres , where industry was concentrated, that the disruption to 
the fabric of society was felt most keenly. Even up to the mid- 
eighteenth century, the schisms generated by economic expansion 
were confined to a few city districts like London and Bristol 
(Owen, 1964). The industrial age, as it was launched in the early 
nineteenth century, gave unrestrained momentum to the process of 
urbanisation. To begin with, many population centres experienced 
rapid growth, as sweeping labour migration from rural to urban 
districts progressed unremittingly. The population of greater 
London increased from just over 1 million in 1801 to over 5.5 
million in 1891. Equally dramatic was Manchester: a population 
of 53,000 in 1801 increased to 505,000 by 1891; and Birmingham's 
population in the same period grew from 71,, 000 to 478,000 
(Mitchell, 1988). The first report by the Registrar-General in 
1839 provided statistical information on the life-chances of the 
new urban working class. The report estimated that in the rural 
districts of Yorkshire, Durham and Cumberland, 204 out of a 
thousand inhabitants reached the age of 70, whereas in urban 
centres like London, the figure stood at 104 individuals per 
thousand reaching the age of 70; in Manchester it was 63, and in 
Birmingham the figure stood at 81 (Owen, 1964, p. 135). These 
impersonal statistical estimates have been accompanied by 
literary portrayals of industrial cities. Engels"s (1969) classic 
account of Manchester, 's labour force, The Condition of the 
Working Class in England, is a case in point. The book was 
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written by Engels as a result of working at his father's factory 
in Manchester. There he garnered an intimate knowledge of 
industrialisation and its effect on the lives of workers, which 
included vulnerable categories such as pregnant women, children 
and the elderly, who were compelled to work under harsh 
conditions (Engels, 1969, p. 189). 
The policy-makers and authorities of early Victorian 
Britain, despite the spectre of heightened poverty and 
deteriorating living conditions, continued to rely upon private 
charity as a form of poverty relief. Government intervention of 
any sort was treated with suspicion. The legislative measures 
that were made available proved on the whole unsatisfactory. For 
example, the Poor Law of 1834 placed resources in the 
agricultural south, where poverty was prevalent throughout the 
fifteen and sixteen hundreds, rather than in the urban regions 
where mendicancy and pauperism was becoming more prevalent during 
the early part of the nineteenth century. Overall, the authors 
of the Poor Law gave only limited statutory protection and 
insurance to the poor, as the law was driven more by the 
objective of abolishing outdoor relief for the able bodied than 
by dealing with the true causes of poverty (Prochaska, 1988). 
Even respectable charitable organs, such as the Charity 
Organisation Society, considered private charity as better 
equipped to discern between genuine poverty and cases of 
indigence resulting from moral malaise. The prevailing 
orthodoxies surrounding poverty relief were by no means shared 
by all charitable authorities: the Royal Commission, reporting 
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on the Poor Law of 1834, was not only indifferent to the law, but 
also critical of the selective methods of charity in operation. 
Despite the conclusions reached by the Royal Commission,, the 
government and wider public authorities throughout the eighteenth 
century and the Victorian period played only a limited role in 
the relief of poverty. The reluctance of central government to 
expend financial resources on poverty relief and the relative 
inability of local government to intervene on behalf of the poor 
helped stimulate private philanthropy (Prochaska, 1988, p. 35). 
Subsequently, a proliferation of charitable activity, whose 
temper was shaped by the repercussions of growing urban 
indigence, took place throughout the nineteenth century. 
Charitable initiatives assumed various imaginative forms 
(district nursing, orphanages, houses for the homeless, 
industrial schools) and covered a spectrum of social problems - 
child poverty, delinquency, illiteracy and unemployment. Such was 
the surge in philanthropy that the memoirist, Charles Greville, 
observed: 'We are just now overrun with philanthropy, and God 
knows where it will stop, or whither it will lead us' (quote in 
Prochaska, 1988, p. 21). 
Amidst this expansion of charitable activity, entrepreneurs 
built significant philanthropic reputations to rival their 
commercial achievements. As a result of Britain's early 
industrialisation, a number of business owners managed to amass 
considerable fortunes. Britain enjoyed several advantages - 
including the availability of investment capital, low transport 
costs, developing technical skills - that facilitated this early 
industrialisation of its economy; the Industrial Revolution in 
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Britain was a triumph of individuals striving for prof it and new 
innovations. Subsequently, such effort resulted in rapid growth 
both for firms and the economy as a whole between the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Supple, 1973). 
The characteristic features of industrialisation - the 
centrality of individual entrepreneurial action - and the wealth 
generated by this process provided civically-minded business 
owners with the necessary wherewithal to fund magnanimous acts 
of charity. But these economic conditions also combined with 
ideological factors: humanitarian religious ideals that were 
popularised by the reaction against Puritanism had a profound 
bearing on philanthropists throughout the nineteenth century. 
These ideals were readily expressed by the new denominations that 
emerged from the Christian evangelical revival from the late 
eighteenth century, many of them viewing charitable involvement 
as a profound expression of faith. 
Among the complex changes sweeping Britain in these 
years none was more important in its effects on 
philanthropy than religious revival. Christians of all 
denominations espoused charitable ideals... Some 
denominations were more active in philanthropic causes 
than others, and most had particular charitable 
interests growing out of doctrinal interpretation and 
social circumstances. (Prochaska, 1988, p. 21) 
The revival of Christian worship, together with its effect on 
charity, was not lost on the emerging business community. The 
Quaker denomination, for instance, throughout the eighteen and 
nineteen hundreds, contained within its congregations some of the 
most celebrated industrial philanthropists of the age. This was 
not a coincidence, as the social status of the Quaker sect, 
together with its unique beliefs, encouraged an ardent commitment 
among its members to the wider social good. 
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The founder of this idiosyncratic, Nonconformist, Christian 
denomination was the shoemaker George Fox, who hailed from a 
Puritan background. At twenty-three he began a concerted 
preaching campaign, and was able to gather around him a loyal 
band of followers. By 1650, the Society of Friends, scornfully 
known as the Quakers, was officially established under Fox, 's 
leadership. Although the Quakers adopted the Puritan traits of 
simplistic living and frugality, their beliefs strayed towards 
the humanitarian end of the doctrinal spectrum. In contrast to 
the Puritan suspicion of human discretion and free will in 
attaining salvation, the Quakers stressed that believers could 
actively seek a relationship with God. Wagner notes: 'The central 
doctrine of the new movement was the belief that in every man 
there was the seed of God and that knowledge of God came through 
direct communication with his spirit,, (1987,, p. 38). These 
doctrinal commitments, which saw them refusing to pay tithes, and 
their seemingly strange form of contemplative worship,, turned the 
Quakers into pariahs, both within the religious community and in 
wider society. Consequently, Quakers found themselves excluded 
from attending English universities and pursuing many 
distinguished professions. The only viable livelihood left for 
Quakers was the world of commerce. The involvement of Quakers in 
business passed through distinct phases. During the early years 
of the movement, from 1650 to 1700, there was a widespread 
interest among Quakers in small-scale trading; in fact most of 
the early Friends were drawn from the artisan workshops and 
yeoman farms. By the end of the seventeenth century, Quaker 
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entrepreneurs headed the first technical and mechanical 
businesses (Wagner, 1987). 
In all their business activities, the Quakers regarded 
wealth for its own sake a sin. As a result, they subjected their 
own commercial activities to rigorous moral scrutiny, partly to 
def lect the many false accusations levelled by their detractors. 
Moreover, business activities were viewed as a form of service 
to the community where individual participants could earn a 
frugal living (Raistrick, 1993). Apart from running a business 
equitably and treating their customers fairly, Quaker businessmen 
were actively involved in the community through acts of charity 
and benevolence. 
The Quaker businessman, Richard Reynolds, is reputed to have 
been one of the first individuals to finance his philanthropic 
activities through the ownership of a heavy industrial company. 
From his background as the son of an iron merchant, Reynolds 
became a partner in an iron works near the Severn Valley, where 
revolutionary advances in iron production had been achieved. Much 
of his career was spent managing a furnace at Ketley, but, after 
the 1760s, the parent establishment at Coalbrookdale came under 
his auspices. Although heavy industry was potentially harmful, 
Raistrick (1993) maintains that Reynolds presided over an 
enlightened company which dealt fairly with customers and 
workers. Regarding his benefactions, Reynolds did not defer his 
philanthropic career until retirement in 1789; as an impassioned 
Quaker, charitable action preoccupied Reynolds throughout his 
life. The objects of these benefactions included schools located 
near the work furnaces, and eventually in other parts of the 
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country. on his relocation to Bristol in 1804, he became 
virtually a full-time philanthropist. In this new vocation,, 
orphan asylums and almshouses benefited from his donations. 
Outside Bristol, Reynolds granted support to various metropolitan 
charities. One estimate has it that Reynolds was regularly 
distributing an average of E8,, 000 per annum -a substantial 
amount by early nineteenth century price indexes. Many commercial 
philanthropists, particularly those from the Quaker denomination, 
followed Reynolds's example throughout the nineteenth century. 
By the Victorian period, the Quakers had given up their 
missionary zeal, becoming more introverted in the process. At the 
same time, they kept many of their traditions and beliefs, 
including the strict obligation to marry within the denomination. 
This isolated several Quakers, resulting in dramatic falls in 
membership. Despite the increased marginalisation and withdrawal 
of the Friends from society, they continued to exert economic and 
political influence through successful and enlightened Quaker 
business owners, such as George Cadbury, and Joseph Rowntree. One 
of the most important Quaker firms was the York-based grocery 
business under brothers Joseph and John Stevenson Rowntree. The 
Rowntrees were committed Quakers, but they questioned those 
doctrines responsible for isolating numerous members within the 
Quaker community. John Rowntree campaigned for a more liberal 
theology that would allow Quakers to marry outside the 
denomination. Equally important was his contention that the 
Quaker church had become introverted at the expense of helping 
the poor in society. The Rowntrees acted upon these liberal 
beliefs within their business: in the workplace, the Rowntrees, 
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with Joseph at the helm, implemented an enlightened programme of 
industrial welfare. This included the company relocating from the 
city centre to a greenfield site on the outskirts of York; the 
company introduced one of the first employee pension schemes; and 
it built the New Earswick community to house employees. Indeed, 
throughout the century several enlightened employers, who by no 
means constituted the majority of industrialists and business 
owners, had introduced welfare facilities within their factories 
(Niven, 1978; Joyce, 1982). Some had shown a sense of moral 
obligation towards the living conditions of employees and had 
constructed dwellings near factory premises (Meakin, 1905). One 
of the first employers to establish staff residences was Robert 
Owen, the founding father of the cooperative movement, in New 
Lanark during the early nineteenth century (Lawrence, 1988). 
Owen"s example was subsequently followed later in the century by 
William Lever at Port Sunlight (Jeremy, 1991),, Titus Salt at 
Saltaire, George Cadbury's Bournville Village (Williams, 1931), 
and of course the Rowntree housing complex of New Earswick in 
York. 
Quaker firms, such as Rowntrees, also looked to exercise 
their religious and humanitarian beliefs beyond the confines of 
the factory. Joseph Rowntree, the founder of the company, 
unwittingly built a reputation around his topical campaign for 
the amelioration of poverty. Initially, he went about this by 
collecting statistics about the incidence of poverty in his 
native York, but this soon evolved into a personal campaign for 
concerted state intervention in tackling deprivation. Mentally 
armed with these radical tendencies, Rowntree became dissatisfied 
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with what he termed the 'charity of emotion', a reactionary form 
of philanthropy that dealt only with superficial manifestations 
of social deprivation rather than underlying structural causes. 
To remedy this misplaced emphasis, Rowntree established three 
trusts in 1904, each with a distinct aim (Owen, 1964, p. 450). 
The Joseph Rowntree Village Trust was to run the New Earswick 
complex and organise studies of housing conditions; the Joseph 
Rowntree Charitable Trust funded social research, Quaker projects 
and adult education; and finally, the Joseph Rowntree Social 
Service Trust was used to fund social and political campaigns. 
Victorian philanthropy: Nonconformist and Liberal credos 
It would be a mistake to assume from the above that industrial 
philanthropy was the sole preserve of Quakers. Enlightened 
entrepreneurs from this age came from a diverse range of 
Nonconformist Christian backgrounds Baptists, 
Congregationalists and Unitarians. In addition to the influence 
exerted by these humanitarian denominations, business 
philanthropists were prompted to action by political values. The 
dominant political values in the Victorian period - especially 
among the commercial classes - were influenced by Liberalism. 
Free trade, social responsibility and the importance of self- 
improvement in relieving poverty were the central traits of the 
Liberal agenda. 
Victorian Liberalism stood for free trade, self-help, 
minimal government interference and internationalism- 
all values calculated to appeal to industrialists and 
employers. It also stood f or generosity and tolerance, 
for democracy and popular representation and for 
radical social reform, carried out by public 
authorities if necessary but preferably by the 
spontaneous voluntary actions of individuals and 
49 
communities. It stressed the moral responsibilities of 
those with wealth and power towards those without it 
and... it had a strongly redistributionist and 
egalitarian flavour. (Bradley, 1987, p. 5) 
Typifying this nineteenth century tradition of industrial 
philanthropy was Samuel Morley (1809-86), who headed the London 
and Nottingham based hosiery firm J. & R. Morley. The company 
made the transition to factory production relatively early and, 
at its height, J. & R. Morley had seven factories in the Midlands 
employing 7,000 workers. Even though Morley adopted a mechanical 
system of production, he continued to employ a number of old- 
style framework knitters,, in part for altruistic reasons, but 
also to continue producing for the high quality, hand-wrought 
hose market. Owen writes: fIf hosiery supplied the material for 
Samuel Morley's philanthropy, it was Nonconformity that largely 
prescribed the conditions of its expenditure' (1964, p. 403). As 
a committed Nonconformist - firmly placed in the congregational 
and non-denominational evangelical camp - Morley saw philanthropy 
as a lifelong vocation. The Dissenting church and Nonconformist 
reform activities were the main objects of his early 
benefactions. As a philanthropist that liked to be intimately 
involved with his projects, one of his favoured methods was to 
provide struggling churches incentives for raising money by 
agreeing to double the sums they managed to collect through 
donations. Overall, his giving to Nonconformism was consistently 
generous: in the 1664-70 period, he put E15,000 into chapel 
building. He was also known for making spectacular one-off 
donations, such as the E5,000 that he bestowed for the purchase 
of Exeter Hall for the Young Menfs Christian Association (Owen, 
1964, p. 404). However, he did not give indiscriminately to the 
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church: there is one incident, recounted by his biographer, where 
he refused a request for a donation made by his local church to 
improve its premises on the grounds that the poor should take 
precedence (Hodder, 1887, p. 308). 
Later in his career, Morley's philanthropic horizons 
broadened to include secular concerns. The most important cause 
to which he dedicated the last twenty years of his life was as 
a Liberal M. P. for Bristol. His political burdens led him to 
become an active supporter of free trade, the temperance lobby 
and the Financial Reform Association (Owen, 1964, pp. 404-5). 
Morley also supported the universities of Nottingham and 
Aberystwyth, and the Old Vic during its incarnation as a working- 
class recreation centre. Morley approached these secular projects 
with the sort of purposeful attention reserved for his 
benefactions to religious causes. As his biographer observes, 
Morley accorded all these charitable commitments, whether secular 
or religious, with the same importance as his commercial 
activities (Hodder, 1887, p. 310). 
Not all Victorian philanthropists were galvanised into civic 
action by a sense of religious obligation. For some 
industrialists, Gladstonian Liberalism demanding, as it did, that 
the privileged few should act responsibly towards the rest of 
society, was sufficient justification. To this secular category 
belonged a number of illustrious names: Thomas Holloway, who 
traded in medicines, financed the Royal Holloway College; the 
publisher Passmore Edwards was noted for establishing library 
facilities; and Josiah Mason, the manufacturer, championed the 
vulnerable in society. In contrast to Samuel Morley, Mason was 
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resolute about his lack of faith (Bunce, 1882, p. 72), and he 
became involved in charitable work at the end of his business 
career -a pen and electroplating manufacturing enterprise. 
Rather than spreading his finances across a variety of suitable 
concerns, Mason limited his charities to children, the aged and 
higher education. He financed - to the tune of E500,000 - the 
building of a small almshouse for aged women, an orphanage for 
girls, both located at Erdington, and Mason College, which formed 
the foundations of the University of Birmingham. Despite 
renouncing Christian ties, Mason's view of the stewardship of 
wealth echoed the pronouncements of those philanthropists that 
were inspired by the humanitarian ideals contained within various 
Christian denominations during the nineteenth century: 'The 
wealth he acquired was valued by him chiefly as the means of 
doing good on a great scale' (Bunce, 1882, p. 63). 
Whilst new movements in organised Christianity exercised a 
prominent influence over business philanthropy, this source of 
ecclesiastical inspiration was far from uniform. obviously the 
secular ideals of social responsibility surrounding Liberal 
thought had some bearing; but even within the gamut of Christian 
denominations, the level of philanthropic expectation tended to 
vary. Nevertheless, the common thread running through the 
philanthropic efforts of these benevolent magnates was their 
concern regarding the impact of industry, whether in the 
workplace or in the surrounding community. The deleterious 
repercussions felt throughout society when Britain industrialised 
elicited magnanimous acts of benevolence from entrepreneurs and 
the new social configuration of owner managers. But at the turn 
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of the century, it was evident that welfare and social care 
facilities could not wholly depend on the contributions of 
private philanthropists. A growing campaign was organised to 
bring about concerted state intervention to alleviate poverty; 
joining the political advocates for greater statutory protection 
were business philanthropists of no little repute. These 
developments need to be scrutinised more closely, because of 
their impact on business philanthropy in the twentieth century. 
question of public versus private welfare 
The prevailing orthodoxy in Victorian Britain was for indigence 
to be viewed largely as the result of moral permissiveness. The 
task of ameliorating genuine poverty was seen as the 
responsibility of voluntary agencies, including industrial 
philanthropists. However, the spectacle of deprivation and 
hardship - evident throughout society - was the most powerful 
testimony against the pre-eminence bestowed upon private business 
and charities as purveyors of public welfare services. 
The advancement of social policy research and statistical 
surveys on the incidence of poverty carried some import in 
bringing the extent of deprivation in society to public 
attention. Not all these studies originated from officially 
sponsored bodies: the contribution of socially aware business 
owners to the growing body of knowledge on poverty was both 
pioneering and highly informative. The shipowner, Charles Booth, 
carried out a paradigmatic inquiry on the extent of poverty in 
London. The f inal study, Life and Labour of the People in London 
(1902-1903) , spanning a mammoth seventeen volumes, concluded that 
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30% of Londoners were existing below a bare level subsistence. 
In the course of his research, Booth suggested that, to eradicate 
poverty, the state should make greater provision for the poor and 
the elderly -a recommendation which was antithetical to the 
Victorian emphasis on individual culpability and private 
solutions to poverty. Booth's observations about the appalling 
living conditions of the working population was confirmed by 
Seebohm. Rowntree (1922) -a member of the confectionary dynasty 
- in his seminal study, Poverty: a Study of Town Life, first 
published in 1901. Using statistics collected by his father 
Joseph,, Seebohm Rowntree estimated that 15% of Yorkls wage 
earners could be legitimately classified as belonging to the 
ranks of the primary poor. Signif icantly , Rowntreel s research was 
used by Beveridge to calculate subsistence standards for his 
final report on the establishment of a nationwide public welfare 
system. 
Apart from the growing number of studies on poverty, the 
nature of business philanthropy highlighted why a voluntary 
system of welf are in general lacked the capacity to eradicate the 
social problems painstakingly documented by the likes of Booth 
and Rowntree. The ability of companies to provide lasting 
solutions to the problem of industrial poverty was circumscribed 
by the fact that not all company owners or industrialists showed 
the same willingness or generosity, as the Cadburys and the 
Rowntrees, to release their wealth for charitable purposes. In 
a moment of Victorian nostalgia, Harrison writes: 'If the 
Cadburys and Rowntrees had been more widely imitated, public 
welfare in Britain - instead of being financed through compulsory 
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taxation - might have been voluntarily conceded, and channelled 
by the employer through the wage-packet, with all the 
consequences for industrial relations flowing from that' (1982, 
pp. 220-1). 
By and large, charitable action in the business community, 
like philanthropic action in general, was confined to a limited 
number of entrepreneurs. Hodder acknowledges this: 'Lord 
Shaftesbury was wont to say that the great givers of London could 
be enumerated on the fingers of both hands, and that every 
subscription list was a proposition of another' (1887, p. 301). 
Moreover, as a system dependent on the whims and fancies of 
individual donors, whether business owners or private 
benefactors, incoming financial resources for charities were too 
variable and inconsistent over time to provide comprehensive 
protection against poverty. For example, the city of Liverpool 
between 1905 and 1920 saw a near trebling of its charitable 
income, because of the dramatic increase of benefactions made 
through legacies. However, such gifts proved a less stable form 
of charitable giving than subscriptions. Hence, the distribution 
of finances among agencies was uneven, and there were 
considerable fluctuations between different years (Owen, 1964, 
467) . 
Added to the problems over resources was the inconsistency 
over the behaviour of certain business philanthropists. In the 
harsh social world of nineteenth century, some benevolent 
entrepreneurs would discredit their own philanthropies by 
committing major indiscretions. The Northern Star ran a report 
in 1842 disclosing that employers were funding philanthropic 
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activities by deliberately underpaying their employees (Harrison, 
1982). The nineteenth century Chartist George Harney was acutely 
conscious of the contradictions inherent in the world of business 
philanthropy: fI discovered that a good many manufacturing 
"philanthropists", whose sympathies had been enlisted on the side 
of the negroes, had been quite oblivious to the sufferings of 
women and children in their own factories, and had 
opposed... champions of the f actory workers ... to redeem the white 
slaves of England from what was, in some respects, worse than 
Jamaica or Barbados slavery, ' (Newcastle Weekly Chronicle, 15 
November, 1890, quoted in Schoyen, 1958, p. 8). In a similar vein 
Keir Hardie, during the 1890s, mounted a concerted attack against 
what he saw as the hypocrisy of Lord Overtoun,, the Scottish 
industrialist and Liberal. The Labour M. P. revealed that 
Overtoun, who was apt to publicise his philanthropic 
achievements, subjected his employers at the Sawfield chemical 
f actory to labour f or twelve hours, seven days a week,, and 
without meal breaks; for Hardie, Overtounfs life was the 
manifestation of 'a living lie, (Benn, 1992, p. 138). 
The obvious shortcomings of relying on private charity or 
employers as the primary means of poverty relief made the cause 
for systematic public intervention more resounding. Throughout 
the nineteenth century,, state intervention of any sort was 
distrusted. Nevertheless, the idea of government provision within 
the ambit of social welfare was given an important fillip by the 
embryonic legislative forays of local municipal authorities. The 
1835-1888 period constituted, to paraphrase the Webbs, a 
veritable municipal revolution. The legislative overhaul of local 
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government - in fact it led to the establishment of elected local 
urban governments - facilitated the movement towards extensive 
statutory services. The Public Health Act (1872), passed during 
Gladstone's first term in government, created local statutory 
authorities in an attempt to inject a degree of uniformity into 
the system of public health administration across the country. 
The empowerment of municipal authorities to supply services 
against deprivation was born out of Victorian pragmatism rather 
than a commitment to the redistribution of wealth. There were 
local councils that found themselves forced into taking 
responsibility for welfare services by public opinion, which 
included the views of local magnates. By the end of the 1860s, 
the local council in Bristol was pressurised to intervene on 
behalf of the city's poor by local business families, Frys and 
Wills (chocolate and tobacco producers respectively) , after they 
had observed for themselves the living conditions of the poor in 
their missionary ventures among such groups (see Frazer, 1979, 
118) . 
The incidence of high unemployment in the late nineteenth 
century once again called upon the pragmatic tendencies of 
Victorian authorities to intervene in society, against their 
better laissez-faire nature. The depression years of the 1880s 
and 1890s challenged the dominant assumption that poverty was 
simply the product of individuals being loath to find employment; 
it was a heartless and exceptional person who suggested that the 
jobless poor were morally culpable for their predicament. The 
Liberal Joseph Chamberlain was one of the first politicians to 
organise government support for the unemployed. In a circular 
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released in 1886, Chamberlain authorised local councils to 
provide work for the unemployed (Birch,, 1974). However, the 
prescription was not enforced because Chamberlain only remained 
in government for three months following the defeat of the 
Liberals at the hands of Salisbury's Conservatives. 
Despite this set-back, the movement towards a state 
organised and funded welfare system at the turn of the twentieth 
century gained further momentum, gradually helping to dislodge 
the emphasis on voluntary modes of poverty relief, such as those 
provided by charities or commercial benefactors. The main 
legislative provisions in this period were occupied with the 
problem of unemployment. Another notable achievement was the 
Liberal government's introduction of the National Health 
Insurance Act (1911) ,a measure insuring against the loss of 
health and subsequent treatment of any sickness for employees. 
During the interwar period, social welfare was still largely 
selective and privately operated, but with unemployment in the 
1930s reaching the three million mark, the Labour government 
eradicated the Poor Law, introducing supplementary aid for the 
unemployed. Ultimately it was the experience of the Second World 
War that brought Britain nearer to a national system of welfare 
(Birch,, 1974). Using the report by the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Social Insurance as its blueprint, the Labour 
administration introduced a series of welfare reforms that formed 
part of a national system of social and welfare provision. At the 
heart of the postwar welfare reforms was the National Health 
Service Act and the National Insurance Act, both passed in 1946. 
The former created a comprehensive system of health care without 
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charge, while the latter established a unif ied insurance scheme. 
Further legislative measures paved the way for a nationwide 
system of care and assistance: the Children"s Act (1948) provided 
services for children without a proper home life; the National 
Assistance Act (1948) filled the gaps of the Insurance Act; and 
the earlier Education Act (1944) extended secondary schooling 
(King, 1987, pp. 52-3). 
Generally, the introduction of the welfare state rendered 
the voluntary sector - the dominant form of source of welfare 
provision up to the 1920s - both dependent upon the public sector 
for funding and peripheral to the state services. On closer 
inspection, however. the voluntary sector was not superfluous in 
the postwar era. While charities in the welfare sector had 
certainly lost ground to the new state agencies, the voluntary 
sector continued to flourish after the establishment of the 
welfare state, as shown by Green and Murphy (1954) in an early 
postwar study of charities. Prochaska writes: "Though little 
reported, voluntary traditions carried on with considerable 
vigour after 1945, shifting ground where necessary and pioneering 
terrain which the state dared not enter. Moreover, a 
concentration of attention on those charities fulfilling welfare 
services obscured the many other voluntary campaigns which 
prospered' (1988, pp. 1-2). 
This suggests that there were still opportunities for 
enlightened business owners and industrialists - as non-statutory 
agents - to support the voluntary sector and community based 
projects. Indeed, from the late nineteenth century to the postwar 
period, when the statutory services gradually came into being, 
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there is evidence of commercial benefactors adopting social 
causes that were not directly covered by the state sector. In 
contrast to earlier epochs, religious doctrine came to exercise 
less of an influence, as did the individual business owner, in 
philanthropic activities. In fact, the nature and extent of 
business involvement in the non-profit sector throughout the 
twentieth century, especially in the post Second World War 
period, was influenced by developments in the structure of 
business ownership. Our aim in the next chapter is to explore 
these developments further. 
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3 The New Corporations and their Responsibilities 
The development of a comprehensive system of public welfare, from 
the late nineteenth century to the postwar period, meant that 
business owners came to play a marginal role in basic social 
services, such as health care, social insurance, and in broader 
social functions, such as education and housing provision. While 
the government assumed a dominant position in social welfare, it 
did not prevent enlightened business leaders from contributing 
to the well-being of wider society, especially in those areas 
where state provision was not extensive. As we have seen, the 
voluntary sector continued to grow and devise important 
innovations, even though certain welfare functions had been 
colonised by the state. 
The aim of the f irst half of this chapter is to explore the 
nature and extent of philanthropic action by business owners and 
industrialists from the late nineteenth century onwards. our 
contention is that the parameters guiding business philanthropy 
and decisions regarding the social causes adopted by company 
owners were shaped by the new structure of proprietorship that 
was coming to the fore during the early years of the twentieth 
century: namely, the replacement of the classical small family 
or individually owned enterprise by the oligopolistic commercial 
organisation under the impersonal proprietorship of shareholders. 
Hence, we trace the origins of the modern corporate economy and 
the extent to which this development contributed towards a 
redefinition of the social priorities of commercial enterprises. 
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During the late nineteenth century and the early years of the 
twentieth century, there is evidence of business owners being 
able to use the resources generated by emerging economies of 
scale to fund social causes that were not directly supported by 
the state. In the postwar years, business institutions operating 
in the most important areas of the national economy underwent 
dramatic expansion, and on the whole came under the ownership of 
loosely based networks of shareholders. For a number of thinkers 
subscribing to the managerial theory (see Chapter 1) , these 
developments would lead to a separation in the traditional links 
between the ownership and the control of capitalist enterprises, 
thus creating a non-sectional managerial class sensitive to the 
needs of society. From our historical analysis, the development 
of capital in this period did not produce the type of 
humanitarian business organisation postulated by certain 
managerial theorists. If anything, business enterprises became 
more commercially focused. 
During the mid-1970s,, however,, there was a discernable 
growth of interest in corporate social responsibility, continuing 
throughout the 1980s. The argument here is that the emergence of 
the modern era of interest in corporate social responsibility 
should be explained by recourse to the social and political 
context of the mid-1970s that transformed the relationship of 
business to government and, ultimately, to society. 
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The beginnings of the 
businesses 
corporate economy and enlightened 
The growth of the modern corporate economy is normally traced 
back to industrialisation; but the equation between both 
processes in Britain is not straightforward, for 
industrialisation did not automatically require or lead to the 
wholesale formation of oligopolistic enterprises (Hannah, 1983). 
Initially, industrial expansion was isolated to specific areas 
of the economy. The first sector to capitalise on new machine 
technology and the introduction of steam power was the textile 
industry. Through such innovations in commodity production, this 
sector was reinvented, changing from a domestic craft industry 
into a highly intensive factory-based form of production. The 
rapidity of this transformation proved phenomenal, as available 
statistics show: between 1858 and 1861 the number of power looms 
rose from 298,847 to 399,992 in Britain (Marx, 1976, p. 561) . The 
expansion of textile companies did not lead immediately to a 
monopoly situation, where industrial control was concentrated in 
the hands of select magnates. This scenario was avoided because 
the increased size of business enterprises was matched by further 
expansion of the market thus allowing small-scale 
specialisation, both on a commodity and geographical basis, to 
take place. Similar developments took place within traditional 
industries - pottery, brewing, chemicals, iron smelting - as 
technological innovations enabled companies to produce for a 
mass-market at a profit. 
These new forms of technology and the larger number of 
employees needed to operate machine units necessitated higher 
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levels of financial investment. The levels required went beyond 
the capacity of traditional resources, such as family wealth or 
yearly prof it margins. Industrial owners encountered considerable 
difficulties in trying to attract external investors, because the 
stock exchange, in the early nineteenth century, lacked dynamism, 
and, furthermore, there was no national legislative framework 
covering joint stock ownership. This legal void was rectified in 
the 1844-1862 period, for legislation sanctioned the formation 
of joint-stock and limited liability companies. This is not to 
say that joint-stock commercial entities did not exist before the 
mid-1800s, or that legislation had never touched upon the issue 
of associative ownership, as separate legislative provisions were 
made available for the public utilities. The distinctive feature 
of the joint stock and limited liability legislation passed 
during the course of these eighteen years, according to Penrose, 
was that it 'removed the most important limitation on the growth 
and ultimate size of the business firm when it destroyed the 
connection between the extent and nature of a firm's operations 
and the personal financial position of the owners' (1968, p. 6). 
The actual funding of a business was rendered more equitable and 
attractive, as shareholders were liable for company debts 
according to the size of their holding. 
It seems that the legal structures for joint stock ownership 
and limited liability were in place by the mid-1800s. Yet, the 
expected growth in the size of businesses was delayed. Contrary 
to the envisaged outcomes of this legislation, it was common for 
existing company owners to adopt private registration, whereby 
limited liability was assumed, while at the same time maintaining 
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the original management of the company. This development, in 
Payne, Is words, amounted to a 'fearful and hesitant' step towards 
larger business organisations (1967, p. 520). This caution did 
not persist indefinitely: at the turn of the century a whole 
spate of new limited liability firms emerged; for instance, 
during the 1898-1900 period, 650 firms, valued at E42 million, 
were absorbed in 198 separate mergers (Hannah, 1983, p. 21). Hart 
and Prais (1956) observe that a fully conscious and deliberate 
movement towards amalgamation took place in the heavy industrial 
sector, which included brewing and distilling, coal extraction, 
and iron and steel production. Many of these aforementioned 
industries, through merger activity, were able to consolidate and 
increase their share of the market, providing tangible evidence 
that large-scale business activity could result in lucrative 
remunera ions. 
The concentration and expansion of productive forces was not 
solely the result of a fluid definition of joint stock status, 
otherwise the merger movement would have taken place much 
earlier. of equal importance was the rise of professional 
financial intermediaries - stockbrokers,, solicitors, company 
agents, accountants and bankers - who liaised between the 
affluent public and firms searching for sound investments. 
Consequently, in the years 1885 to 1907, the number of firms 
involved in domestic manufacturing and distribution with 
quotations in the London stock exchange increased from 60 to 600. 
Another important factor was the transformation of Britain"s 
infrastructure, through the development of a national rail 
network. The consequence of a national rail system was that it 
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helped expand the potential size of commercial markets for 
producers. 
The merger movement that we have been analysing of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century did not bring about levels 
of industrial and capital concentration comparable to that 
attained by Britain's foreign competitors. As a number of 
commentators have noted,, the most important areas of the American 
economy, by the turn of the century, came under the auspices of 
large, amalgamated industrial combines (see Mitchell, 1989). One 
of the obstacles that stood in the way of wider corporate growth 
in Britain was the disinclination of those families and 
individuals that owned enterprises towards devolving any control 
to external interests (Payne, 1967, p. 526). This is not to deny 
the impact of the merger wave at the turn of the century, but it 
needs to be seen within the context that combinations touched 
upon heavy industries, whereas in America concentration covered 
a wider constituency of business sectors (Hannah, 1983, p. 22). 
Efforts to overcome this reluctance to expand gained 
momentum during the interwar years. The industrial practices put 
in train throughout the First World War challenged the dominance 
of the f amily-owned enterprise. In doing this, the way was paved 
for the wider expansion of commercial and industrial enterprises. 
Furthermore, the government, through the Ministry of Munitions, 
made unprecedented strides to intervene in the economy and the 
manufacturing process. Among its many influential 
recommendations, the Ministry discouraged industrialists from 
product diversification, and promoted, instead, the mass 
production of commodities and the amalgamation of enterprises to 
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meet government munition targets. These attempts to rationalise 
industrial units continued after the war with the onset of 
recession and high unemployment. By the early 1920s, the joint- 
stock enterprise had turned into a generalised feature of the 
economy, a fact that was assisted by the ability of the stock 
market to recruit large amounts of capital (Tawney, 1920). 
Increasingly, family owners were opting to sell their businesses 
to other quoted companies or to float them directly on the issues 
market. In addition, direct competition from large and 
technologically advanced foreign, mainly American and German, 
combines forced indigenous business owners into forming defensive 
amalgamations within their sector groupings -a notable instance 
being the expansion of Imperial Tobacco before 1914 as a 
defensive formation against the advances of the American Tobacco 
Company. The attempt by the German chemical company I. G. Farben 
to acquire British Dyestuffs propelled three of Britain's 
foremost chemical businesses to combine forces, resulting in the 
formation of the ICI company. Banks and f inancial houses that had 
invested in British industry exerted greater pressure in this 
period for industrial expansion: in 1929, the Bank of England 
established the Bankers' Industrial Development Company (BIDC) 
as a formal financial agency to promote rationalisation within 
the industrial sphere. A major achievement of the BIDC's work was 
the formation of the Lancashire Cotton Corporation -a textile 
holding company that absorbed almost a hundred separate firms, 
occasionally under duress, between 1923 and 1932. 
The changing face of ownership in the interwar years was 
indicated by the increased number of firms quoted on the stock 
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exchange: in 1907, there were 569 firms in domestic manufacturing 
and distribution quoted on the London stock exchange, but by 1924 
the number went up to 719 and by 1939 the figure stood at 1,712 
quoted companies (Hannah, 1983, p. 61). A number of family 
businesses, in using the securities market to generate 
investment, expanded their operations enormously during the 
interwar years. Thirty years after being floated onto the stock 
market, the textile company, J. and P. Coats, was one of the 
first family enterprises to achieve corporate status in 1919 
(Hannah, 1983). Ten years later, it was being joined by the likes 
of Unilever, Imperial Tobacco, ICI, Courtaulds, and Guinness. 
Although large commercial entities had existed before the 1920s, 
the interwar merger movement covered a wider range of industrial 
sectors, in contrast to the mergers that had taken place at the 
end of the nineteenth century. Acknowledging this point, Scott 
writes: "By the Second World War "big business" was a more 
diverse, and more powerful, sector of activity, and it was 
increasingly determining the conditions under which smaller 
enterprises had to operatef (1985, p. 200). 
This gradual, though radical, restructuring of the 
organisation and ownership of enterprises had important 
repercussions for the strategies and policies of capitalist 
enterprises. To begin with, expansion allowed companies to mass 
produce their commodities for both indigenous and international 
markets. But on an issue of salience, the remodelling of company 
structures established new sectional interests and constitutional 
frameworks, which redefined the social expectations of business 
in modern society. 
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For shareholder-owned businesses that were gaining 
prominence during these years, philanthropy and charitable giving 
was rendered problematic. Unlike the small family-owned company, 
the directors of the emerging joint-stock enterprise could not 
legitimately expend resources, which legally belonged to 
shareholders, on non-commercial activities, such as philanthropy. 
Indeed, there are records during the period under consideration 
of shareholders taking legal action against executives who had 
used the funds under their trusteeship for charitable purposes. 
Although the actual litigations were few in number, they 
demonstrated that the phenomenon of shareholder-owned entities 
presented difficulties for the future of business philanthropy. 
The Taunton v Royal Insurance Co (1864) was one of the 
earliest legal cases regarding the discretion of executives to 
support philanthropic causes. The action was brought before the 
court by a shareholder who objected to the directors offering 
compensation f or houses damaged by a gunpowder explosion on board 
a vessel, when the insurance policy did not compel the company 
to compensate for these losses. While the court intervened to 
prevent the expenditure of corporate funds for purposes not 
related to the interests of the company, it stated that directors 
should not, on the whole, be prevented from making gratuitous 
payments to their customers, especially when such payments would 
enhance a company's reputation (Sheikh, 1990). In the Hutton v 
West Cork Railway Company lawsuit of 1883, an early legal 
precedent was established over whether directors could utilise 
f inances for activities that were not of direct relevance to the 
interests of stockholders or a normal part of the budget 
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expenditure. The case was specifically brought to decide whether 
a company had the mandate 'to expend a portion of its funds in 
gratuities to servants or directors... I (Law Reports, 1883, p. 
654). In his summary, Lord Justice Bowen suggested that, while 
charity is not the responsibility of business, philanthropy and 
charitable donations could be justified providing they are, in 
some way, congruent with commercial interests. 
Even within the strictures established by this ruling,, 
industrialists and company owners continued to make benefactions 
throughout the late 1800s and the early years of the twentieth 
century, including the interwar period; historical evidence shows 
that modern joint-stock companies were not indifferent to the 
needs of society. A report presented to the House of Commons in 
1909 on the charitable contributions of railway companies in 
1908, possibly the earliest survey of corporate giving in 
Britain, demonstrates that the new industrial corporations 
appearing at the turn of the century supported a variety of 
mainly secular welfare and social causes. The most favoured areas 
included hospitals, which gained E7,699, schools and technical 
institutions were given E1,107, and benevolent societies were 
granted E1,051 (Board of Trade, 1909, p. 19). There are a number 
of reasons why companies continued to be involved in 
philanthropic work during the early part of the twentieth 
century, even though the emerging trend towards joint stock 
ownership limited the scope for charitable expenditure. One 
factor is that the shareholder-owned firm did not develop into 
a generalised phenomenon until the interwar period - the majority 
of companies were owned outright by individuals or families up 
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to this date. Consequently, industrialists and company owners 
could pursue their charitable aspirations without the prospect 
of shareholder opposition or court interference. Furthermore, 
modern philanthropy edged towards the parameters established by 
the Hutton case. Here, emphasis was placed on making 
philanthropic action relevant to the interests of the commercial 
benefactor, which for shareholders would be deemed more 
acceptable than straightforward charity. one prominent cause seen 
to embrace both motives of charity and self-interest was 
education, especially the technical and higher variety. 
Industrialists, corporations and university education 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the university system 
in England expanded from the ancient cloisters of Oxbridge to 
several metropolitan centres. In this period, no less than ten 
new university colleges were formed to provide undergraduate 
studies up to degree level. The origins of provincial 
universities like Manchester (1851), Leeds (1874), and Reading 
(1892) could be traced to local medical schools, colleges for 
technical training and university extension classes (Evans,, 1975, 
p. 247). Using the Scottish and German models as their 
inspiration, a number of industrialists participated in the 
provincial university movement as a response to the perceived 
chasm between the scholastic field and the requirements of 
industry (Armytage, 1955). While the efforts made by local 
authorities, such as in Liverpool and Southampton, to promote 
higher education should not be overlooked, the university 
movement at this early stage had not gained the full attention 
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of public authorities. This, in turn, gave local business owners 
the latitude to assume a pioneering role in the provincial 
university movement. Many of these industrial leaders felt 
excluded, on cultural and religious grounds, from the elitist 
enclaves of Oxbridge (Owen, 1964). To combat the exclusivity of 
the ancient universities, local industrialists attempted to 
promote educational institutions that would be both progressive 
and relevant, while at the same time contributing to the life of 
their communities. A certain number of provincial universities 
were established through the work of individual company owners, 
but at later points in their history these institutions attracted 
support from modern corporations. 
The University of Sheffield is a typical example: the 
university began life as Firth college in 1879, the brainchild 
of a local manufacturer, Mark Firth. The company owner by this 
point had already recorded some conspicuous philanthropic 
achievements: 36 almshouses and a college for the training of 
Methodist ministers were singlehandedly endowed prior to his 
involvement with the university. Firthfs interest in building a 
higher education college was stimulated during a course of 
university extension lectures given by a group of Cambridge dons 
between 1875 and 1877. Inspired by their scholarly musings, he 
bought some land and constructed a building at a cost of E20,000. 
His untimely death in 1880 did not bring to a premature end the 
work that had been initiated: by 1905, the college was officially 
named the University of Sheffield, and even without Firth"s 
contributions, financial support was forthcoming. The largest 
donations, during the interwar period came from Sheffield"s 
72 
business leaders and local firms. Chapman's (1955) statistical 
analysis reveals the extent of business contributions to the 
university: Vickers Ltd between 1902 and 1920 made contributions 
amounting to E16,979 for various causes; the United Steel 
Companies Ltd from 1920 to 1948 made donations adding up to 
E30,400; its counterpart, the English Steel Corporation, gave 
E2,500 to the building fund in 1936 and E22,400 to the 
development fund in 1947; and finally, the Staveley Coal and Iron 
Co. donated E50,000 towards chemical research laboratories. 
In another prominent case, business leaders and enterprises 
were found to be active at every stage of the process in the 
establishment of Leeds University. One historical account of the 
university revealed that from the turn of the century to around 
1950 the university managed to attract the support of over forty 
companies (Brown, 1953, pp. 36-7). Members of the Yorkshire 
business community not only provided financial assistance, but 
also actively participated in the administration of the 
university. The Tetleys, one of Yorkshire's better known 
commercial families, contributed to the long-term development of 
the university. Dr Charles Tetley was a life governor of the 
university and a member of its council from 1904 until his death 
in 1934. His concern for student welfare led him to contribute 
towards the building of a sports hall. Shimmin observes that the 
Tetleys 'help belongs in the main to a period when public grants 
were very limited and it was a courageous thing to help 
University education and to invite others to do the same' (1954, 
104) - 
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number of individuals with business and industrial 
backgrounds contributed to the university, ' s progress without 
taking up official posts. Lord Brotherton, an important figure 
in the British chemicals industry, contributed E220,000 and his 
company made a donation of E39,000. The merchant tailor, Sir 
Montague Burton, endowed a chair of industrial relations at Leeds 
University. In view of the negative associations of the textile 
trade with sweated labour and exploitation, this chair held 
certain gravity for Burton. It would be wrong to assume that it 
was solely eminent industrialists or the representatives of large 
enterprises that dominated the private sector's contribution to 
the university, for when an appeal was made in 1925, the E500,000 
generated over four years included donations from smaller 
companies in textiles, mining, agriculture, engineering, 
chemicals and leather. 
In the modern business environment emerging at the turn of 
the century, where large industrial firms were beginning to 
supplant the family-owned enterprise, the benefactions furnished 
by firms to higher educational institutions, such as Leeds and 
Sheffield, could not be made dispassionately - there had to be 
some return (Shimmin, 1954). For philanthropically-inclined 
corporations! financial contributions made to higher education 
seemed to traverse the divide between social goals and commercial 
interests. This was confirmed by the Evans v Brunner Mond (1921) 
case, where a disgruntled shareholder attempted to obtain a court 
injunction to stop his company from distributing E100,000 to 
various universities and scientific bodies for the purposes of 
research. In the end, it was decided that using the sum to 
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sponsor education and scientific research was the most 
advantageous way in which corporate funds could be expended for 
non-commercial purposes (Sheikh, 1990). In fact, the funding of 
research stood out as an educational activity where business 
leaders recognised a definite benefit to their business 
activities. With Leeds University, local businesses consistently 
provided research grants and facilities. In the years prior to 
and after the Second World War, there were numerous instances of 
such benefactions: the ICI company from 1945 to 1954 gave around 
E78,000 towards research fellowships and additional funds for 
departmental equipment. The textile industry, a mainstay of the 
Yorkshire industrial economy, was a staunch supporter of 
research. The Wool Industry Surplus Cloth Corporation endowed a 
chair in textile engineering, and the International Wool 
Secretariat gave around E60,000 towards equipment and research 
for textile departments. In a different, yet traditional 
Yorkshire industry, the West Yorkshire Coal Owners' Association 
donated E60,000 for the study of coal mining (Shimmin, 1954, pp. 
109-10) . 
The active presence of business interests was a distinctive 
feature of the history of Leeds University. Yet,, from 1905 
onwards, the university, ' s affairs steadily came under the control 
of Leeds Education Authority, and for its own financial well- 
being was increasingly reliant on treasury grants, a symptom of 
the burgeoning presence of public agencies in the affairs of 
society generally (see Chapter 2). The constituent elements of 
the university's income, when broken down in percentage terms, 
reinforce these observations: for the 1903-04 academic year, 
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Treasury grants constituted 10% of the university's income, fees 
39%, local authority grants 25%, and other income 26%, including 
business donations. By 1952, the corresponding figures showed a 
number of changes: Treasury grants went up to 69%, fees 14%, 
local authority grants 5%, and business gifts 12% (Shimmin, 1954, 
p. 214). The growing importance exercised by public funds was not 
unique to Leeds University. Much of the increasing public 
involvement in the higher education system was directed towards 
the expansion of university education, especially from 1945 
onwards, in order to accommodate the larger number of pupils 
continuing with their education past the statutory leaving age. 
By the 1960s, this was further compounded by the high birth rate 
which followed the war (Sanderson, 1972). Hence, in contemporary 
Britain, the system of higher education has gradually come to 
depend on public resources and intervention. While industry no 
longer has a central, innovatory part to play in higher 
education, as it did in the late nineteenth century, it has, from 
the postwar years to the present, continued to f und research not 
only in technical and scientific areas, but also in the field of 
management studies. 
The modern corporate economy 
With the end of the Second World War, the political leadership 
of the country undertook the task of rebuilding British society 
along social-democratic principles, which entailed a radical 
break with the dominant social and economic policies of the 
interwar period. There was a bipartisan agreement in Parliament 
over the need f or concerted state intervention in the economy to 
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achieve full employment and maintain a comprehensive welfare 
system (see Chapter 2). 
The changing nature of postwar society reverberated in the 
business sector: during these years, the private sector 
consolidated the rationalisation of its organisational 
structures. This led to an intensification of the expansionary 
trends that had taken place within Britain's major industries 
during the years leading up to the Second War, a development 
which complemented the creation of large public corporations, 
particularly in the utilities sector. But what made the postwar 
rationalisation movement distinct was the involvement of 
financial institutions as both investors and shareowners in 
private companies. 
Like the industrial sector,, financial institutions - whether 
joint-stock banks, insurance firms or merchant banks - had 
experienced a merger wave through joint ventures and take-over 
bids, significantly enhancing their ability to exert an influence 
over external investments. Aaronovitch (1955) produces hard 
statistical data revealing the extent of financial concentration. 
Starting at the turn of the century, the 1890-1920 period saw a 
reduction in the number of deposit banks from 104 to 20 
(Aaronovitch, 1955, p. 47). By 1951, five banks held 86% of the 
total deposits and current accounts. Alongside deposit banks, 
insurance firms also grew in stature: between 1913 and 1951, 
their assets increased seven times, from E550 million to E3,500 
million. Ultimately, these assets came under the aegis of a 
limited number of companies. Thus, by 1951 eleven organisations 
controlled half the assets outlined above, and one-sixth of the 
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total was owned by the Prudential insurance company (Aaronovitch, 
1955,, pp. 47-8). This powerful financial bloc turned into a 
prominent supplier of investment capital to industry and 
commerce. Indeed, financial houses bought shares and placed their 
own representatives on the company boards where thev had 
financial stakes - thereby ensuring some degree of sway over 
their financial interests. Scott estimates that the proportion 
of shares held by families and individuals declined from 65% in 
1957 to 28% in 1981. During the corresponding period,, the 
holdings for financial institutions increased from 21% to 57% 
(1985, p. 78). As a way of attaining strategic control over their 
industrial investments, financial institutions, in the postwar 
years, cultivated networks both in other financial houses and in 
industrial complexes. 
We now need to look at how the growth of business 
enterprises - the general feature characterising the 
transformation of British capitalism during the postwar years - 
influenced the philanthropic contribution of the commercial 
sector. 
Corporate social action in postwar society 
By the late 1950s, the oligopolistic corporation, under 
shareholder proprietorship, was the dominant and most influential 
economic institution in many Western capitalist nations, 
including Britain; it presided over the most critical areas of 
the economy. As noted in Chapter 1, several American social 
scientists extrapolated from this postwar expansion of 
businesses, and the concomitant increase of minority share 
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ownership, that the links between the ownership and control of 
capital were abrogated. The divorce between ownership and control 
not only ended classical material and ideological differences 
between the owners and non-owners of the means of production, 
but,, for some of these writers, also brought to the helm of 
modern corporations managerial specialists, who aspired to ideals 
of social responsibility (see Chapter 1). 
In the heady days of the postwar economic boom and early 
years of the welfare state,, the managerial thesis, on the 
surface, seemed to have credence. On closer inspection, many of 
its claims are questionable. The assumption over the changing 
nature of capital ownership and its ability to instil a concern 
with broader social responsibilities, usurping narrow economic 
considerations, has not been supported by historical evidence and 
academic research. 
Few British academics during these years examined whether 
industrial and company managers were endeavouring, as claimed by 
managerial theorists, to render the companies accountable and 
responsible to society. One exception is Nichols's (1969) study 
of businessmen in a city location, given the pseudonym of 
Northern City. In the study many of the themes relating to the 
managerial hypothesis - business ideology, ownership and control 
and corporate social responsibility - were carefully scrutinised. 
From a survey of sixty-five business managers selected from 
fifteen companies based in Northern City, Nichols found that the 
sample of businessmen were motivated more by long-term company 
interests than social responsibility. Nichols concludes that 'the 
conception of social responsibility held by most Northern City 
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businessmen was some distance removed from that advocated or 
implied in much of the management literature' (1969, p. 239). 
While the sample of businessmen obtained from Northern City was 
not entirely representative of private sector managers in this 
period, there is some credence to Nichols's findings that modern 
day businesses have not wholeheartedly aspired to social and 
political goals, as envisaged by several, mainly American, 
theoreticians. 
The erroneous assertions made Kaysen, Berle, Bell and other 
managerial theorists over the emergence of ethically-motivated 
companies derive mainly from their lack of real insight into the 
nature of modern capital ownership. Recent studies of ownership 
patterns in Britain and America have shown that, while 
traditional family-controlled enterprises are no longer the 
dominant form of private ownership, capital is not strictly under 
managerial control (Scott, 1985,1986). The modern corporation, 
like its family-based predecessor,, is still owner-controlled, but 
the defining features of the owners have changed. Most companies 
are controlled through what John Scott terms a 'constellation of 
interests', which as well as personal shareholders has 
increasingly come to include institutional shareholders and 
financial intermediaries. This development held portentous 
implications for industrial and commercial philanthropy. 
The expansion of businesses after the Second World War, and 
the presence of powerful financial interests in this sector, only 
served to restrict the opportunities for philanthropic 
involvement. A survey conducted by Shenfield (1969) in 1964 of 
charitable donations made according to company size demonstrated 
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that larger companies were likely to give away a smaller 
percentage of their pre-tax profits than medium-sized 
counterparts. From a sample of 442 firms, the largest 
institutions gave 0.12% of the profits to charity, while the 
middle range of firms gave 0.25% of their pre-tax profits. This 
was something confirmed by American research: Green, from 
analysing company contributions as a percentage of net income 
according to company size in 1968,, notes that the larger a 
company becomes, the lower its contributions as a percent of net 
income, ' (1973, p. 57n. ). Indeed, prominent voluntary leaders 
during the late 1960s, commenting in The Times, claimed business 
expansion had contributed directly to the decline in company 
giving: 'The national trend of business mergers, reducing the 
number of local businessmen accustomed to supporting the 
charities of their district, has left a serious gap' (The Times, 
1968, p. 2). 
While historical and empirical evidence shows that companies 
in the postwar period, contrary to the optimistic predictions of 
managerial theorists, were inclined to restrict their 
philanthropic commitments, the modern corporations did not 
disregard socially responsible activities tout court. 
Undoubtedly, the legal ownership claims of individual and 
institutional shareholders established well-defined parameters 
for corporate giving to charity. But within these legal and 
financial limits, companies still reserved funds for charitable 
causes and voluntary organisations. Indeed, the 1962 Jenkins 
Committee on Company Law Reform asserted directors should be able 
to make charitable donations without the threat or fear of court 
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action by shareholders in order to preserve a sense of public 
goodwill for their businesses (Sheikh, 1990, p. 16). 
A study by the Economist Intelligence Unit (1957) provided 
a thorough examination regarding the incidence of business 
philanthropy during the early postwar years. The Intelligence 
Unit approached a total of 900 British f irms across a wide range 
of sectors, which were categorised according sixteen different 
industrial categories from electrical engineering to food and 
tobacco production. Out of 381 replies, only 232 were suitable 
for statistical analysis,, but these respondents covered all 
sixteen of the sectoral categories used by the researchers. 90% 
of respondents claimed an interest in philanthropy as an issue, 
but it was 'apparent very early on in the survey that the 
majority of companies had no clearly conceived policy regarding 
their charitable donations' (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1957, 
p. 10). Only 12 of the 381 companies examined actually had 
definite policy guidelines outlining suitable organisations and 
preferred causes for charitable gifts. The companies in this 
early study seemed to operate within their own informal criteria 
when making contributions: for a substantial number of 
respondents (60%) , the rationale for charitable giving was guided 
by the possible benefits they would bring to the company and its 
employees. 
The study conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
possibly the only British study of corporate social 
responsibility carried in these early years, showed that 
philanthropy was not ruled out by modern economic conditions. 
Yet, the emergence of large, predominantly shareholder-owned 
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corporations restricted the financial autonomy of company heads 
in making donations, and placed pragmatic criteria - that 
charitable gifts should promote commercial interests - on giving 
policies. Compared to the humanitarian business owners of the 
pre-industrial period and the industrial philanthropists of the 
Victorian period, these developments made for a fairly staid and 
passive approach on the part of enterprises towards social 
responsibility. 
Throughout the early postwar years, corporate involvement 
was predominantly equated with the provision of f ormal donations 
to the subscription lists of large charitable and voluntary 
organisations. This contrasted with the proactive approach 
adopted by American corporations in the late 1950s and 1960s. 
Heald notes: 'Formal monetary contributions, of course, were by 
no means the only form of corporate assistance to community and 
philanthropic agencies. Loans of company personnel, gifts in kind 
and services, use of company clerical and other facilities, 
payroll deduction plans, sponsorship of community activities, 
advertising, and a host of similar services added untold amounts 
to the values actually contributed by business firms, (1970, pp. 
259-60). By the 1960s, American corporations were prepared to 
tackle major social problems. Neubeck (1974) studied the 
initiatives taken by companies - including ghetto factory 
projects, housing development and educational schemes - to 
rejuvenate the urban district of St. Louis in Washington. 
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The 'modern era' of corporate social responsibility 
Significantly, the social policies of British corporations did 
not remain in a conservative rut indefinitely: the early 1970s 
witnessed the beginning of a modern era of corporate social 
activism which drew much of its inspiration from the policies of 
American corporations. Could this interest in corporate social 
responsibility be attributed to the achievement of a true divorce 
between the ownership and control of capital? Was there a real 
separation between the two which allowed managers and executives 
to act independently of shareholder interests and set a new 
social agenda for the business community? The main argument of 
this analysis is that the prominence given to corporate social 
activism in this modern period has not been due to a fundamental 
transformation in the essential nature of British capitalism. 
Rather, any explanation must be grounded in the proximate social 
and political developments of this period. More specifically: it 
was the social and political repercussions following the economic 
recession of the 1970s which made corporate social responsibility 
a relevant issue of public debate. 
After twenty years of near uninterrupted growth, full 
employment and the institution of democratic ref orms through all 
levels of society, the start of long-term economic decline in the 
early seventies effectively undermined the stability that marked 
the early decades of the postwar period. Faced with recession, 
governments found they could no longer rely on economic growth 
to sustain the central pillars of the postwar consensus - full 
employment, economic intervention and a comprehensive social 
security system. Furthermore, alternative forms of state 
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financing had the potential to threaten popular support for the 
social services: 'More public expenditure meant higher taxation 
for it could no longer be financed out of growth. The liability 
to income taxation slipped dramatically down the income 
distribution: the traditional middle-class hostility to income 
tax spread to the working class' (Heald, 1983, p. 7). 
The economic recession of the 1970s proved deep-seated and 
highly unsettling, forming part of an international crisis of 
confidence afflicting all OECD countries. Major economic 
indicators - high unemployment, rapid inflation and slow growth - 
revealed that the postwar economic boom for many Western states 
was coming to a dramatic end; but the spreading malaise was by 
no means uniform. It was evident that the slow growth economies 
of Britain and America found themselves more seriously implicated 
than dynamic and expanding nations like Germany and Japan 
(Currie, 1983). 
Historical texts locate this economic collapse to a specific 
event: the quadrupling of international oil prices in 1973 
resulting from the strategy adopted by the oil producers cartel, 
OPEC. Although a crucial factor in the actual precipitation and 
intensity of the recession that followed, the OPEC incident was 
a symptom of deep structural f aults in the world economic system. 
The origins of these structural defects could be located to the 
growing integration between different national economies. This 
process gained substantial momentum under the aegis of the United 
States, the supreme economic power, which organised trade 
liberalising agreements after the Second World War such as OEEC 
(later OECD), IMF and GATT. The unyielding drive towards 
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commercial, financial, and productive interdependence of the 
global economy was a prominent factor behind the decline of 
heavy, labour-intensive industries - shipbuilding, coal and steel 
production - in Britain and much of the West. For British 
society, these manufacturing industries were the mainstay for 
secure employment and financial security for whole communities. 
Within the context of the modern global economy, these industries 
found themselves under severe foreign competition - pressure that 
they were ill-equipped to sustain, because productive capacity 
was denied proper levels of investment,, much of it destined 
abroad. Britain, historically through its early industrial isation 
and colonial interests, had developed a strong orientation 
towards investing in the international market. This tendency was 
exacerbated by the move towards global integration during the 
postwar years. 
The steady integration of national economies by the early 
1970s had created unprecedented demands for goods. This in due 
course drove prices up sharply: the general price index f or OECD 
countries rose from 5.5% in 1972 to 15% by the spring of 1974 
(Harris, 1983, pp. 75-6). Ultimately, this surge in demand 
allowed the OPEC cartel to destabilise the world economy through 
its decision to raise the price of oil. In the industrial world, 
prices rose dramatically, while output fell. For Britain, this 
meant a marked growth in inflation and unemployment. The dramatic 
injection of inflation in the British economy curtailed the range 
of policy prescriptions and public expenditure plans available 
to stimulate growth, protect heavy industry and fund government 
COMMltments like the welfare state (Currie, 1983, p. 95). Hence, 
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the ability of British governments to uphold the political 
consensus surrounding the social democratic state was rigorously 
circumscribed by the economic conditions of the 1970s. 
One of the most damaging repercussions of the economic 
downturn was its impact upon the souring of industrial relations. 
Prior to this, relations between governments, trade unions and 
employers could be described as fairly cordial. In the General 
Election of 1964,, the issues of labour law and industrial 
relations did not feature with any prominence during the 
campaign. As the postwar economic miracle was brought to an 
abrupt end by crippling rates of inflation and high unemployment, 
the government found it increasingly difficult to maintain the 
social services and institutions established under the postwar 
democratic consensus, while, at the same time, trying to overcome 
inflation in an international economy where Britain's position 
was proving increasingly uncompetitive. All of this strained 
relations between the Labour government and public sector unions. 
Successive governments throughout the 1970s, but initially 
starting with Wilson's Labour government in 1968, attempted to 
confront this difficulty primarily through legislate provisions 
(Davies and Freedland, 1993). For Wilson, this meant restricting 
free collective bargaining and introducing incomes policy 
measures to hold down inf lationary pressures (ibid. I p. 34 9) . The 
Heath government took a different legislative course by following 
the dictates of the right-wing I'Selsdon Man' strategy. Hence, the 
Industrial Relations Act (1971) attempted to curb the legal 
privileges of trade unions in order to render incomes policy 
unnecessary. The Act created immense turmoil as a total of 
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twenty-three million working days were lost due to strike action 
in 1972 (Kavanagh, 1990). The 1974-79 Labour government, which 
managed to win the election on the premise that it was better 
equipped to appease the trade unions, was forced to adopt a 5% 
norm for wages and salaries to combat inflationary pressures. 
What subsequently followed was christened by the Sun, 's then 
editor, Larry Lamb, as the 'winter of discontent' - an outbreak 
of strikes, often unofficial and mainly located in the public 
sector. By January 1979, a series of highly publicised industrial 
disputes organised by core public sector employees - firemen, 
local government manual staff, lorry and ambulance drivers - 
brought about the closure of numerous public services. This added 
to the general sense that Britain's economic decline was due to 
the actions of recalcitrant trade unions, rather than underlying 
structural factors. 
Adding to the general air of political and economic 
instability was the preoccupation of the major political parties, 
especially Labour, that employers should be accountable for their 
actions to both employees and wider society. This was a central 
consideration of the Labour Party's industrial strategy, 
published in Labourfs Programme for Britain in April 1973 and 
then incorporated into its election manifesto of February 1974 
(see Beck, 1983; Benn, 1989). The fundamental aim of the strategy 
was to reverse the long-term decline of British manufacturing 
through a concerted programme of state intervention. But this was 
not a Soviet-inspired nationalisation plan, for the proposals 
attempted to combine state intervention with democratic controls 
over the private sector. The most controversial provision of the 
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policy was for the creation of a National Enterprise Board 
(hereafter, NEB) , which would carry out selective privatisations 
and organise subsidies to increase the level of investment in the 
manufacturing sector. The strategy also made proposals for 
"planning agreements, ' , where financial assistance from government 
would be provided in return for public control and democracy in 
the workplace. Although this proved a radical agenda for Britain, 
even Heath's Conservative Government, at around the same time, 
published a White Paper on Company Law Reform (DTI, 1973) that 
made various recommendations for reforming businesses and 
introducing a code of conduct to engender a wider sense of 
responsibility in the business community (ibid., pp. 19-20). 
When Labour came into power after the 1974 election, the 
proposals for the NEB and planning agreements faced intense 
opposition from the private sector. In his diary submission, the 
then Secretary of State for Industry, Tony Benn, writes how, when 
Labour returned to office, the employers representative 
organisation, the Confederation of British Industry (hereafter, 
the CBI),, made it known unequivocally that it 'was bitterly 
opposed to the proposals for the NEB' (1989, p. 249). Companies 
and their representative organisations mounted a virulent 
campaign of opposition against the White Paper on industrial 
regeneration of 1974, with its proposals for planning agreements 
and the Industry Bill of 1975, which contained provisions for the 
NEB. The business -sponsored Aims of Industry launched a E100 f 000 
campaign against nationalisation; sections of industry even 
canvassed European community officials in Brussels to use powers 
in the Treaty of Rome to prevent the British government from 
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assuming control of industries (Browne, 1983, p. 227); and CBI 
representatives attacked the Labour Government's plans as 
politically and ideologically motivated. 
The private sector response to these proposals for corporate 
accountability and state intervention in the economy was not 
entirely confrontational or negative: in order to reinforce the 
legitimacy of private enterprise - brought into question by 
political and industrial developments - business associations and 
spokesmen made public pronouncements and academics published a 
number of texts on corporate social responsibilities, all within 
a relatively short space of time (Ivens, 1970; Beesley, 1974; 
BIM, 1974; Kempner et al., 1974; Robertson, 1974; Fogarty, 1975; 
Epstein, 1976,1977; Humble, 1976; SSRC, 1976; Beesley and Evans, 
1978). Possibly the most significant and comprehensive 
publication was the CBI 11 s Company Af f airs Committee report on The 
Responsibilities of the British Public Company (1973). In the 
report, the Committee generally welcomed the recommendations for 
the wider disclosure of financial operations and for an emphasis 
on non-f inancial, social goals; but there was disapproval of any 
external interference in company affairs to secure compliance 
with social objectives. The CBI report opted, instead, for a 
policy of self-regulation: 'The business of private enterprise 
is capable of working out its own programme of self-reform, as 
this and other initiatives by the CBI and other bodies show, 
(CBI, 1973, p. 5). For the authors of the report, business 
enterprises, in reappraising their activities, should consider 
the interests of groups, other than shareholders; namely, 
employees, suppliers, trade unions and the community. However, 
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the CBI Is admission that business should demonstrate sensitivity 
to a broader constituency of interests came with qualifications: 
,1 In return, we hope and expect that those who have a relationship 
with the board and the company which it controls, will seek to 
reciprocate by re-examining their own standards of conduct and 
applying them to their relationships with the board and the 
company. we certainly include the Trade Union movement in this 
context' (CBI, 1973, p. 43). As this comment reveals, the 
business community was willing to build consensual relationships 
within certain limits and conditions, probably the main one being 
that, while firms should act responsibly towards the interests 
of groups in wider society, they would not, by the same token, 
be made accountable to these parties (Fogarty, 1975, p. 13). 
The worst fears of the private sector, however, did not 
materialise with the formation of the new Labour administration 
after the 1974 election. The Labour leadership did its utmost to 
dilute the plans for industrial development, adopted by Labour 
while in opposition. The provisions of the Industry Act, passed 
in November 1975, was a pale version of the original NEB-planning 
agreements strategy. Af ter the Act,, planning agreements were 
organised on a purely voluntary basis. The only agreement 
conducted by the NEB was with the Chrysler company at the end of 
1978; in fact, many subsidies were handed over without planning 
agreements or conditions placed on public and democratic control 
(Forester, 1978). 
As the Labour government abandoned many of its original 
proposals, a revised version of the industrial strategy was 
formally presented after a meeting of the National Economic 
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Development Council in November 1975. The plan emphasised the 
importance of cooperation between government, industry and trade 
unions in achieving industrial regeneration. However, the 
approach of this new tripartite forum was mainly confined to 
those deemed acceptable to the private sector. In accordance with 
the CBI's recommendations (see Adamson, 1975), the government 
established 40 sectoral working parties to improve industrial 
performance. These sectoral plans made no mention of 
nationalization or planning agreements. 
The events culminating in this revised strategy and the 
nature of the new policy resulted in the augmentation of direct 
links between government and business. Civil servants stepped up 
their contacts with companies, while corporate representatives, 
in turn, liaised with a range of government departments. One 
senior civil servant observed: I ... in the 1970s there has been 
a greater realisation that government must also have contact with 
individual companies,, to complement its relations with industry's 
collective representative bodies. That principle is now generally 
accepted and quite a lot of progress has been made' (Mueller, 
1985, p. 105). For both government and business, such direct 
contact was of strategic importance. For the Labour government, 
it provided a symbolic demonstration that its new industrial 
strategy was succeeding; and for business, there was the 
opportunity to influence opinion within government. 
The interlocution between government and business gave 
further impetus to interest in corporate social responsibility. 
on the one hand, the government transposed the tripartite model 
of partnership for industrial policy to social legislation, 
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partly as a ploy to reinforce cooperation in the former area. The 
active interest shown in social responsibility also gained 
credence, because of the 'perception of a relative shift from 
government to companies as the source of social improvement and 
the means to promote specific items of social welfare' (Beesley 
and Evans, 1978, p. 13). Hence, semi-public bodies, such as the 
Department of Industryfs Industry/Education Unit (1978). were 
established to involve the private sector in policy formation, 
and the implementation of education policies. on the other hand, 
the economic and political vicissitudes in Britain during the 
1970s led a number of large companies to form specialist in-house 
departments for government relations (see Mitchell, 1990; Chapter 
1, methodology section). In many instances, these government 
liaison departments became responsible for a broad range of 
external functions, and were given suitable, often non- 
descriptive, titles, such as external affairs or corporate 
relations. Inevitably, in some cases, the responsibility of 
organising and implementing social programmes was devolved to 
such departments, or specialist departments dealing with social 
relations. 
To summarise: the economic crisis of the 1970s undermined 
the postwar welfare consensus and resulted in a gradual shift in 
dominant political ideas. In this unstable climate, corporate 
social responsibility was the focus of public and political 
debate. Moreover, the instability of these years and the 
political solutions offered increased the frequency and 
importance of direct links between government and business. The 
transformation of government and business relations generated the 
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institutional opportunities for businesses to become actively 
involved in areas of public and social concern. 
Studies done at the time confirmed the general raising of 
interest and awareness among companies not only over corporate 
responsibility, but also concerning active engagement in society. 
In one survey, Webley (1974) canvassed the opinions of 180 chief 
executives, and found that 90% of respondents agreed that 
companies had obligations besides profit making. On another 
related issue, Webley found that 50% of those questioned rejected 
the view that profit is the sole priority of business. In a study 
of company policy statements, Melrose-Woodman and Kverndal (1976) 
demonstrated how enterprises, both in statements of philosophy 
and concrete actions, took seriously the notion of social 
responsibility. out of the 130 companies studied by Melrose- 
Woodman and Kverndal, 66 gave an affirmative response to the idea 
of a written code for social interventions. Out of this number, 
40 already had written codes, a further 13 were planning to write 
a social policy, and another 13 favoured such a policy in 
principle but had not devised such a code. According to Melrose- 
Woodman and Kverndal, most of the policy statements in the study 
were published after 1970, for 'since 1970 there seems to have 
been a small but significant number of companies turning their 
attention to the production of a code' (1976, p. 21). Even with 
the economic recession of the early 1970s, there was little 
evidence that private sector interest in social responsibility 
was waning, especially as companies used annual reports and 
corporate plans to launch policy statements. Although 60 of those 
questioned did not support written policies or reporting measures 
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on social involvement, a significant proportion of them still 
donated resources f or use in non-commercial, community ventures - 
A series of community programmes undertaken by a number of 
major corporations in Britain during the early 1970s - initially 
confined to the areas of education and urban regeneration - 
seemed to confirm the general conclusions reached in the studies 
mentioned above. These initiatives indicate that corporate social 
responsibility was not only becoming a generalised phenomenon, 
but that it was also being reinvented as a solution to modern 
social problems such as unemployment, urban degradation and low 
educational standards. The foremost protagonist in this new 
development was the British subsidiary of the American computer 
hardware company, IBM. The schemes pioneered by IBM - with their 
emphasis on business assuming a creative, affirmative and 
enterprising approach to social involvement - were essentially 
models of the social interventions characteristic of American 
firms. The company helped established two projects, which are now 
folklore in the history of modern corporate philanthropy. The 
first project was the Trident Trust, established in 1970 through 
the work of IBM's public affairs director. The Trust functioned 
as a progenitor for vocational schemes under local education 
authority management. Its aim was to provide work experience f or 
pupils close to the school-leaving age by linking them with local 
companies. A close relation of the Trident initiative was the 
Action Resource Centre (hereafter, ARC), founded, with the 
assistance of IBM's public affairs director, in 1973 to act as 
a clearing house for business secondments to community and 
voluntary groups. The organisation also aimed to promote the 
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practice of social responsibility among British businesses and 
encourage partnerships between the government, voluntary groups 
and the private sector (New Society, 1973). 
IBM" s social lead was subsequently followed by several other 
British-owned corporations that actively organised and funded 
social schemes, many of them directed at prominent social 
problems of the day: Shell UK in 1978, under the Chairman of the 
Shell Transport and Trading Company, C. C. Pocock, created the 
Shell Small Business Unit to provide entrepreneurial advice for 
those interested in forming their own businesses. The rationale 
behind the Unit was that Pocock viewed small businesses as being 
the institutions most likely to create jobs in the future, which 
held some relevance and credence in the economic climate of the 
late 1970s. Following Shell, the Midland Bank, in 1979, announced 
a financial support package for the small business sector. In 
addition to assisting the small enterprise sector, the Midland 
supported ARC and furnished secondments to the GLC London 
Industrial Centre. The British Petroleum Company (hereafter, BP) 
contributed to job creation schemes with ARC and the Pilkingtons 
venture capital trust (DOE, 1980). 
The various initiatives outlined above could not have been 
envisaged two decades earlier. For a small band of corporations - 
increasing in number as the decade progressed - to consider 
participating in areas normally reserved for government, an 
important shift in British society and politics had taken place. 
This paradigm shift became increasingly entrenched throughout the 
1980s, culminating in extended opportunities for business 
engagement throughout society. 
96 
BUsiness and society in the age of the New Right 
The sharp decline of Britain's economic fortunes was a coup de 
grace for the postwar democratic consensus, encompassing, as it 
did, state management of the economy and high levels of public 
spending in areas such as welfare and social insurance. The 
political and economic events of these years, as we have seen, 
legitimised more extensive private sector involvement in society. 
Symptomatic of this was the Labour government's general attempt 
to embrace the precepts of the market in response to economic and 
political pressures (King, 1987, p. 68). Consequently, the 
economic policies developed by the Labour government during the 
latter part of its last term in office were very similar to the 
economic and social policy strategies employed by Mrs Thatcherf s 
Conservatives on entering government in 1979 (Kavanagh, 1990). 
Before the mid-1970s,, public expenditure was a subordinate issue, 
as borrowing was relied upon to fill the gap between spending and 
available resources. After this period, key issues that would 
form the basis of the New Right Conservative agenda, such as 
public borrowing, control of money supply and the constriction 
of public expenditure, came to determine the government's 
economic strategy. 
The Labour government's dalliance with the market proved a 
decisive turning point in British politics - However, the adoption 
of monetarism by Labour was an expedient response to crisis, 
whereas f or the incoming Conservatives monetarism was a strategy 
in its own right (Richardson, 1989, pp. 12-13). After four 
successive terms of conservative office, the onus in 
macroeconomic policy has been on money supply, requiring the 
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government to traverse the rubicon of consensus-Keynesian 
politics on many policy fronts. This the Conservatives 
successfully navigated, as they eschewed tackling inflation 
through income agreements and opted for widespread cuts in 
government spending. A key element in all this was the increasing 
emphasis placed on market mechanisms in areas such as the public 
utilities and social services. As part of the undertaking to 
promote market freedoms in society, the New Right Conservatives 
envisaged opportunities for business involvement in community 
action and in shaping public policy (see Kelly, 1991). 
Consequently, the conservative governments of these years 
systematically consolidated the interest that had developed over 
corporate social responsibility during the mid-1970s: concerted 
efforts were made to create further opportunities for corporate 
involvement in society. Here, more than during the Labour 
administration of the mid-1970s, corporate-led social action was 
imbued with ideological significance. 
The close and direct links between business and government - 
a trend which had increased throughout the 1970s - enabled 
practitioners from both sectors who were interested in promoting 
corporate social responsibility as a viable policy alternative 
to extend the institutional outlets for active corporate 
involvement in the non-profit sector and society in general. As 
a result of initiatives taken by civil servants and other 
government personnel, together with some input from the private 
sector, several agencies were established during the 1980s, after 
the precedent set by ARC and the Trident Trust in the 1970s, to 
coordinate business involvement in society, spanning a wide range 
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of areas. The most notable of these new coordinating bodies was 
Business in the Community. This body was founded in 1981 to 
organise business involvement in local enterprise agencies -a 
nationwide network of support agencies for small enterprises. 
Indicating the expanding preoccupations over corporate social 
involvement throughout this decade, Business in the Community's 
membership went up from 20 companies in 1981 to over 400 member 
corporations by the early 1990s (see Chapter 4). In addition, the 
government proved instrumental in creating policy-making forums 
where the private sector would be invited to make a direct input. 
This has unquestionably been evident in areas such as the 
environment, Job training and inner-city rejuvenation. Further 
to these initiatives, the 1980s saw a number of independent 
research bodies that began to publish information and practical 
advice on corporate social action. Among the most prominent 
organisations have been the Directory of Social Change,, the 
Policy Studies Institute, and private firms such as Bain and 
Company. 
Adding to the increasing number of intermediary bodies and 
forums dealing with socially active companies, the government 
throughout the 1980s introduced new fiscal measures for company 
giving to charities and social projects. These measures were 
introduced by the Conservatives immediately on entering office: 
there was a reduction in the minimum period of charitable 
covenants from seven to four years in 1980. In 1983, employers 
were given tax relief on salary costs for those employees 
seconded to charities. The 1986 Lawson Budget introduced a E70 
million package of fiscal reforms for charities. According to its 
99 
author, this package 'had one principle running through it, which 
I frequently enunciated, and which informed my other concessions 
in this f ield in other Budgets: namely, that the best way to make 
such concessions is to assist, not the charities themselves, but 
the act of charitable giving' (Lawson, 1992, p. 380). To 
encourage corporate donations, the 1986 Budget gave companies tax 
relief of up to 3% of their annual dividend to shareholders for 
single donations to charities and voluntary organisations. 
Moreover, employers were encouraged to institute 'payroll 
giving', in which charitable donations worth E120 a year, 
deducted from the pay of employees, would attract tax relief 
(Fogarty and Christie, 1990, p. 64). Encouragingly for policy- 
makers, the past f if teen years have seen marked increases in the 
level of corporate giving: in 1977, the charitable contributions 
of the top 200 totalled E13.9 million, but in 1990 this total 
went up to E190 million (Lane and Saxon-Harrold, 1993, p. 24). 
The following chapters attempt to explore more fully those 
factors identified as responsible for bringing about the modern 
era of interest in corporate social responsibility by examining 
two of the most significant and prevalent areas of corporate 
intervention: local economic development, especially in urban 
areas, and the environment. Indeed, one survey of the community 
policies of 230 firms, provides evidence on the specific causes 
adopted by socially active companies. Both the environment and 
local economic development were popular areas of intervention for 
the businesses in the study: 75% of the companies identified the 
environment as issue of active concern, while 58% indicated an 
involvement in economic regeneration (Gillies, 1992). 
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By examining the social and political context which brought 
about greater corporate intervention in these areas, our 
intention is to also highlight those analytical issues concerning 
the nature of corporate social responsibility: the implications 
of corporate community involvement for social and public policy; 
the extent to which enlightened corporate activities can provide 
solutions to public problems, and the institutional and financial 
provisions set aside by companies for intervention in the 
community. To address these issues and enhance our understanding 
of the socio-political context surrounding the emergence of 
corporate social involvement, we will closely examine some of the 
social programmes organised, in the main, by four major British 
corporations - BAT, BT, Unilever and Shell (see Chapter 1) . These 
corporations very much typify the way social responsibility 
evolved into an area of interest for the business sector: all of 
them, over the past fifteen years, have institutionalised a 
corporate responsibility function for administering social 
interventions, and they have participated actively in areas such 
as local economic development and the environment. 
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PART 11 THE MODERN ERA 
4 Rejuvenating Local Economies through Enterprise 
Britain's faltering position within the global economy had a 
direct and uneven bearing on the fortunes of local economies and 
communities throughout the country. While regional decline at the 
destructive hands of global forces holds nothing new for British 
society, the systematic deterioration of particular city areas 
during the 1970s was dramatic and seemingly intractable. As a 
result,, the local economy was the object of numerous policy 
initiatives and new institutional arrangements to bring about a 
semblance of regeneration or, at best,, prosperity (Lawless,, 
1987). Throughout the early 1980s, the private sector was seen 
to embody an alternative institutional strategy to state 
intervention in dealing with the problems of local economic 
decline and its attendant characteristics - unemployment, 
poverty, crime and rioting. Indeed, as corporate social 
involvement gained momentum during the 1970s, urban decline and 
unemployment were perceived to be among the most pressing issues 
for corporate attention. Some of the f irst examples of American- 
inspired corporate social activism, and the initial coordinating 
agencies established to promote corporate social involvement, 
addressed the problems of unemployment and inner-city 
deprivation. Hence, business involvement in the local economy is 
of great significance to the origins of corporate responsibility 
in Britain. 
The concern of this chapter is to reinforce the main 
contention at the centre of this thesis: that the general 
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interest shown in corporate social responsibility in Britain 
since the mid-1970s can only be explained by a comprehensive 
analysis of the social and political context - mediated through 
relations between the state and business community - in which it 
took place. Our intention is to use corporate involvement in 
local economic regeneration as a focus point for this analysis. 
Furthermore, the subject of local economic regeneration provides 
an ideal opportunity to explore one social problem area where, 
more than other possible domains of corporate social 
intervention, commercial practices and enterprises are seen to 
offer expert insight to policy solutions. 
0 Local economic decline and the response of government and 
business 
The initial pioneering forays of corporate intervention into 
urban regeneration were precipitated by the decline of local 
cities and the spectre of unemployment that blighted these 
communities during the recession of the early 1970s - the origins 
of which can be traced to the collapse of the postwar economic 
boom. This period of expansion kept economic growth in advanced 
countries within a healthy range of 4%, allowing these economies 
to maintain high levels of employment (Harvey and Swyngedouw, 
1993, p. 13). With companies being able to generate job and 
training opportunities, local economies, even those located in 
less prosperous regions, were granted a certain degree of 
stability. However, by the mid-1970s, the postwar boom in 
Britain, as in many OECD countries, had run its course. The 
ensuing recession, characterised by high unemployment, inflation, 
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cuts in public expenditure and a reliance on international loans, 
resulted in political and economic instability. 
The failings of the national economy were immediately 
transmitted to local city economies through the closure of 
factories and the flight of capital investment. Responding to 
fierce international competition and the declining profitability 
of British industry in the global economy, the corporate sector 
was reorganised through company mergers and the introduction of 
intensive production methods. Consequently, older urban 
industrial districts - unsuited to the requirements of modern 
production - were susceptible to widespread plant closures (see 
Massey and Meegan, 1982). The local economies within these urban 
areas experienced structural dislocation, retarding, or at least, 
postponing the prospects for recovery. 
There were some firms that organised institutional 
provisions to lessen the social impact of mass redundancies and 
factory closures resulting from commercial restructuring. For 
example, a number of companies carried out social audits to 
assess the wider social and economic costs of forcing 
redundancies and closures (Craig et al., 1979). Having been 
forced to rationalise its production process to maintain 
commercial viability, the British Steel Corporation formed a 
Social and Regional Policy Department in 1969. The organisation 
carefully scrutinised the implications of redundancies and plant 
closures prior to final decisions being made (Jones, 1974, p. 
18). The glass-making company, Pilkingtons, on the other hand, 
established an enterprise agency in the wake of large 
redundancies at its St. Helens plant in 1978. The St. Helens 
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Community Trust, as the agency was known, drew together 
representatives from local employers in the area to advise 
unemployed individuals on the logistics of setting up small 
businesses. Although these corporate contingency plans for 
restructuring were influential, it was the emerging debate within 
government surrounding urban policy that secured the momentum of 
interest and institutional opportunities for extending private 
sector involvement in local economic regeneration. 
When Peter Shore was appointed to the post of Secretary of 
State for the Environment in 1976, there ensued a conspicuous 
revision of postwar planning strategies. Governments since the 
late 1960s had largely relied on district based policies to 
revitallse urban areas. These interventions, though, were 
characteristically fragmented: local and central government 
agencies were implementing measures for communities with little 
or no cooperation and often in isolation (Hambleton, 1981). By 
1976, leading figures within the Department of the Environment 
(hereafter, DOE), which by this point had overtaken the Home 
office as the leading government department in urban affairs, set 
in motion new proposals for urban redevelopment. Hence, an 
interdepartmental committee of junior ministers, under the 
chairmanship of Peter Shore, was established to review inner-city 
and local economic policy. The committee's findings subsequently 
led to the publication of the White Paper, Policy for the Inner 
Cities (DOE, 1977). The document acknowledged the Socio-economic 
and structural causes of urban deprivation. Consequently, it was 
suggested that programmes for redevelopment had to include 
economic, environmental and social projects, and their funding 
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should be increased from a projected E35.2 million in 1977-78 to 
E165 million in 1979-80. (These figures apply to England only. ) 
The White Paper, at the same time, recommended that partnerships 
should be established between central government and designated 
local authorities to oversee public expenditure and social 
regeneration of inner-city areas; in fact, it envisaged an 
expansive and interventionist role for selected local authorities 
in economic development, including the power to declare 
industrial improvement areas, prepare industrial sites and 
provide loans to small businesses (Hambleton, 1981). 
The recommendations of the White Paper were placed in the 
Inner Urban Areas Bill of 1978. As the Bill made its way through 
Parliament, the Labour government was in the midst of economic 
and political turmoil (see Chapter 3). It responded by reneging 
on some of the radical industrial policies, devised in 
opposition, and by making a series of concessions to the private 
sector. As we have seen, the plans for intervention and joint 
agreements, such as the National Enterprise Board, were 
considerably diluted by this date. Earlier the CBI had won from 
the government tax relief worth E4 billion over the 1973-75 
period (Middlemas, 1991, cited in Grant, 1993). Several members 
of the Labour Government attempted to engineer this support for 
private enterprises and worked closely with representatives of 
the private sector in order to defeat the economic and industrial 
policies adopted by Labour in opposition during the 1970-74 Heath 
government. The Inner Urban Areas Bill was not unaffected by the 
unfurling of these events. 
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Some of the funding provisions made available by the Bill 
were circumscribed. Many authorities faced reductions in rate 
support,, as public spending was constricted in response to 
economic pressures. In addition, the government attempted to 
impose controls over inner-city and local economic policy, 
contradicting the plans of the Inner Urban Areas Bill to devolve 
certain powers to local authorities. Symptomatic of this was the 
use of the urban development corporation model, initially used 
for depressed areas within Scotland. The introduction of the 
Scottish Development Agency into Glasgow and other inner-city 
areas in the Clydeside conurbation during the late 1970s, whilst 
no intended to replace local authorities, 'brought a strong 
central policy thrust into local projects influencing the 
objectives and focus of urban projects' (Moore and Booth, 1986, 
362). A further dilution of this legislation came in the 
committee stage, when the Bill was widened in scope to include 
considerations of commercial interests (Hambleton, 1981, p. 56). 
Hence, it was no coincidence that Callaghan pressed Peter Shore 
to examine the possible contribution of the small f irm sector in 
the reconstruction of urban areas (Fieldwork Interview, Senior 
DOE Official, 23.3.93). Callaghan seemed to be echoing the 
arguments being put forward by some senior executives, such as 
the chairman of Shell Transport and Trading Company, C. c. 
Pocock, over the need to promote the small business sector as an 
alternative form of employment and economic rejuvenation. 
The micro-capital sector soon became a cause that helped 
stimulate private sector interest in urban and local economic 
development. Certain junior figures within the DOE began to 
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petition corporate executives about their willingness to assist 
small f irms in economically depressed locations. However, because 
the Inner Urban Areas Bill had unequivocally singled out local 
authorities as the 'natural agenciesf to tackle inner-city and 
local economic dereliction, DOE officials at under-Secretary 
level were loathe to involve large firms in this policy area 
(Fieldwork Interview, Senior DOE Official, 23.3.93). Despite the 
reservations of some civil servants, a coterie of DOE mandarins, 
members of the London Chamber of Commerce and representatives of 
leading corporations - BP, Shell, Marks & spencer, Sainsbury, and 
Tesco - met informally to discuss details about establishing a 
corporate sponsored agency for small entrepreneurs, similar to 
the St. Helens Community Enterprise Trust founded by Pilkingtons. 
To give the proposals some degree of momentum, the under 
secretary at the DOE persuaded Peter Shore to organise a special 
dinner with the heads of leading British companies. The dinner 
was held at the Foreign Secretary's special residency at Carlton 
Terrace in a bid to attract a full attendance. A working party, 
under the auspices of the London Chamber of Commerce, was f ormed 
as a result of the engagement; it was subsequently instrumental 
in bringing together Tesco, Marks & Spencer, Shell, Barclays, 
Lloyds,. Midland and BP to form the London Enterprise Agency 
(hereafter, LENTA) in April 1979. 
Detailing the various machinations leading up to the 
formation of LENTA has perforce been part of our strategy in 
demonstrating how the increasing links between government and 
prominent elements of the private sector helped create the 
opportunities for corporate intervention in the urban arena. In 
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f act, it is our contention that increased dealings between these 
two sectors, exacerbated by the economic crisis in the 1970s and 
the Labour government" s attempt to engineer a tripartite strategy 
for economic recovery, was central to the general surge of 
interest in corporate social involvement, especially around the 
po icy area of urban and local economic rejuvenation. Shortly 
after the formation of LENTA, plans were afoot to form similar 
organisations in Bristol, Birmingham and Manchester. With 
hindsight, the LENTA model was of considerable significance to 
the modern era of corporate responsibility: the enterprise agency 
phenomenon would, by the mid-1980s, take on national proportions 
and provide the first attempt to create a systematic and 
nationwide movement for corporate social involvement. 
Business involvement in the local enterprise movement 
In 1979, Britain once again entered into a period of recession, 
lasting much of the early 1980s. While many sectors of the 
economy were blighted by the post-1979 recession, the decline of 
manufacturing industries was particularly acute. Most OECD 
countries suffered falls in industrial production, but the 
constriction of manufacturing employment and output was more 
serious in Britain than in other advanced capitalist nations 
(Judge and Dickson,, 1987). Because the industrial sector was 
mainly implicated, the regional impact of the recession proved 
uneven: areas in the Midlands and the North, where manufacturing 
industry had been a traditional and integral rampart of economic 
life, saw greater economic and social decline at the hands of the 
recession than the South. The North and other regions, such as 
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Scotland, lost 10% more manufacturing jobs when compared to areas 
in the South (Fothergill and Guy, 1990, P- 13). What concerns us 
here is how the deepening recession and high unemployment led 
influential authorities and relevant government ministers to look 
towards the private sector and corporate social involvement, as 
a way of finding policy solutions, or at the very least new ideas 
for tackling the problems of urban blight. 
On the eve of what proved to be one of the worst recessions 
in fifty years, urban regeneration initiatives went through a 
phase of instability and uncertainty, with the incoming 
Conservative government undertaking a review of policy. The new 
Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Heseltine, 
finally made a statement on government plans for the inner city 
in September 1979. Although the statement pledged to continue the 
review process - thus doing nothing to abate the sense of 
uncertainty - it indicated a change of approach. Heseltine 
stressed the limits of public sector intervention in solving the 
economic problems of urban areas and the need for local 
authorities to attract private sector investment (Hambleton, 
1981). In a consultation paper issued in the same month as the 
policy statement, Heseltine announced the government's plan to 
f orm urban development corporations f or the London Docklands and 
the Merseyside Dock area. This provided some intimation that the 
government was determined to curtail the central position 
assigned to local authorities in economic planning by Peter 
Shore's 1978 Urban Areas Act (Hambleton, 1981, p. 58). 
The tenets of exploratory statements gradually turned into 
the central planks of legislation. The government policy in these 
ill 
early years gradually shifted the content of urban and local 
economic rejuvenation away from an emphasis on social provisions 
for assisting underprivileged groups, towards economic measures 
aimed at creating wealth and invigorating private sector activity 
in deprived geographical areas (Hambleton, 1981, pp. 57-8). Here, 
wealth creation was lauded as the panacea for social problems 
left in the wake of economic recession. The creation of 
enterprise zones by the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land 
Act provided an early indication of this change in emphasis. The 
enterprise zones provided designated areas with an array of 
fiscal concessions for a period of ten years. The most important 
concessions included exemptions from rates, with local 
authorities being reimbursed for lost revenue, and 100% capital 
allowances on commercial properties. The first zones to benefit 
from the initiative were within urban programme areas, but by the 
mid-1980s the scheme was extended to non-urban areas. According 
to Lawless the enterprise zone strategy held onto the assumption 
, 'that by reducing physical and financial controls within selected 
areas, enterprise would flourish, output expand and jobs be 
created' (Lawless, 1987, p. 126). 
As part of the general review of urban policy that saw the 
creation of enterprise zones, the small firm sector was raised 
to a position of prominence in local economic development. Some 
interest in the small enterprise sector was expressed by 
academics and industrialists during the late 1970s. But under 
Margaret Thatcher the small firm sector was imbued with 
ideological significance: the micro-sector was vaunted as the 
guardian of the free market, and perceived to be better equipped 
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than monolithic state owned entities for the task of stimulating 
enterprise in local communities. Towards this end, the Thatcher 
administration during its first four years of office delivered 
108 separate administrative, fiscal, and advisory measures to 
assist the small firm sector (Goss, 1991). 
For those officials within the DOE, who had endeavoured 
since the late 1970s to promote corporate involvement in local 
economic and small firm assistance, the emphasis on the small 
business sector came as welcome progress. The debate surrounding 
the small business sector was used to consolidate interest in 
corporate social responsibility. In their efforts to harness 
private sector support for the small firm sector, senior figures 
within the DOE, in conjunction with prominent corporate 
officials, established a national coordinating body, Business in 
the Community (hereafter, BITC), to spearhead such a campaign; 
this organisation was a milestone for those advocating a greater 
business presence in society, and would, later in the 1980s, 
eventually extend its remit to provide a forum for debate and 
practical leadership in corporate social activism. Because of its 
importance to the corporate social involvement, we need to 
examine in detail the events surrounding the establishment of 
BITC. 
The establishment of closer and direct links between 
government and business throughout the 1970s, and the initial 
collaborative forays by both sectors on projects such as LENTA 
and the ARC (see Chapter 3), provided a ready-made network of 
influential and interested parties in the area of corporate 
responsibility. These close associations, forged in the 1970s, 
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proved integral to the acceleration of corporate intervention in 
local economic and small firm affairs during the early 1980s, 
eventually culminating in the formation of BITC. After the 1979 
election, the same civil servants involved in the formation of 
LENTA embarked on the task of winning over their new Conservative 
Secretary of State, Michael Heseltine, to the idea of local 
enterprise agencies for promoting the development of small 
businesses. With DOE urban policy under review in the midst of 
recession and a consensus emerging over small business, Heseltine 
proved himself receptive to the overtures being made by the DOE 
mandarins,, and subsequently agreed to visit the St. Helens 
Community Trust, one of the first local enterprise agencies to 
be established. After the visit, Heseltine was suitably impressed 
by the Trust, and he launched plans to create thirty enterprise 
agencies by the end of 1980 (Heseltine, 1987, p. 165). 
The Secretary of State at the DOE played an important part 
in trying to enthuse business associations like the CBI and the 
Chambers of Commerce, as well as individual businesses, about the 
concept of local enterprise agencies and the contribution that 
businesses could make to urban and local economic regeneration 
by supporting the small f irm sector (see Richardson, 1983, p. 1) . 
To help the process, an Anglo-American conference on corporate 
social involvement was organised in April 1980 by the Department 
of Trade and Industry (hereafter, DTI) and the DOE to give 
company representatives, mainly from the United States, an 
opportunity to share their experiences regarding business 
involvement in urban regeneration and social action in general 
(DOE, 1980). It was deci e at the conference that a national 
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umbrella organisation was required to promote local enterprise 
agencies throughout the country. A working group on community 
involvement, consisting of DTI and DOE officials, senior managers 
from BP, Fissons, the Coal Board and high profile executives - 
Marcus Sieff from Marks & Spencer, and Alastair Pilkington - 
mulled over the possibilities of forming a coordinating agency 
of the type discussed at the conference. Subsequently, a report 
containing a proposal for a Business in the Community Unit was 
published by the working party four months later and, by 1 June 
1981, BITC was officially constituted, with two full-time 
administrators seconded from the DOE and Shell overseeing this 
initial phase. The organisation soon attracted major f igures from 
the corporate world to act as executive board members. For 
instance, Tiny Milne of BP assumed the position as a part-time 
director. 
The most decisive factor behind the establishment of BITC 
and the growth of support for the enterprise agencies was a 
period of sustained collaboration between government and 
business. This was evident in the higher echelons of the business 
community, which, because of multiple directorships among top 
level executives, was beginning to form a consensus of opinion 
over the issue of corporate responsibility (Useem, 1984). 
once formed, BITC continued to promote partnerships between 
government and business representatives in order to create a 
support network to sustain the local enterprise agencies. In this 
formative phase, BITC was assisted by a number of seconded 
assistants that operated in tandem with the Small Firms Minister, 
David Trippier, to establish enterprise agencies in specified 
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areas. Although agencies shared similar aims - to provide jobs 
by stimulating the growth of small businesses and encourage 
private involvement in local economic and urban renewal - they 
were f ar from being homogenous as organisations. Each agency was 
created as a separate, autonomous company entity, which in turn 
would attempt to attract funding from private and public sources. 
In Cheshire, Business Link Ltd was founded by Cheshire County 
Council, Grosvenor Estates, Holton Borough Council, ICI Mond and 
with assistance from the Midland and National Westminster banks. 
In Merseyside, Unilever, together with the local authority and 
Chambers of Commerce, helped form the enterprise agency, In 
Business Limited. Helped by BITC, ' s coordinating work and the 
provision of tax concessions for local enterprise agencies, the 
rate of formation grew dramatically from 40 agencies in 1981 to 
100 by May 1983; by the late 1980s, this figure increased to 250 
and by the early 1990s there were over 300 local enterprise 
agencies operating in Britain (Richardson, 1983; Deakins, 1993). 
What is most significant about BITC and the local enterprise 
agencies has been their contribution towards mobilising corporate 
interest in local economic rejuvenation. For instance, two and 
a half years after being founded, BITC's membership rose from 20 
to 200 companies. The number of businesses sponsoring enterprise 
agencies also grew appreciably: within the space of a year, 
between 1984 and 1985, the sum total of businesses actively 
engaged in furnishing monetary support for enterprise agencies 
rose from 1,477 to 2,242. The actual contributions from these 
companies totalled E10 million for that year (Metcalf et al., 
1989, p. 12) - 
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In view of the events that had taken place around BITC, a 
number of enterprises established specialist in-house units for 
supporting economic regeneration schemes, or for simply 
organising corporate social activities (see Chapter 3; Mitchell, 
1990). These organisational facilities allowed companies to go 
beyond impersonal largesse by actively assisting local enterprise 
agencies. However, the level and nature of support has tended to 
vary from one company to another. This can be illustrated if we 
examine the community strategies of Shell, as it responded 
positively to the expanding opportunities for business input in 
local economic regeneration. 
The case of Shell UK exemplifies how a company can both 
support and utilise the local enterprise agency network as part 
of its social intervention in local economic regeneration. Shell 
representatives were prominent figures in the setting up of BITC 
and the local enterprise movement. In fact, it was one of the 
first companies to embrace small enterprise creation. The 
company's support of this area was initiated by a senior 
chairman, C. C. Pocock, when he delivered the 1977 Ashridge 
Lecture. Following company- sponsored research on the creation of 
small businesses, the Shell Small Business Unit was established 
in July 1978. At first,, the Unit assisted organisations like 
LENTA and ARC. In the early 1980s, the Enterprise Unit, which now 
forms an integral part of Shell's Community Relations Department 
that organises community programmes from the company's 
headquarters in London, made a bold move to organise an 
enterprise initiative at its own behest, rather than rely on 
schemes managed by external bodies. 
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The initiative originally began in 1982 as a competition for 
young people in the Strathclyde region and was the brainchild of 
two Shell employees, who were galvanised into taking action by 
the levels of high youth unemployment in the area (Livewire,, 
1992/93). The Livewire scheme, as it was called, involved placing 
contestants who had devised plans for an enterprise, under the 
tutelage of experienced business counsellors, who helped the 
students refine their business proposals for the final stages of 
the competition. The underlying objective of Livewire was to make 
young people aware of the job prospects available through self- 
employment. The success of the scheme led Shell to organise a 
national Livewire competition in 1985. A year later, with 
Livewire expanding to such an extent that it could no longer be 
managed in-house by Shell, the management of the scheme was 
placed under Project North East, a Newcastle-based enterprise 
agency founded in 1980 to cater for young business owners (PNE, 
1990). Although Shell devolved management of the scheme to the 
Project North East enterprise agency, it continued to be the 
major financial backer of Livewire. In 1993, the Enterprise Unit 
used around E624,000 - 60% of the unit's annual budget - to fund 
Project North East"s management of the Livewire scheme (Fieldwork 
Interview, Shell UK, 23.4.93). 
Under the management of the Project North East, Livewire was 
transformed into a national advice and counselling service for 
16 to 25 year-olds wishing to form their own small enterprises. 
Livewire now has seventeen full-time staff based at Project North 
East headquarters, and a network of 80 local coordinators 
appointed mainly from enterprise agencies. Through this network, 
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enquirers are put in contact with suitable advisers, who are 
garnered from a pool of 2,, 000 professional and voluntary business 
counsellors. From its inception in 1982, the scheme has provided 
advice and support to over 55,000 young people. since going 
national in 1986, enquiries have increased dramatically: in a 
three year period between 1989 and 1991, UK enquiries rose by 
146% (Livewire Bulletin, 1992). These sharp increases tend to 
reflect national trends. particularly regarding unemployment: in 
1989F 39% of enquirers were unemployed, but this rose to 62% by 
1992 (Livewire, 1993). 
Our examination of Shell shows how the local enterprise 
agency network is significant in terms of economic regeneration 
strategies and the expansion of interest in corporate social 
responsibility. One positive feature here is that, through the 
flexibility of the enterprise agency network, companies have been 
afforded a certain degree of latitude over the form and extent 
of their involvement in the economic regeneration process. 
By the mid-to-late 1980s, there were further opportunities 
f or the private sector actively to engage in economic issues - The 
government was still endeavouring to attract private investment 
and stimulate entrepreneurial activity in local economies. 
Specific import was placed on those communities, such as urban 
and former manufacturing strongholds, that were reeling from the 
effects of the recession of the early 1980s. The government 
achieved this by opening up urban policy to private sector 
influence, both in the formation and implementation of plans to 
redevelop urban and inner-city areas. This needs to be given 
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fuller consideration, as corporations were made central to the 
future development of local and urban city areas. 
Urban policy and the corporate contribution 
The involvement of companies and business associations in public 
policy of any sort can often result from specific needs or 
circumstances. In the late 1970s, there were sectoral trade 
agreements, where business associations negotiated, unofficially, 
on behalf of the government (Grant, 1993). However, for recent 
conservative governments, with their commitment to restoring the 
primacy of the market economy at the expense of state 
intervention, there is a strategic and ideological thrust to the 
delegation of policy responsibilities to business organisations. 
Thus, the government has allowed certain industries to regulate 
their own activities rather than having to face the bureaucratic 
mechanisms of the state. Some of the most prominent instances of 
self-regulation have occurred in the financial, newspaper and 
dairy industries. Another interesting example is the way policy- 
makers in recent years have sought to involve the private sector 
in devising and implementing social polices. One of the most 
prominent areas where this has taken place is in the regeneration 
of local economies and urban areas. 
The involvement of business in local economic policy has 
formed an integral part of the government's perceived solution 
for urban decline: that to regenerate depressed local economies 
it is necessary to stimulate entrepreneurial activity and create 
wealth. Such involvement was a significant step up from 
supporting local enterprise agencies, as it has involved the 
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private sector in defining and presenting solutions for urban 
problems (Harding, 199o, p. 109). Several factors facilitated 
this development: the links between government and business, much 
of it confined to the largest and most visible firms (Mitchell, 
1990), were already extensive, as both sectors had collaborated 
on all manner of issues. On social matters, organisations like 
BITC ensured that these links were sustained. Through the 
I 
expansion of corporate-led social action, a number of businesses 
developed the organisational means in such functions as external 
or community relations departments, and the specialised personnel 
to deal with government ministries on social policy issues. 
Among the most significant institutions that have attempted 
to harness the private sector in local economic policy strategies 
are the urban development corporations. These semi-public 
agencies were introduced in 1980 to organise market and economic 
renewal of specific urban locations. The Local Government, 
Planning and Land Act (1980) introduced the powers needed to 
designate urban development corporations, and two such bodies 
were immediately created f or urban areas in Liverpool and London. 
Firstly, the Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC) was given 
the task of regenerating 865 acres of redundant dockland on the 
Merseyside waterfront (Parkinson, 1988) ; and secondly, the London 
Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) presided over 5,100 
acres of Central and East London, including docks previously 
owned by the Port Authority of London (Barnekov et al., 1989). 
Private business managers and executives, at the governmentfs 
insistence, were given prominent and influential representation 
on the urban development corporations. Such participation has 
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generally complemented and added symbolic value to the 
Conservative government" s early market reforms in the urban arena 
(Robinson and Shaw, 1991) . The presence of business 
representatives was also a deliberate ploy to maximise the 
ability of urban development corporations to generate funds from 
private sources to match public funds. This practice is referred 
to as 'leverage' or 'pump-priming' and is very much a concept 
borrowed from the American experience of urban renewal, where 
corporations have been active since the 1960s (Boyle and Rich, 
1984). The leverage process involves the use of public funds in 
the f orm of grants or subsidies to attract private investors. The 
1984-85 LDDC Annual Report announced that public funding of E149 
million had been used to lever in E821 million in private 
investment (Barnekov et al.. 1989, p. 195) . The urban development 
corporations demonstrated the government's intent to expose the 
process of local economic and urban renewal to private sector 
influence. Moore and Booth comment: 'The role of the private 
sector has moved from that of client or consumer of the benefits 
of initiatives to an equal partner in policy formulation and 
implementation' (1986, p. 374). 
The new policy paradigm established by the urban development 
corporations was an important step towards involving the private 
sector in the local economic policy process. The opportunities 
for such involvement increased during the mid-to-late 1980s. For 
instance, in 1987, a further nine urban development corporations 
were created in the Black Country, Trafford Park, Tyneside, 
Teesside, Manchester, Bristol, Cardiff, Sheffield and Leeds 
(Parkinson,, 1988). In all these new urban development 
122 
corporations, as with the Liverpool and London prototypes that 
were organising major projects at Albert Dock and canary Wharf 
respectively, specially appointed officials and senior business 
leaders dominated the executive boards. The Action for Cities 
Initiative, starting in 1988, invited private industry, such as 
construction f irms, to participate in subsidised property renewal 
schemes within urban areas. As a result of Action for Cities, 
eleven of the largest civil engineering and construction firms 
joined forces to redevelop derelict city sites. The formation of 
new urban development corporations and the direct influence of 
business on urban policy suggest that a pattern of public-private 
partnership, where the interests of the private sector are 
uppermost, is now the dominant model for urban policy. As 
Barnekov et al write: 'That model implies that the city, first 
and foremost, is a place to do business and that politics, 
government, and administration must ... rely on the initiatives of 
the private sector to direct the process of urban change' (1989, 
p. 211) 
The City Challenge partnership: the case of BAT Industries and 
the London Borough of Lambeth 
Such developments in the urban policy arena has limited the 
opportunities for local economic planning on the part of local 
authorities. Unlike the Inner Urban Areas Act of 1978, recent 
initiatives in the f orm of the urban development corporations and 
Action for Cities have all placed a central onus on private 
businesses and central government in restoring local economic 
fortunes, whilst at the same time marginalising the position of 
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local authorities in this policy area. By the early 1990s, with 
Michael Heseltine back at the DOE, there were some modest 
attempts to address this problem. The most notable initiative was 
the City Challenge funding scheme, announced in May 1991. Even 
though the scheme shared many of the characteristics of its 
forbearers - the enterprise zones and urban development 
corporations - it did indicate a slight break with given 
orthodoxy, the most important being the prominent role given to 
local authorities. Here, authorities would receive funding 
directly, without the interlocution of an intermediary body. 
Moreover, the City Challenge scheme was deliberately linked to 
a broad strategy involving I local authorities, local communities, 
and business, voluntary groups and other organisations active in 
the area, backed by Government support' (DOE, 1991). 
The scheme took the form of a competition which in the first 
round was opened to 15 of the 57 local authorities with special 
urban programme status. All these local bodies were invited to 
bid for a DOE grant package worth E37.5 million over five years. 
In the end, 11 authorities were successful in the first round. 
A second round of the City Challenge was announced in 1992, and 
on this occasion all 57 urban programme authorities were invited 
to make bids. Subsequently, 20 more authorities gained City 
Challenge funding. It was envisaged that the private sector 
should have a central part in the City Challenge competition (De 
Groot, 1992). This exemplifies the influence attained by the 
corporate sector over the policy process for urban development. 
The DOE conditions for the competition stipulate that an 
essential prerequisite for successful bids is the aptitude for 
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building effective partnerships with businesses and the ability 
to attract private funding through public sector grants. In the 
following, we focus on the City Challenge bid made by London 
Borough of Lambeth in the second round of the competition. The 
bid is worth scrutinising because it gained close support from 
the London-based tobacco and insurance f inance conglomerate, BAT 
Industries, which, prior to the City Challenge bid, had already 
established close links with Lambeth Council through its support 
of an enterprise centre in the Brixton area. 
The campaign from the very start was problematic because of 
Lambeth's reputation for political extremism. A senior 
participant in the proceedings commented: f[Heseltine made it 
clear that] there was no point in Lambeth even asking for the 
application form, because they wouldn, 't win a City Challenge 
grant, ' (Fieldwork Interview, Confidential). This was certainly 
the outcome in the first round of the competition, but BAT's 
close links with the government proved decisive in the Boroughfs 
ability to organise another City Challenge campaign. Prior to the 
second round of City Challenge in 1992, BAT had a senior official 
seconded to the Inner Cities Unit of the DOE. One of the under- 
Secretaries asked this individual to encourage BAT to assist 
Lambeth to put in a bid for City Challenge. The chairman of BAT 
was informed of the conversation and organised an informal lunch 
for DOE officials, Lambeth representatives and senior managers 
from BAT (Fieldwork Interview, BAT Industries, 25.9.92). 
Subsequently, the decision was reached that Lambeth should 
produce a bid for the second round of City Challenge. To support 
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and promote the bid, BAT agreed to second a public relations 
manager from its Eagle Star insurance subsidiary. 
funding proposal was marshalled by a steering group 
consisting of four councillors, representing the main political 
groups, members of the private sector, including BAT Industries , 
and representatives from community groups. The funding strategy 
outlined details of 65 potential schemes - requiring an 
investment of E170 million over five-years - that would create 
2,000 jobs, 8,000 training places for local people and improve 
the quality of life in the area through environmental 
improvements, health care facilities and better housing. 
Conditions established by the DOE demanded that authorities 
should demonstrate an ability to 'lever in three times as much 
money from other sources as is available from City Challenge' 
(Lambeth City Challenge, 1992). In its bid, Lambeth demonstrated 
a leverage ratio of 3.1 to 1, so that total investment was 
forecasted as E170 million over a five year period. 
BAT, Is efforts to secure a City Challenge funding were not 
in vain, as the authority obtained, together with nineteen other 
applicants in the second round, funding worth E37.5 million over 
five years. The involvement of BAT Industries was an 
indispensable component in this successful bid: throughout the 
process the company interceded with relevant authorities, 
primarily government departments like the DOE, as part of a 
concerted public relations exercise to promote Lambeth. The City 
Challenge policy exemplifies, as with other initiatives such as 
the urban development corporations and Action for Cities, the 
extent to which the private sector has become an important 
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element in the policy process for addressing economic issues 
within localities. 
Prospects for economic regeneration 
What lies at the centre of the rationale to engage the private 
sector in urban and local economic renewal is that businesses can 
help invigorate local economies and improve the prospects of 
these areas. In fact, the debate surrounding corporate social 
responsibility in recent years has been influenced by the idea 
of enlightened self-interest, a concept implying that business 
social involvement is of mutual benefit to both companies and 
communi les (Bennett, 1990; LIEtang, 1994). These claims, like 
government policies for economic regeneration examined above, are 
based on the conviction that the private sector is vital to 
bringing about the renewal of urban and depressed local economies 
(see CBI, 1988). our concern now is to weigh up this claim by 
singling out two broad areas of proactive corporate engagement: 
firstly, those corporate-led interventions in the local economy 
that have been coordinated by intermediary bodies and secondly, 
policies involving direct action on the part of business. 
The intermediary role of local enterprise agencies 
As we have already noted, early advancements regarding corporate 
involvement in economic regeneration focused on support for the 
small enterprise sector. Much of the social activity in this area 
has been coordinated, from the early 1980s onwards, by local 
enterprise agencies. The enterprise agencies have contributed to 
small enterprise creation through the provision of advice, 
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training, business support clubs and occasionally by making work 
spaces available. The agencies were also established to provide 
a focal point for private sector involvement and public-private 
partnerships in local economic development. An important aspect 
of this partnership, as far as the enterprise agencies are 
concerned, is financial: most of these bodies have gained 
financial support through a combination of private and public 
sector sources, although the actual ratio between both tends to 
vary quite considerably. 
The enterprise agency movement has not placed strict 
definitions and requirements on the types of firms that can be 
involved in small firm and local economic development. It is 
common, however, for much of the private sector support to 
emanate from larger companies (Smallbone, 1990, p. 18). There is 
certain variation, however, in terms of the quality and length 
of corporate support. Metcalf et al, in a study of 200 local 
enterprise agencies and 400 businesses, found that while 
corporate assistance was generally stable, the provision of long- 
term support to enterprise agencies by corporations can prove 
problematic (1989,, p. 173). If we turn to BT and Shell as 
examples, we can see that both companies in recent years have 
scaled down their support for enterprise agencies. BT's Economic 
Regeneration section, forming part of the company-s central 
Community Affairs Division - based at BT's headquarters - that 
oversees social programmes, reduced the number of agencies under 
its sponsorship from 120 to 50 between the late 1980s and early 
1990s (BT, 1991). One manager in the section explained the 
reasoning behind this gradual rationalisation of support: fThis 
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was a decision by our Board of Charities committee [the executive 
committee over community affairs at BT]. They don't like leaving 
things open-ended where every year we are committed to giving so 
much money to all these agencies, it doesn't matter who it is. 
They'll support a programme, but they want to know what the end 
is. At the end they, 111 want to get out of it" (Fieldwork 
Interview, BT, 7.1.94). Moreover, the Economic Regeneration 
section has adopted new schemes with the Training and Enterprise 
Councils and Action for the Rural Communities of England. Without 
commensurate increases in the department's yearly budget, this 
has meant reducing support for local enterprise agencies. 
The Shell Enterprise Unit, which has used the Newcastle 
enterprise agency, Project North East, to organise and implement 
the Livewire scheme - an enterprise awareness and education 
scheme for the young - discontinued funding for the project at 
the end of 1993. The funding for the Livewire scheme was a 
reliable source of income for Project North East on a year-to- 
year basis. In fact, a BITC report found only 60% of enterprise 
agencies possessed guaranteed funds for a full year (BITC, 1987). 
Shell"s withdrawal from the Livewire scheme prompted the agency 
to consider whether it could provide f or-prof it advisory services 
to generate funds (PNE, 1990). Diversifying into these profit- 
making areas may result in enterprise agencies being less willing 
to assist those who are economically marginalised and in need of 
most help (Metcalf et al., 1989). 
The action taken by BT and Shell to constrict their support 
of enterprise agencies reflects the way corporate support for 
enterprise agencies has progressed over the years. In one 
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detailed examination of local enterprise agencies within greater 
London, Smallbone (1990) found that business funds for local 
enterprise agencies were concentrated in the successful and high 
profile agencies. More: 'The growing concentration of private 
sector resources in the high profile LEAs is part of a national 
trend,, and the consequences may be even more serious in other 
parts of the country' (Smallbone, 1990, p. 31). The pattern tends 
to reflect regional differences: those agencies which have failed 
to attract sufficient private sector support and are dependent 
on public assistance, tend to be concentrated in areas that have 
experienced serious economic decline, such as Northern Ireland 
or Scotland. In greater London, where there is substantial 
prosperity and a high concentration of corporate headquarters, 
enterprise agencies are predominantly private entities, showing 
little dependence on public funds (Smallbone, 1990, p. 19). 
The uncertainty over private funding and the prospect of 
sponsoring businesses withdrawing their support can create major 
problems for enterprise agencies, because a considerable number 
of agencies are reliant on single sponsors as the main source of 
finance (Metcalf et al., 1989, p. 4). In those instances where 
private sector support is withdrawn or where agencies cannot 
attract corporate funding in the first place, there are various 
funding safety nets available from public sources. Since 1986, 
the Department of Employment has operated the Local Enterprise 
Agency Grant Scheme, enabling approved agencies to obtain grant 
aid to match private sponsorship. In urban programme authorities, 
the Local Enterprise Agency Project (LEAP) is available for 
specific projects. Researchers have also shown the continued 
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importance of public funding for local enterprise agencies, 
especially those in economically depressed areas (see Moore et 
al. , 1985). One senior executive from LENTA, an enterprise agency 
totally funded out of private sector funds, on being interviewed 
was highly scornful of the fact that many agencies are reliant 
on public sector funds. The reason for his consternation is that 
the enterprise agencies were originally established to act as 
conduits for private sector support, and at the very least a 
means of public-private sector partnerships (Fieldwork Interview, 
LENTA, 16.11.92). Gibb and Durowse make an important observation 
about the injection of private funds into the enterprise agency 
network: 'Without public support of this kind, it is possible 
that the impetus of enterprise agency generation will die out and 
many of the agencies will disappear, thus weakening the number 
of channels available for large company participation in 
community initiatives' (1987, p. 15). 
We would have to conclude from this that corporate 
involvement in the enterprise agency movement has proven to be 
uneven. Subsequently, these agencies have demonstrated a greater 
reliance on public assistance than originally envisaged by those 
practitioners who helped establish the enterprise agencies in the 
first place. While corporate support for local enterprise 
agencies is not uniform, we need to consider whether the 
enterprise agency model, which provides business advice, support 
services and, where possible, private sector resources - 
financial, human and conceptual - for the small firm sector, has 
effectively promoted the advancement of this sector. 
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The importance of enterprise agencies to the small business 
sector has led some organisations to monitor the services 
provided by local agencies and their impact upon job and 
enterprise creation. But as Gibb and Durowse observe this is f ar 
from being a straightforward task: 'Some individual enterprise 
agencies have attempted to evaluate their activity, but their 
results can be taken as no more than broad indications of 
performance, given the great difficulties in relating 
interventions such as counselling or training or advice to 
, 'outputs' in terms of employment, income or jobs' (1987, p. 14). 
In addition, researchers have pointed to the distinct paucity of 
firms regularly monitoring the effectiveness of their activities. 
One exception to this is the Shell Livewire scheme. The 
Project North East enterprise agency that manages and administers 
the scheme regularly collates information on the number of young 
people using the business start-up advice service. The 
information is regularly published by Project North East or 
reported in the Livewire newspaper, The Link. The agency also 
collects information on the characteristics of enquirers: their 
regional location, gender and the commercial sector they envisage 
entering. These figures usefully demonstrate how the supposedly 
meritocratic enterprise culture is affected by socio-economic 
differentials between social groups and regions, and the 
structural weaknesses of particular commercial sectors. For 
instance, Northern Ireland represents 8% of Livewire 
registrations in the UK, compared to 76% for England (Livewire, 
1993f pp. 1-2). The Livewire figures also show that only 33% of 
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UK enquiries were made by women, reflecting the under 
representation of women in the small enterprise sector. 
In order to overcome the difficulties of generating 
entrepreneurial interest among economically disadvantaged social 
groups and regions, it is necessary to target and shape support 
for these needy categories. However, a study of 150 enterprise 
agencies by Deakins found only a minority of these organisations 
had a policy or strategy towards different groups of clients on 
the basis of age, gender, and ethnic grouping (1993, p. 65). 
Because support strategies tend to be non-targeted, as Deakins 
demonstrates, enterprise agencies may end up reproducing the 
inequalities that already exist in the world of small businesses. 
Turning from training and educational services to the vital 
task of job creation, there are certain difficulties in assessing 
the performance of local enterprise agencies according to this 
function. This problem is exacerbated by the characteristic 
reticence of enterprise managers to quantify their efforts in 
terms of jobs being created (Moore, 1988). From their point of 
view, they are simply facilitating the process of job creation 
by assisting the expansion of small firms. However, some 
assessments are more optimistic about the job creation 
capabilities of the local enterprise agencies: in a press 
release, BITC announced that the local enterprise agencies have 
helped create over 50,000 new jobs (Moore, 1988, p. 23). 
According to one report in the Shell Livewire newspaper, The 
Link, the scheme has created 8,000 jobs since its inception in 
1982, by helping young people consider the self-employment option 
(Livewire, 1992/93). 
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Recent academic studies of enterprise agencies suggest a 
tempered appraisal of the job-creating potential of enterprise 
agencies would be more appropriate. Moore (1988) examined the 
claims being made about enterprise agencies against trends in the 
local economy. The author focused on Neath, St. Helens and the 
Tyne and Wear where enterprise agencies have been active for a 
number of years. The actual contribution of the enterprise 
agencies to local economic development was marginal. Despite the 
founding of enterprise agencies, the level of unemployment grew 
in the areas studied by Moore. The qualms expressed by Moore's 
research over the inability of local enterprise agencies to 
generate concrete job opportunities reinforces the findings of 
other studies that show how small firms are unable to overcome 
the structural and economic disparities between regions (Storey, 
1985; Moore, 1988; Goss, 1991). Indeed, Storey (1982) claims that 
incentives to encourage the creation of small firms are 
regionally divisive, as they end up reinforcing economic 
inequalities between deprived and prosperous areas (cited in 
Goss, 1991, p. 132). 
Considering the participation of business in economic 
renewal has centred, especially during the early to mid-1980s, 
on assisting the small firm sector through local enterprise 
agencies, we would have to conclude the following from the above 
evidence: that corporate engagement in the local economy has not 
produced the sort of benefits depicted by copious publicity 
materials and corporate representatives. Furthermore, the 
potential effectiveness of the enterprise agencies might be 
limited by the nature Of corporate support, which lacks 
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uniformity and is often biased towards the larger enterprises. 
Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that enterprise agencies are 
intermediary organisations for channelling corporate resources 
into local economic and urban renewal. Hence, a fuller judgment 
regarding the capabilities of the private sector in this area of 
social policy can only be garnered once an examination is carried 
out of direct corporate intervention in local economic 
development. 
Direct intervention 
Although much corporate activity in this area is coordinated by 
organisations like BITC or local enterprise agencies, there are 
companies operating autonomously on their own terms in assisting 
the process of local and urban economic growth. The impetus may 
come from different divisions within the company - procurement 
or personnel departments - but often these activities are placed 
under the control of community affairs divisions (Gibb and 
Durowse, 1987). These autonomous interventions are normally 
conf ined to leading players in the field. To illustrate this, we 
will examine BAT Industries -a company, that since the early 
1980s, has participated in a variety of inner-city and economic 
renewal schemes. 
The social and community policy of BAT Industries, formed 
during the early to mid-1980s, rests on the company prioritising 
support for the small enterprise sector and inner-city 
rejuvenation - the former is viewed as a prerequisite for the 
latter. one aspect of enterprise creation where BAT has made an 
independent and distinctive contribution is in the provision of 
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managed work spaces for small enterprises in urban areas. The 
original impetus for BAT's interest in this area came during the 
early 1980s from the company's then chairman, Peter Macadam. 
According to one former BAT manager, Macadam was influenced by 
proclamations from government spokesmen and BITC officials that 
the rejuvenation of inner-cities was dependent on private sector 
companies stimulating entrepreneurial activities in these areas 
(Fieldwork Interview, Brixton Enterprise Centre, 15.9.92). In 
response, the company located the Toxteth area in Liverpool as 
a possible area which could benefit from an enterprise centre. 
(BAT already had a long established links with the city of 
Liverpool through its Sandhills cigarette factory. ) The company 
eventually chose to renovate a derelict warehouse in Liverpool's 
south docks. BAT, in 1982, placed E1.1 million to restore the 
warehouse into 120 separate units and offices for small 
businesses. As the Merseyside Development Corporation was 
overseeing the redevelopment of the south docks, it provided BAT 
with a E300,000 grant for the task; in addition BAT obtained tax 
concessions for the project by deliberately borrowing the E1.1 
million needed for the restoration through a lending house 
(Fieldwork Interview, Brunswick Enterprise Centre, 4.1.93). 
By 1983, the Brunswick Small Business Centre was fully 
renovated and offering services to local enterprises. At this 
point, BAT acquired a second derelict building, on this occasion 
the abandoned Bon Marche department store in Brixton. The company 
intended to pay for the renovation whilst renting the premises, 
as it had done in Liverpool, but it was forced to buy the 
freehold - at a cost of El million - in order to begin renovating 
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the building. Altogether the conversion cost BAT E2.2 million, 
and a further E800,000 was obtained from central government 
grants. The Bon Marche Centre (or the Brixton Enterprise Centre) 
was opened in 1984 with 100 unit spaces meant for small, light 
industrial enterprises. Both enterprise centres were founded to 
operate on a flexible tenancy-at-will basis, whereby tenants 
would not have to commit themselves to a contractual agreement 
for any length of time, and, thus, run the risk of losing revenue 
as a result. To support enterprises, both centres housed business 
advisors and counsellors. 
While BAT has placed substantial resources into both 
enterprise centres, including some of its managers to run the 
centres and senior officials to sit on the executive boards, 
subsequent events have demonstrated that Peter Macadam" s original 
plans were an underestimation of the deep seated economic 
problems faced by urban and inner-city localities. The demand for 
units by small enterprises in both centres has been considerably 
short of the actual supply: Brixton in 1990 had only 50% of its 
units filled, while Brunswick had a better rate at 75% (Fieldwork 
Interview, Brixton Enterprise Centre, 15.9.92). Because take-up 
rates were lower than expected by 1992, BAT found itself 
subsidising losses of around E200,000 for each centre. Such 
disappointment is put in perspective by the f act that the Brixton 
Centre is now worth E5 million; for an original investment of El 
million, this could prove profitable should the company wish to 
sell the property. At first, though, the realisation that both 
centres could not survive unless BAT provided ongoing support 
caused some consternation among senior managers, even for a 
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multi-billion pound business like BAT. A former BAT manager 
involved with the centre commented: 
I think they were slightly upset originally because 
they had been led to believe that it was a piece of 
cake, that the projects were going to break even, no 
problem at all, within two or three years. In 
practice, that turned out to be completely optimistic 
if we wanted to continue to do it the way we had 
planned to do it. So, I think they were a bit upset 
initially. I think everybody accepted that it was a 
good cause to be in but I think they didn't want to 
see a perpetual,, never ending expense. (Fieldwork 
Interview, Brixton Enterprise Centre, 15.9.92) 
BAT managers now accept the financial burden posed by the 
centres as part of the company, ' s social responsibility programme. 
However, the position occupied by these enterprise centres within 
the BAT organisation further highlights the predicaments faced 
by large private sector f irms when they attempt to embrace small 
enterprise and employment creation. To deal with the financing 
and general monitoring of the two organisations, the Brunswick 
and Brixton Enterprise Centres were placed under the aegis of a 
specially created company - BAT Industries Small Businesses Ltd. 
The subsidiary reports to corporate headquarters and the main 
board of directors on a monthly basis, which is problematic as 
the directors are responsible for weighty financial decisions and 
are unlikely to place much emphasis on the relatively minor 
financial concerns of the enterprise centres. As one official 
from the Brixton Enterprise Centre commented: 'Welre totally 
f oreign f ish in the corporate world -I think they f ind a certain 
amount of difficulty knowing exactly how to handle it. To be 
fair, most of them do, if they can spend the time, take quite a 
lot of interest. But I can, 't believe that it is something 
foremost in their minds, ' (Fieldwork Interview, Brixton Enterprise 
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Centre, 15.9.92). The institution of a direct line of command 
between the Small Business Subsidiary and the main BAT board is 
less a sign of the company keeping a tight reign over its 
finances than an index of its uncertainty. 
The problems that BAT has f aced in its contribution to local 
economic generation through supporting the small enterprise 
sector may be due to the fact that large f irms are substantively 
different from small enterprises. Contrary to theoretical and 
empirical economics, firm size is not part of a continuum, with 
large firms at one end and smaller companies at the other (Storey 
et al.,. 1987). Because there are sharp differences between these 
organisations, covering a whole gamut of areas such as employment 
practices, market power, financial structure and performance, 
corporate managers and executives are unlikely to fashion the 
type of support required by small firms (see Chapter 7 for a 
further discussion of this point). 
These difficulties might be compounded by geographical 
distance between corporations and the small enterprises, some 
located in deprived areas, that they are trying to support. This 
is well exemplified by one scheme,, where community affairs 
managers from BT established a venture capital fund. The Future 
Start Fund aimed to provide venture capital loans of between 
E50,000 and E250,000 to small enterprises looking to expand. The 
fund was specifically targeted at enterprises within inner-city 
districts, in which medium-term finance is characteristically 
difficult to obtain. In order to manage the E3 million fund, BT 
brought in Top Technology -a venture capital company; the 
company is ultimately answerable to Future Start's executive 
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board - made up of senior BT community affairs managers and 
consultants. The fund was in operation by June 1991, and the 
executive members from BT envisaged that within three years at 
least ten companies would be receiving support f rom Future Start. 
Since, 1991, however, Future Start has invested in only five 
companies, two of which have come close to collapse (Fieldwork 
Interview, BT, 30.4.93). These results have deflated the original 
expectations surrounding the scheme, but for those involved the 
recession has contributed to these difficulties. 
Oakey"s (1985) work on the role of financial infrastructures 
in small f irm development suggests other variables might account 
f or the modest success of Future Start. The argument put f orward 
by Oakey is as follows: for there to be economic growth in 
regions, there has to be a financial infrastructure capable of 
responding quickly and flexibly to local businesses. To provide 
this level of flexibility and responsiveness, financial 
organisations need to be oPerating in the indigenous economy. 
Provincially-based firms are loathe to respond to external 
funding sources such as venture capitalists lest they relinquish 
internal control to outside interests (Oakey, 1985, p. 159). 
Thus, the limited number of firms that have used Future Start may 
be due to the lack of contact between those operating the scheme 
- Top Technology and the executive board - and the regionally- 
located firms the scheme is trying to assist. A solution to the 
problem might have been to give local community af f airs managers 
control over the scheme. But at BT, as with many other 
corporations, community interventions are tightly controlled from 
central departments, normally based at corporate headquarters. 
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This means that the scope for devising local activities is 
limited to the prior approval from central departments and higher 
level management (see Siegfried et al., 1983). One local 
community affairs manager from BT articulated this very dilemma: 
What we"re trying to get sorted is a share of the 
money which BT gives to the community so that less is 
doled out by London and more money is available to the 
districts where the people are and the charities are 
working. (Fieldwork Interview, BT North-East Regional 
Centre, 7.1.93) 
From the preceding analysis, we would have to question if 
corporate action in local economic rejuvenation - whether through 
coordinated or direct involvement - has reversed economic decline 
in inner-city areas and other localities affected by recession. 
The selective support given to enterprise agencies, the minimal 
impact of small firms on economic growth, and the uncertainty 
over the ability of corporations effectively to harness the 
resources at their disposal for the purposes of local economic 
development has exemplified how the expectations surrounding 
corporate social involvement have proven to be unrealistic. 
Certainly, placed against this evidence, the claims made by those 
who have promoted corporate responsibility for the local economy 
have not made considered estimations concerning the potential of 
corporate social action. The involvement of the private sector 
in urban policy is driven by the politically expedient task of 
valorising the private sector and extending the enterprise 
culture; there is no empirical evidence or certainty that private 
sector involvement can bring about social benefits such as 
economic renewal and the raising of living standards for 
marginalised groups. 
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A concluding assessment 
The involvement of the private sector in local economic 
development and urban policy-making has implications for local 
democracy and elected institutions. The private sector 
undoubtedly has an important part to play in any policy strategy 
for local economic recovery. However, there has to be a degree 
of sensitivity and accountability on the part of socially active 
businesses towards the local communities they purport to serve. 
For some commentators, the determination of recent governments 
to involve the private sector in devising and implementing 
regeneration policies - through urban development corporations 
and enterprise zones and policy schemes like City Challenge - has 
resulted in resources and policy-making powers for the local 
economy being transferred from local town halls to unelected 
agencies and central government (Colenutt, 1988, p. 121). 
misgivings directed at efforts to abdicate urban policy and local 
development to the private sector has not been the preserve of 
the academic intelligentsia. Carley (1991), in an examination of 
business involvement in the rejuvenating Birmingham, found a 
number of commercial participants expressing doubts over the 
diminishing financial and political powers of Birmingham City 
Council to intervene in the local economy. 
The dominant expressions of private sector involvement in 
local economic regeneration must, ultimately, be judged according 
to whether this new direction in policy has reversed economic and 
social decline in recession-hit city areas. Because of the 
extensive resources and political capital invested into expanding 
the role of business in rejuvenation policy, we would expect this 
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strategy to have a modicum of success. willmott and Hutchison 
(1992) in a survey of urban trends between 1977 and 1991, provide 
an empirical study of how depressed areas - large cities, urban 
districts and former industrial centres - have progressed, 
relative to other parts of the country, under this new policy 
regime of the Conservative government. As the level of employment 
often determines the economic and social fortunes of a local 
area, Willmott and Hutchison examine employment and unemployment 
trends in 36 local authority districts; a number of these are 
assisted by urban development corporations, Task Forces, and City 
Action Teams, all of which have a strong business representation. 
Their findings provide a certain amount of succour for policy- 
makers and business leaders: 'It... looks as if the efforts of 
Urban Development Corporations, City Action Teams and Task Forces 
have helped improve the relative employment position of some 
deprived areas. On some other indices, too, there have been 
relative improvements in some areas" (1992,, p. 81). All the 
London boroughs that experienced increased levels of employment 
between 1989 and 1991 were either covered by City Action Teams 
or Task Force schemes. 
Much of this improvement could be put down to the general 
reduction of unemployment throughout the country during the late 
1980s boom. In fact, the share of new jobs during these years in 
the most deprived areas of the country was less than f or the rest 
of the country. Large conurbations such as Manchester and 
Liverpool have not enjoyed a proportional share of increased 
employment levels as the rest of the country during these years 
of economic recovery. The pattern remains the same according to 
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major trends in education, training, housing, poverty and 
welfare: despite general improvements, the economic and social 
conditions within underprivileged localities have not improved 
in relation to the rest of the country; and in times of recession 
the general opportunities for social advancement and quality of 
life measures of people living in these areas have shown a marked 
deterioration, especially when compared to other groups in 
society. Willmott and Hutchison note: 'But in general the gap 
between conditions and opportunities in deprived areas and other 
kinds of place - the gap that the government's 1977 White Paper 
sought to narrow - remains as wide as it was a decade and a half 
ago. In some respects the gap has widened' (Willmott and 
Hutchison, 1992, p. 82). 
In addition to national economic conditions, ensuring that 
these inequalities are transformed into permanent structural 
features, central government policies have contributed to 
economic decline in certain areas. The decrease in government 
money for local authorities in deprived areas, and the provision 
of special urban programme funding to unelected urban development 
corporations rather than needy authorities, has exacerbated 
matters in those areas already in decline (Willmott and 
Hutchison, 1992, p. 81). Hence, the dominant emphasis on 
enterprise and wealth creation in local economic policy, together 
with the considerable emphasis placed on the private sector, has 
to be questioned; from Willmott and Hutchison's analysis, these 
policies, contrary to expectations, have not narrowed the gap 
between deprived and prosperous regions: 'After 15 years, and 
many new initiatives, surprisingly little has been achieved. 
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Given the record so f ar, it is dif f icult to have much conf idence 
in more of the same or to feel at all hopeful about the future 
prospects for deprived urban areas' (Willmott and Hutchison, 
1992, p. 82) . 
After a myriad of initiatives over f if teen years and little 
in the way of concrete successes, the objectives remain the same: 
to improve the prospects of local areas and deprived urban areas. 
What has to change, however, are the policies and strategies 
adopted to achieve this end. 
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5 Befriending the Environment 
The previous chapter focused on corporate involvement in urban 
regeneration - an issue that heralded the modern era of corporate 
social responsibility in the mid-1970s. But our concern in the 
present chapter is to explore the relationship between 
environmentalism and business, which came to exercise particular 
influence during the latter half of the 1980s. The main rationale 
for attempting to analyse this subject in the first place is 
that, like the issue of economic regeneration, the environment 
has come to occupy a position of some pre-eminence in the social 
policies of corporations. Part of the reason for this has been 
the sheer welter of public and social interest generated by 
environmental issues. Hence, companies, like other social 
institutions, were enticed into considering the environment and 
contributing actively to the support of ecological charities and 
voluntary organisations. In view of the effects of modern 
commodity production on pollution levels and the importance of 
environmental regulations over industry,, corporate responsibility 
for the environment has led companies to scrutinise carefully 
their commercial operations and their impact on the well-being 
of wider society. 
One of the main objectives of this chapter is to discover 
why and how companies have become involved beyond the 
requirements of legislation in adopting responsible strategies 
for the environment. Moreover, we will consider the dominant 
preference for market mechanisms rather than regulatory 
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impositions in exacting such responsible practices on the part 
of companies. This part of the analysis delves into the 
possibility of whether the central motors of the market economy, 
the financial markets and consumer activity, can be harnessed for 
the purpose of improving the environmental performance of 
companies. 
Annus vex-idis: the greening of society 
Since the late 1980s, British society, like much of the Western 
world, underwent a conspicuous greening of public opinion. With 
awareness of green issues proliferating in all sections of 
society, the environmental movement was in a position to 
challenge the traditional partisan division between the interests 
of capital and labour - an institutionalised feature of most 
democracies (Lowe and Rudig, 1986, p. 529). The unprecedented 
success of the Green Party at the 1989 European elections, where 
it picked up 15% of the vote, indicated that the green message 
was winning over popular sentiment. A number of opinion surveys , 
carried out initially in America and later in Britain, confirmed 
that public awareness of environmental issues was gaining 
momentum (see Lowe and Goyder, 1983). A 1989 questionnaire survey 
by the Department of the Environment (DOE) provided a useful 
longitudinal view of the growing interest in green issues 
throughout the 1980s. The survey asked respondents, inter alia, 
what they regarded to be the areas that government should be 
prioritising: of the sample interviewed, over 30% regarded 
environmental pollution second only to the health and social 
services. By contrast, a similar DOE survey carried out in 1986 
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showed that only 8% of respondents thought the environment should 
be a priority concern for the government (Yearley, 1992). These 
surveys demonstrate that the emerging interest in green issues 
during the 1980s was not just confined to formal environmental 
campaigners - even though such organisations did experience an 
expansion in their membership in the 1980s - but was something 
that appealed to the broader public. What is more, the public 
appeal and stature of the environmental movement was indicated 
by the way non-environmental groups, such as lawyers, 
industrialists and educationalists, began scrutinising more 
closely the problems caused by pollution. Even the news media 
increased its coverage of the area. Although the significance and 
popularity of the environmental movement is not in question, 
there is less certainty over the actual causes for the popular 
dissemination of environmental ideas and principles as seen in 
Britain during the latter half of the 1980s. 
A number of theorists in this field of scholarship have 
explained the growth of environmental awareness in terms of 
paradigmatic shifts in the secular value system. In other words, 
values are seen to act as independent variables that can 
determine perceptions and behaviour regarding various issues, 
including the environment. One of the most influential thinkers 
to address this issue is Inglehart (1977), who devised the thesis 
of "post-materialist value change'. In it, Inglehart pointed to 
a discernable shift from a materialist value system, where 
economic security was paramount, to 'post-acquisitive' and later 
'post-materia list' values, which transcend material concerns in 
pursuit of metaphysical needs, such as love, aesthetic 
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appreciation and spiritual insight. Inglehart (1977) traces this 
development by contrasting the dominant values of those 
generations that lived through the Second World War and those 
born in the postwar period. The former category, according to 
Inglehart, grew up in a period dominated by economic depression 
and war; for this generation material needs and physical security 
were paramount. In the postwar years of economic prosperity and 
peace, individuals could take their material security f or granted 
and concentrate, instead, on fulfilling their metaphysical needs. 
In his early writings, Inglehart argued that the post-materialist 
value system gave rise to new forms of political activism, such 
as the peace movement, protests for civil rights, and anti- 
nuclear disarmament. The green movement can legitimately sit 
alongside these new political movements, but Inglehart in his 
earlier works failed to equate post-materialist values with the 
emergence of environmentalism as a political force. This task was 
left to subsequent authors such as Milbrath (1984), but Inglehart 
gave explicit consideration to environmentalism in his subsequent 
works (see Lowe and Rudig, 1986). According to these authors, the 
adoption of environmentalism due to the prevalence of a post- 
materialist value system gave rise to protests against nuclear 
energy, ecological activism and support for environmental 
legislation. 
This thesis has been widely adopted and modified by several 
authors. Yet, there are difficulties in attributing the rise of 
environmentalism to post-materialist value change. For 
sociological observers of ecological politics, there are 
'fundamental misgivings about the general enterprise of 
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conceptualizing environmentalism purely in terms of value change' 
(Lowe and Rudig, 1986, p. 517). The post-materialist thesis 
assumes that values are independent, objective and timeless 
causal variables of social behaviour. These variables, in turn, 
can be measured and assessed by utilising quantitative research 
methods like questionnaire surveys. However, social-psychologists 
have demonstrated that the values held by individuals are often 
subject to change and modification. Indeed, for sociologists 
studying public attitudes, the origins of popular concerns over 
issues do not result from substantive value changes or society- 
wide ideologies, but are born through the interplay between 
actual objective conditions and the subjective awareness of these 
conditions as problematic or a threat to personal existence. In 
other words, the prevalence of objective conditions in themselves 
are not sufficient to spread awareness of a particular social 
problem. Kitsuse and Spector point to the central dynamic in 
making social problem claims about particular issues, such as the 
environment: I ... we define social problems as the activities of 
groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect 
to some putative conditions. The emergence of a social problem, 
then, is contingent on the organization of group activities with 
reference to defining some putative condition as a problem, and 
asserting the need for ... changing the condition' (1989, pp. 203- 
4, authors' emphasis) - Although the authors are referring to the 
construction of social problems in general terms, the rise of 
environmentalism during the 1980s displayed the same sort of 
dynamic relationship between actual ecological conditions and the 
campaigning work of environmentalists. 
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Certainly, the 1980s provided no shortage of spectacular 
environmental disasters: the Chernobyl nuclear reactor explosion 
(1986), the Exxon Valdez oil spillage in Alaska (1989), and the 
Bhopal explosion in India (1984) dramatically brought to public 
attention the problem of environmental degradation and the threat 
of pollution to human existence. But public perceptions over the 
external threat posed by the deterioration of the ecosystem were 
not sustained by these dramatic events alone. As we have already 
mentioned in general terms, an important element in this raising 
of awareness have been the endeavours of intermediary groups, 
that is, environmental groups. 
Most of the agencies central to the raising of green 
awareness in the late 1980s were actually formed during an 
earlier period of mobilisation by the environmental movement in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. In contrast to the 1980s, where 
environmental groups consolidated their position and campaigning 
work,, the early 1970s saw the expansion of existing groups and 
the formation of many new green agencies. Researchers have found 
that between 1966 and 1975, the growth of environmental groups 
was more prolific than at any time in British history (Lowe and 
Goyder, 1983; Robinson, 1992). Amongst the new organisations 
formed in this period were Friends of the Earth, the Ecology 
Party,, Transport 2000, the Wildlife Advisory Group, the Tree 
Council, the Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group, Watch, and the 
Professional Institutions' Council for Conservation (Lowe and 
Goyder, 1983, p. 17). The emergence of these new groups, together 
with public support for their cause, led to a consideration of 
environmental issues within government. In response, the 
151 
government founded the Department of the Environment (DOE) in 
November 1970 to assume responsibility for environmental matters, 
previously spread across a variety of government departments. 
Official organisations can play a vital role in proselytising 
ideas or drawing public attention to issues. Indeed, the DOE has 
provided a formal mouthpiece for environmental protection. For 
Robinson, this government department fsymbolised the advent of 
a new political awareness which recognised the socio-economic 
significance of environmental concerns and the fact that 
environmental issues were interwoven with other policy areas' 
(1992, p. 11) . 
From this brief historical analysis, it can be deduced that 
there are several different organisations that have emerged in 
Britain with distinct traditions and objectives, but linked by 
the common objective of promoting the environment as a social and 
political cause. They were able to do this effectively during the 
1980s because of their ability to act, in Becker's (1973) words, 
as moral entrepreneurs (Yearley, 1992). These groups would seek 
out the environment as a social problem and then enlist the 
interest of the media, politicians and the community at large. 
In order to create a certain level of awareness about green 
issues, ecology groups throughout the 1980s ran several high 
profile campaigns to underline specific environmental threats and 
problems. 
The most noteworthy of these campaigns was that spearheaded 
by Greenpeace in the late 1980s to raise awareness about the hole 
in the layer of ozone gases which envelope the atmosphere to 
protect the earth against harmful ultraviolet radiation from the 
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sun. According to Yearley (1992), the perceived threat to the 
ozone layer was a turning point in the political fortunes of the 
green movement, helping to popularise the green cause as consumer 
campaigns were organised to ease the use of non-reactive CFC 
gases - the source of chemical threat to the ozone - in everyday 
consumer products like aerosols. Many other organisations have, 
at the same time, politicised the environment around specific 
issues or areas: the Marine Conservation Society has endeavoured 
to protect marine life, while Transport 2000 has lobbied to 
relieve road congestion because of the environmental dangers 
associated with car exhaust fumes. The growth of community based 
campaigns organised by less formal groups around local threats 
to the environment also contributed to the general awareness of 
ecological and related issues (Yearley, 1992). 
The work of both formal and informal organisations in making 
social problem claims about the environment through a number of 
successful campaigns during the 1980s resulted in the semblance 
of a 'comprehensive green ideology ... which allowed ecological 
politics to continue in the absence of an immediate threat, 
(Yearley, 1992, p. 86). The ideology centres around the 
understanding that detrimental changes in the ecosystem, which 
are the result of human agency and decision-making in the 
economic, political and social spheres, constitute an all- 
encompassing threat to immediate and future human existence. The 
content of this ideology convincingly puts f orward the case that 
the campaign for improving the environment is relevant to all 
social classes. Characteristically, the environmental movement 
has proven to be uniquely inclusive, and is one of the factors 
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that underlined its expansion during the late 1980s. Indeed, 
while formal environmental activism has remained largely a 
middle-class preoccupation (see Lowe and Goyder, 1983, pp. 10- 
12), as is the case with most forms of voluntary activity, one 
of the distinguishing features of contemporary environmentalism 
has proven to be its appeal across all sections of society. 
The inclusive character of the modern environmental movement 
is well exemplified by the way mainstream political parties have 
endeavoured to embrace its principles. The environment as a 
political issue is now not just the preserve of organisations 
dedicated to the green cause, but features in the policies of 
established parties in Britain. Possibly the pinnacle event in 
the recent greening of British politics was Margaret Thatcher's 
speech at the October 1988 Conservative Party Conference where 
she aligned Tory traditionalism with conservation (Robinson, 
1992). This speech broke a period of silence on the environment, 
which began after the 1987 election. Following Margaret 
Thatcher's pronouncements, both opposition parties published 
policy documents on the environment,, indicating that green issues 
were moving into the centre of party political debate - something 
they had been threatening up until the 1987 General Election 
(Robinson, 1992). 
As outsiders to the environmental movement, the traditional 
parties are not alone in being compelled to include the 
environment as part of their secular objectives. Several non- 
environmental institutions, including the media, advertising 
agencies, trade unions and engineers, have demonstrated a 
burgeoning concern for the environment. In addition to the 
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greening of civil society, the environment has also impinged on 
the economic sector. A significant development in this respect 
was the display of environmental sensibilities by prominent 
British corporations from the late 1980s onwards. In the 
following sections, the focus of this analysis will turn to how 
this modern greening of British capitalism came about and the 
main features regarding the assumption of environmental 
responsibilities by corporations. 
Capitalism and the environment 
The endeavours of corporations to demonstrate their environmental 
credentials should be seen as a specific manifestation of the 
recent expansion surrounding the green movement. A popular medium 
where companies drew attention to their support for the 
environment was in advertising. In the late 1980s, the use of 
environmental sentiments or green symbolism in promoting products 
within advertising were commonplace in Britain. The electronics 
company AEG in its press advertising claimed: 'People don't buy 
AEG just to care for their clothes. Our Lavamat automatic washing 
machines are also designed to look after something more delicate. 
The environment-. A Shell advert for unleaded petrol announced 
that its product was not only 'ecologically sound" , but also 
"economically sound' (Myers, 1991). In this climate of heightened 
environmental awareness, the marketing of ecologically-friendly 
products was also a popular phenomenon. one of the great 
commercial successes of the 1980s was the cosmetics chain the 
Body Shop, which based its whole commercial strategy around 
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caring for the environment through the sale of naturally-based 
products. 
The evident greening of business, in the context of a 
capitalist society, has generated certain paradoxes. French neo- 
Marxist, Bosquet (1977) argues that the central competitive 
dynamic of capitalism necessitates economic growth and the 
expansion of commodity consumption. In modern capitalist 
societies, this imperative can be seen by the way manufacturers 
produce commodities of temporary utility and the tendency to 
provide a range of models in order to expand future markets. 
These activities, as well as producing waste, place increasing 
pressure on finite natural resources. 
Environmental groups have been particularly adept at 
remonstrating against the environmental damage caused by modern 
industry and corporations. Many green activists have successfully 
argued that acid rain - when moisture in the air is polluted with 
various toxins, which, in turn, cause wastage in building 
structures - is the result of emissions from power stations and 
factories. Questions also arise over commodities purported to be 
environmentally benign: although oil companies have lauded the 
emergence of lead-free petrol as a significant breakthrough, 
reports from Britain show that some enterprises have been 
replacing the lead constituent with benzene rather than the more 
expensive additive MTBE (methyl tertiary butyl ether), employed 
in the United States and parts of Europe (Yearley, 1992, p. 38). 
However, not all environmental organisations have been openly 
critical of business enterprises. There are organisations, mainly 
engaged in practical conservation and amenity functions, that 
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have taken a conciliatory approach towards the business 
community. Even pressure groups belonging to the radical end of 
the green political spectrum are aware that isolating the 
corporate sector would in many ways prove to be counter- 
productive to their cause, f or they need to command the attention 
of business leaders in order to press for improvements in the 
environmental performance of businesses. 
Considering businesses hold a central position within the 
environmental debate, whenever companies begin collectively to 
demonstrate a positive response to environmentalism, as was made 
manifest in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Britain, there is 
normally analytical speculation over why such developments occur 
in the first place. One of the most prevalent explanations, 
especially within American academic circles, is based around the 
functionalist precepts of the contingency thesis, outlined in 
Chapter 1. According to this theory, corporations have sought to 
prioritise corporate responsibility because of the influence 
exerted by social and political factors in determining 
performance within the market economy. Windsor and Greanias note: 
I social responsibility and economic performance must become 
equal values in corporate strategy and must be fully coordinated 
in corporate decisionmaking' (1982, p. 78). Thus, in response to 
the mounting pressures exerted by the environmental movement, it 
has become necessary for companies to adopt strategies for 
dealing with the demands of environmental groups and governments. 
Such responses are viewed as an integral part to maintaining 
commercial viability (see Moskow, 1978, cited in Windsor and 
Greanias, 1982). 
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The awareness of green issues among firms, clearly evident 
in recent years, can be attributed to the general response of 
companies to the expansion of environmental legislation and the 
popularity of ecological issues. But there is less validity to 
the argument, made by the likes of Windsor and Greanias, that 
social and environmental policies are embraced as a strategic and 
functional response to the fact that events within wider society, 
such as the emergence of environmentalism, have decisive 
influence over the way economic objectives are fulfilled. These 
theorists seem to overstate the ability of wider social 
conditions to determine economic performance within companies, 
and, therefore, mistakenly regard environmental responsibility 
programmes as strategic responses to these external events. For 
instance, it can be seen that following the expansion of greenery 
in the late 1980s, the 1990s have seen a lull in the fortunes of 
the green movement (Rudig, 1993, p. 17). Thus, the uneven 
development that has characterised the environmental movement, 
as seen by recent events, has made it difficult to maintain the 
same level of wider public interest that can determine commercial 
activities to such an extent that businesses need to organise 
strategic responses. 
The relationship between environmentalism and industry is 
much more fluid and subject to a more complex set of variables 
than is acknowledged by the contingency theory. This perspective 
seems to assert a deterministic reciprocity between the 
politicisation of issues and the necessity for companies to 
devise some sort of strategic response. From available research, 
the influence of environmentalism on corporate policies is often 
158 
dependent on how senior personnel view its significance. For 
instance, the decision by BT to adopt a policy regarding the 
environment came after a recommendation by an environmental 
consultant to the main board in the late 1980s (Fieldwork 
interview, BT, 30.4.93). Logsdon (1985), in a study of how 
American oil refining companies dealt with the issue of 
pollution,, found that the attitudes of senior managers and 
executives, rather than financial or strategic considerations, 
were central in determining a companyfs sensitivity to 
environmental issues. Logsdon writes as follows: 'While 
environmental problems and possible solutions occur at all levels 
in the hierarchy, top executives must acknowledge the existence 
of pollution problems and provide financial resources and 
encouragement before much will be done, ' (1985,, p. 68). While 
executives are influenced by public concerns, their decisions are 
not rigidly set by strategic imperatives to respond and adapt to 
these external pressures. It might be that company executives, 
who on the whole share similar middle-class backgrounds to most 
environmental activists,, are bound to show some degree of concern 
over the environment. 
Another significant factor in the general elevation of green 
issues in the corporate sector has been the changing relationship 
between the government and the private sector. As we have seen, 
the government has expanded the opportunities f or direct private 
sector involvement in social problem areas. The issue of 
environmental protection, during the latter part of the 1980s, 
has come to constitute one of these areas of intervention. 
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Business-environment agencies and the voluntary sector 
In the changing political and social climate of the 1980s, the 
phenomenon of corporate social involvement was expanded through 
the government actively pursuing collaborations with the business 
sector on significant policy areas like inner-city rejuvenation. 
The same endeavours to build partnerships between public and 
private bodies has characterised certain aspects of the 
government's environmental strategy. 
Throughout the 1980s, the government drew the corporate 
sector into environmental protection mainly by bridging the gap 
between the private sector, public and independent environmental 
agencies. But there were instances of government agencies 
collaborating with businesses over environmental causes in 
earlier decades: the Nature Conservancy Council in 1969 was the 
first public body to enter into partnership with business, when 
it helped to fund, assisted by Shell, the Better Britain 
Campaign. The campaign, which helps small conservation groups 
working on a local basis, is still operating under the auspices 
of Shell and other environmental organisations (Shell Better 
Britain Campaign, 1988). But it was during the 1980s that the 
process of partnership-building between business and 
environmental groups, through government intervention, increased 
rapidly. Existing public agencies for the environment have played 
their part as interlocutors between firms and environmental 
organisations. The Nature Conservancy Council in the 1980s formed 
a specialist Partnership and Industry Liaison Unit. In addition, 
it attempted to stimulate business sponsorship of environmental 
schemes by forming independent Industry and Nature Conservation 
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Associations (Forrester, 1990, p. 23). The DOE - historically at 
the forefront in promoting corporate social involvement - has 
been instrumental in generating openings for corporate support 
of environmental schemes and organisations. The Conservation 
Foundation was one of the first relevant initiatives to be taken 
up by the DOE. It was launched in 1982, with the blessing of 
Michael Heseltine, to broker private and industrial sponsorships 
of voluntary environmental groups. 
Another conspicuous manoeuvre in this f ield was the creation 
of special forums, allowing companies, mainly large corporations, 
to discuss ecological strategies and make recommendations 
concerning environmental legislation. Two main policy forums for 
business emerged at the latter end of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Firstly, the Business in the Environment Target Team was formed 
by BITC in 1989. The members of the Target Team were exclusively 
drawn from the ranks of senior executives of major corporations 
and financial institutions, including the likes of ICI, TSB, 
Tesco,, BT, IBM. The programme of the Target Team involved 
discussions about what the environmental priorities of the 
private sector should be and how to apply the notion of 
sustainable development to commerce. Secondly, the Advisory 
Committee on Business and the Environment was jointly constituted 
in 1991 by the DOE and DTI, following the DOE's White Paper (DOE, 
1990), This Common Inheritance, in which it pledged a commitment 
to establishing a closer dialogue with business on environmental 
policy (Advisory Committee on Business and the Environment, 
1992). Again, executives from some of Britain, 's largest companies 
were invited to join the 24 member committee to ruminate over 
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legislative issues and good environmental practice within 
business. 
The growth of such intermediary groups has seen a 
corresponding expansion in corporate support for conservation 
work. One of the first, though ultimately unsuccessful, 
organisations established for this purpose was UK 2000. This 
agency was established in 1986 as away of attracting business 
sponsorship through government incentives for voluntary 
environmental schemes. A more successful foray was made with the 
Groundwork Foundation in 1985. This agency grew out of Operation 
Groundwork, an urban renewal scheme implemented by the 
countryside commission in areas around the North-West during the 
early 1980s. Since its inception, the Groundwork Foundation has 
attempted to bring together support from local authorities, 
government, businesses and voluntary organisations in order to 
create a national network of autonomous trusts - cell-like 
voluntary groups - involved in rejuvenating the urban 
environment. Most of the financial support comes from the DOE, 
which has made funding available until 1995 to expand the present 
number of trusts from 31 to 50 (Fieldwork Interview, Groundwork 
Foundation, 7.5.93). While the government Treasury secures the 
bulk of the Foundation's income, it has managed to attract wide- 
ranging business support. The Foundation's first major private 
sector collaboration was with Shell in the Brightsite Campaign, 
a scheme that became axiomatic to the Foundation's work. The 
Brightsite Campaign was launched in 1988 by Shell in conjunction 
with the Countryside Commission and the European Community, but 
the implementation of the scheme was actually overseen by the 
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Groundwork Foundation and its network of local trusts. over a 
three-year period, Shell placed over E255,000 into the programme, 
whose main objective was to bring the environmental message to 
small businesses. The scheme has tried to encourage small 
enterprises to restore any derelict land around their factory 
premises by offering free landscape design and low cost 
maintenance services through the network of Groundwork trusts. 
Once presented with these proposals for renovation, a company 
would then be left to decide whether it wants to follow up the 
plans made by the local Groundwork trust. In 1989, over 300 
companies used the landscape design service, with around 40% of 
these businesses accepting the improvement plans (Forrester,. 
1990, p. 31). Because the Foundation uses the financial resources 
at its disposal to undertake practical environmental projets that 
have definite, concrete results, and generally avoids contentious 
issues, several companies have patronised its work: British Gas 
agreed to a three-year sponsorship of Groundwork"s training 
programme for environmental managers,, while BT has seconded staff 
to the Colne Valley Groundwork Trust (Groundwork Today, 1992). 
It appears, then, that government intervention has helped 
promote business support of voluntary environmental organisations 
and practical conservation schemes. The liaising between the 
private sector and voluntary environmental groups has constituted 
a major advance in terms of actively engaging corporations in the 
area of environmental responsibility. However, surveys have shown 
that environmental bodies, despite government efforts in recent 
years, have been less successful than other voluntary and social 
causes in corporate giving schemes. The Charities Aid Foundation, 
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in a 1991 survey of top corporate donors, produced these 
findings: the number of environmental organisations mentioned as 
beneficiaries of corporate funds stood at 419 compared to 2,718 
in the medical and health field and 1,014 in education. A further 
survey of 213 companies for the 1991-92 period revealed that 4.9% 
of total corporate cash donations went to environmental causes 
(Woollett, 1993,, p. 11) . In addition, as Forrester observes, 
major environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth and World 
Wide Fund f or Nature have come to see environmental sponsorships 
as only flight green' solutions to environmental problems. 
The new decade is opening with some important changes 
in the relationships between major environmental 
groups and companies. The current sponsorship approach 
of Friends of the Earth and World Wide Fund for 
Nature ... now illustrates the creative recognition of 
a simple truth. That no matter how worthy and useful 
company sponsorships of environmental groups may be 
they are of negligible importance to or influence on 
the quality of our environment as a whole, that it is 
far more important, if not imperative, for companies 
themselves to develop coherent environmental policies, 
audited, monitored, staffed and reviewed regularly at 
board level. (1990, p. 143) 
In the next sections, we shall focus on how companies have 
managed to embrace these recommendations for improving 
environmental performance. 
Improving environmental performance 
The main focus here is on how firms can go about assuming 
responsibility for protecting and improving the quality of the 
environment. The most obvious procedure whereby this objective 
can be achieved is for there to be a strict adherence to 
environmental legislation among companies. From 1831 to 1986, 
there have been around 86 Acts of Parliament covering various 
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aspects of the environment. Much of this legislation, in one way 
or another, has attempted to regulate the impact of industry and 
private commercial activities on the environment (Cutrera, 1991, 
pp. 832-3). According to Vogel, because relations between 
government and the most powerful sections of the business 
community have, historically, been conducted on the basis of 
cooperation, environmental legislation has followed a flexible 
strategy, leaving considerable scope for administrative 
discretion and interpretation (1986, p. 70). 
In view of the latitude afforded by such legislation, over 
the years there has emerged a close relationship between 
environmental regulators and business institutions. From 
researching the enforcement of environmental regulations on 
businesses, Peacock (1984) found that officials were often 
sensitive to the specific circumstances of individual companies 
and took these into account when applying statutory requirements. 
Hence, in times of economic recession when profit margins are 
tighter, regulatory obligations tend to be less demanding than 
usual (Peacock, 1984, p. 104). Peacock concludes that the task 
of setting regulatory standards and their enforcement involves 
a constant process of bargaining and negotiation between company 
representatives and officials. Symptomatic of the inbuilt 
flexibility of the legislative process is the reluctance of 
enforcement agencies to prosecute businesses found infringing 
statutory environmental regulations. Research has shown how the 
number of prosecutions as a ratio of actual environmental 
infringements is very small (Ogus, 1983, p. 62). In fact, 
officials and agencies often rely on informal mechanisms to 
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secure compliance. one common ploy, according to Hawkins, is for 
field officers to reason with company representatives and appeal 
to their sense of social responsibility (1983, p. 51). 
Government administrations throughout the 1980s have 
attempted to reinforce the flexible and informal approach to the 
enforcement of legislation by reducing the burden of 
environmental regulations faced by the private sector. These 
administrations have deliberately failed to implement legislation 
passed in earlier Parliaments: many of the clauses contained in 
the Control of Pollution Act of 1974 and numerous European 
Community directives for protecting the environment have been 
deliberately scuppered or their enforcement delayed in Britain 
by government ministers (Goldsmith and Hildyard, 1986, pp. 18- 
19) . 
In the early nineties - probably as a reaction to the 
popularity of environmentalism - the government and relevant 
departments, such as the DTI, expressed the need for rigorous 
enforcement of environmental standards. However, the White Paper 
(DOE, 1990) on the environment, This Common Inheritance, 
indicated a distinct shift in policy emphasis towards the use of 
self-regulation. The paper mentioned that, while legislation 
would continue to provide the basis for pollution control,, 
recourse to the state was not necessarily the most cost-effective 
way of improving environmental standards among businesses. 
Instead, the document argued that this objective would be 
practically achieved by utilising market mechanisms (McCartney, 
1991, p. 35). The White Paper specifically considered how fiscal 
modifications, such as the introduction of carbon taxes, can be 
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used to monitor the impact of industry on the environment - 
suggestions eagerly endorsed by business groups (Advisory 
Committee on Business and the Environment, 1993, p. 59). 
Recent developments in the market economy, namely the 
emergence of green consumerism and ethical investment, have given 
a significant fillip to those advocating the use of self- 
regulation and market mechanisms as a way of improving the 
environmental performance of companies. The notion of consumer 
and financial mechanisms representing market-styled forces for 
imposing environmental responsibilities on business enterprises 
has achieved much prominence in recent years (Elkington and 
Hailes, 1988). The emerging acceptability of market mechanisms 
as instruments for social change clearly gives credence to the 
political tenets of the New Right. Considering the emphasis on 
using market mechanisms within government circles and the 
importance attached to green consumerism and investment, we will 
turn our attention to these market developments and assess the 
implications for improving the environmental performance of 
industry, especially in the areas of product analysis and 
environmental performance reporting. 
The greening of finance and environmental reporting 
The occurrence of serious environmental disasters in the 1980s, 
together with the popularity of environmentalism, alerted banks 
and insurance companies to the liabilities they would be likely 
to incur when financing environmentally hazardous businesses. The 
American financial community has been particularly sensitive to 
such eventualities following the Exxon Valdez disaster and 
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legislation concerning financial liability over contaminated 
land. In Britain, the raising of green awareness within the 
financial sector has proven to be a gradual affair. In recent 
years, insurers and banks have insisted on carrying out 
environmental audits of potential borrowers (Peacock, 1984). 
Thus, the emergence of ethical and environmental funds is of 
significance to the greening of finance in Britain. 
Again, the United States led the way in the field of ethical 
investment during the early 1970s with the establishment in 1972 
of the Dreyfus Third Century Fund. Now, the States possesses 
several financial management houses solely devoted to this form 
of investment. It was not until the early 1980s that similar 
funds began to operate on the British stock market. The initial 
signs of this form of financial activity came with inception of 
the Ethical Investment Research Service (hereafter, EIRIS) in 
1983, and was followed a year later by the first ethical 
investment fund, Friend's Provident Stewardship Trust. Although 
Britain is still waiting for a financial house devoted 
exclusively to ethical investment, several financial institutions 
have established specialist divisions to plug the social and 
ethical market. For example, Jupiter Tarbutt Merlin in 1988 
launched the first authorised unit trust fund with environmental 
credentials - the Ecology Fund (Simpson, 1991, p. 20). The actual 
number of ethical funds operating in the UK markets to date is 
encouraging: according to recent EIRIS (1993) estimates, there 
are around 26 ethical and environmental funds officially 
functioning. The investment programmes of these funds are 
underpinned by both positive and negative criteria. In terms of 
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the latter, funds will try to avoid placing investments in 
sectors deemed unethical - tobacco, alcohol, and gambling - or 
particular organisations with socially unacceptable interests, 
such as the defence industry, nuclear power and investments in 
oppressive regimes. On the other hand, when using positive 
criteria, funds tend to favour businesses with attributes that 
are considered to be of social value; for environmental funds 
this may result in favouring businesses which are involved in 
recycling and those that manufacture pollution abatement 
equipment. 
According to the American social theorist, Severyn T. Bruyn, 
the emerging financial practice of allocating capital through 
social investors can potentially advance the well-being of 
society at several levels: employment policies, urban community 
and Third World underdevelopment. He writes: 'The trend towards 
social investment may seem insignificant in the context of the 
larger forces of business today, but evidence is accumulating 
that it could become a significant movement in the near futuref 
(Bruyn,, 1987,, p. 253). Even those on the left of the political 
spectrum have acknowledged that finance capital, such as pension 
funds, can be utilised to change the social and material 
circumstances of the labouring classes (Murray, 1983). 
With the expansion of ethical and environmental investment 
in Britain, we would expect this to have some repercussions for 
corporate social responsibility. The main area of corporate 
policy where we would expect ethical and environmental funds to 
achieve some change is this: the disclosure of information 
concerning the effects of commerce on wider society. The reason 
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for this is that, as Rockness and Williams (1988) have found, 
ethical investors are heavily reliant on company reports and 
publications to guide their investment decisions; a point also 
made by Miller, as he observes that social investment is 
'dependent upon the availability of extensive and accurate 
information' (1992, p. 245). Hence, as a distinct user group, 
ethical investors require and are likely to press for better 
disclosure of information on subjects like environmental 
protection, relations with repressive regimes, product quality, 
and defence contracting. In the process of divulging socially 
relevant information, a company should become accountable and 
sensitive to the needs of society. In the present chapter, we 
will focus specifically on environmental investment and its 
influence on the disclosure policies of companies. 
Environmental reporting, like ethical investment funds, is 
a recent phenomenon, which has taken root with the upsurge in 
green awareness. While there are a number of statutory provisions 
and European Community directives requiring the disclosure of 
environmentally sensitive information, the preference of the 
business community and government in Britain has been for 
reporting practices to be flexible and voluntary. There are 
several mechanisms that can be adopted to make environmentally 
sensitive information freely available: the eco-audit, which is 
a variant of the social audit that gained popularity during the 
1970s as a response to factory closures; eco-labelling, which 
indicates the environmental properties of a commodity; the 
setting up environmental management systems, like BS7750; and the 
adoption of environmental charters such as the Valdez Princip es. 
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Studies have shown how these voluntary disclosures are 
mainly confined to larger institutions and that in recent years 
an increasing number of companies have provided environmental 
information within in-house and financial documents. Harte and 
Owen, studying environmental disclosures in the annual reports 
of what are considered to be 30 of the top reporting companies 
in Britain, make this observation: "Although we have concentrated 
on detailed reporting in the 1990 annual reports, we have 
observed on the basis of a comparison made with the previous 
year"s annual report what we believe is a general increase in the 
level of environmental disclosure' (1991, p. 55). Some of the 
most notable examples of contemporary environmental reporting are 
provided by the Norwegian industrial combine, Norsk Hydro, which 
published a report on the emissions, discharges and hazardous 
substances produced by its UK businesses. In addition,, the 
cosmetics company Body Shop produced an extensive 32-page 
environmental report. BT's Environmental Performance Report, the 
first in the company's history, furnishes a detailed examination 
of BT-s impact on the environment. The BT report and the way it 
emerged is worth commenting upon in some detail, because it 
illustrates the requirements and institutional changes that have 
to be implemented, and the possible uncertainties generated by 
this form of social reporting. 
The telecommunications industry is generally regarded as 
environmentally benign. The sheer size of BT, though, means that 
it does have a significant impact on the environment. Towards the 
end of the 1980s,, when the environmental movement was at its 
zenith, BT was alerted to the implications emanating from its 
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size as a commercial organisation and began to act accordingly. 
Prior to this, the company's environmental considerations were 
confined to a few isolated schemes,, often the part of cost- 
cutting exercises (Bowtell, 1991). By the late 1980s, the 
Community Affairs Division organised several environmental 
sponsorship schemes as a part of the company's expanding social 
programme at the time. But the company's interest in 
environmental responsibility went beyond supporting environmental 
groups, when the decision was made to provide information on the 
impact of BT's operations on the environment. 
The reason for BT's decision to adopt a reporting programme 
on environmental performance came as the result of suggestions 
made by an external consultant (Fieldwork Interview, BT, 
30.4.93). In 1989, BT commissioned the environmental consultancy 
group, SustainAbility (sic], to carry out a scoping study of the 
company. The final report recommended that BT should institute 
environmental functions within the management and board structure 
and that it should adopt a formal, company-wide policy on the 
environment. Following Elkington's (1987) classic formulae for 
, 'environmental excellence', the formative step taken by a 
specially appointed environmental liaison panel was to draft a 
policy statement, which was then sanctioned by the main board and 
published in March 1991. The policy detailed ten main commitments 
where the company would seek to minimise the impact of its 
operations on the environment: meet and, where possible, exceed 
legislative requirements; promote recycling; design energy 
efficiency into new services; reduce, where practicable, the 
level of harmful emissions; minimise waste; assist suppliers to 
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minimise the impact of their operations; protect visual amenity; 
promote, through community programmes, environmental protection; 
include environmental considerations in company training 
programmes; monitor progress and produce an environmental 
performance report on a yearly basis (BT, 1992). 
BT, at this point could have remained taciturn about its 
environmental performance, but the decision was taken late in 
1991 to publish an environmental performance report. Managers 
that eventually became part of the Environmental Issues Unit, 
which forms a part of BTfs Community Affairs Division based at 
the company's headquarters in London,, acknowledged that the 
company took a considerable risk, in terms of tarnishing its 
reputation as an environmentally clean company, by producing a 
report containing environmental ly-sens itive information (Tuppen, 
Because the company does not partake in environmentally 
contentious areas, it could afford to be selectively candid in 
the report. The information for the intended report was gathered 
by an independent consultant and then modified for publication 
by managers from the Environmental Issues Unit. The final 
document - published in May 1992 - combined narrative and 
statistical data for 'a self-critical and open review of BTIs 
operations and how they affect the environment' (BT, 1992f p. 2). 
It also included future target objectives for improving 
environmental performance. In the process, BT did face certain 
difficulties in obtaining relevant statistical information, as 
it was not under statutory obligation to monitor waste and 
emissions. Consequently, most of the details for the twenty-five 
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page report were derived from purchasing statistics, and disposal 
contracts (Tuppen, n. d. ). 
The information gained from these sources is deliberately 
presented to address each of the ten commitments made in the 
environmental policy statement. For instance, in terms of energy 
consumption, the report reveals how the company's use of 
electricity, oil and gas represents around 0.2% of the UK's total 
energy use. As part of its pledge, the report maintains that BT 
will stabilise carbon dioxide emissions resulting from its heavy 
energy use to their 1990 levels by the year 2005. Regarding 
harmful emissions, the report discloses that BT's emission of 
twenty-eight tons of ozone depleting chemicals represents around 
0.25% of the UK total. To reduce these harmful emissions, the 
company has pledged to use refrigerants with lower ozone- 
depleting potential. 
The BT report is part of a growing trend towards 
environmental and social reporting among businesses. In view of 
the fact that ethical funds are dependent on companies disclosing 
information to plan their investments -a feature of investment 
strategy that is now well established in the literature (Owen et 
al. , 1987; Rockness and Williams, 1988; Harte et al. , 1991) - 
this constitutes a welcome development. However, even with 
ethical investment gaining prominence (Mitchell et al., 1990), 
environmental reporting has been confined to larger companies, 
and is still far from being the norm among British and European 
corporations in general (Roberts, 1991). For instance, the 
Institute of Business Ethics (1990) . in a questionnaire survey 
of 500 chief executives taken from the top 1,000 companies, found 
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out from 82 full responses that only 12 companies provided 
information on environmental performance in their annual report; 
but a further 16 indicated that this issue was under 
consideration (cited in Harte and Owen, 1991). 
What has to be examined now is the substantive quality of 
these environmental disclosures. The growing body of work being 
done on disclosure practices shows that the actual standard and 
quality of environmental reporting, particularly from the view 
point of prospective user groups like environmental investors, 
is variable and not characterised by the type of detailed 
assessment and institutional procedures demonstrated by BT,, Norsk 
Hydro and the Body Shop. In one study, Harte and Owen (1991) 
examined 30 businesses, highly regarded by ethical investors for 
their consistent and open reporting of social and environmental 
information. According to the authors, the list includes the 
majority of the best reporters on the environment, such as the 
Body Shop, BT, Marks & Spencer, NFC and Unilever. using annual 
reports as their source material, Harte and Owen considered the 
extent of financial and non-financial disclosure on the 
environment (1991, p. 53). In terms of the standards of 
reporting, the authors found a paucity of detailed information 
on environmental performance and innovations in this area. A 
great deal of the information presented included statements of 
good intent: 'Much of the disclosure appears to be linked to the 
development of an image, suggesting that it is good for both 
customers and shareholders that the company be environmentally 
aware, rather than representing a commitment to the concept of 
Public accountability' (Harte and Owen, 1991, p. 55). 
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This point about the utility of company documents for 
ethical investment forms the basis of a study by Perks et al 
(1992). The authors identified 17 companies, such as Body Shop, 
British Gas, Argyll group and Tesco, which regularly enjoyed 
investments from environmental funds. They examined the extent 
to which the environmental disclosures provided by these 
companies within their annual reports were sufficiently detailed 
for environmental funds to make informed and considered 
judgements about their investment strategies. From their 
analysis, Perks et al (1992) conclude that there was only a 
modicum of information which could assist ethical investors in 
deciding whether or not environmental requirements are being 
satisfied. Indeed, company reports are presented as meeting the 
information requirements of investors in general terms, but they 
are lacking in the specific information needs of ethical 
investors who are concerned with environmental issues: 
But, in common with other information included in this 
part of the annual report, such information is 
selective, partial, unquantified and not subject to 
external verification... If annual reports are used as 
a basis for environmental investment decisions it 
seems that in many cases investors have little more to 
rely on than scattered references to environmental 
concerns. (Perks et al., 1992, p. 55) 
The findings from this research are reinforced and confirmed by 
other studies. Ullmann in a review of the research literature on 
corporate social disclosure concludes that studies generally show 
a weak link between social disclosure and social performance 
(1985, pp. 544-5). More than this, some researchers have found 
only a tenuous relation between the information disclosed and 
independent measures of environmental performance. Ingram and 
Frazier from their research of environmental disclosure by 
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American companies argue that because 'management is free to use 
its own discretion in selecting information to be reported, it 
is possible for poorer performers to bias their selections in 
order to appear like the better performers' (1980, p. 620). 
It appears at the present moment that corporate procedures 
for disclosing information do not provide the level of 
transparency and detailed information required by ethical 
investors. some practitioners argue that improvements in the flow 
of environmental and social information will depend largely on 
the mobilisation of ethical funds. Harte et al write: fFuture 
developments in social and environmental reporting in Britain may 
arguably hinge upon the growth in both size and influence of the 
ethical investment movement... and its consequent ability to lobby 
effectively on issues of accounting policy making" (1991, p. 
245). Although operating for a relatively short period of time, 
ethical funds have grown significantly in recent years and their 
performance in the financial markets, according to some business 
analysts, have not only equalled but surpassed the FT Ordinary 
Index (Dunham, 1988, p. 104). In future years, these funds may 
come to exercise a decisive influence over business operations. 
However, our final conclusion must be tempered by this 
observation: there are certain structural factors which may limit 
the ability of these funds, contrary to what Bruyn (1987) 
asserts, to act as the harbingers of corporate accountability and 
social change based on the availability of social and 
environmental information. 
The influence that ethical funds are able wield is inversely 
proportional to their financial wherewithal. From aval ab e 
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statistics, ethical funds constitute only a small proportion of 
total equity investments: in 1989 ethical funds were valued at 
E200 million, but this constituted 0.06% of the total value of 
UK equity. Furthermore, the E6 billion invested according ethical 
and environmental principles - an estimate made by Dunham (1990) 
- still only amounts to 2% of the total UK equity (Perks et al., 
1992). The marginal economic status of the ethical funds has 
confined them to a passive investment role: they either avoid 
companies which fail to meet social and environmental criteria 
or invest in those that meet various ethical characteristics. 
There have been no concerted efforts on the part of ethical funds 
to actively change company policies. In a study of 13 ethical 
funds by EIRIS (1989), it was found that just one of these funds 
tried directly to influence company policies, and only three of 
the funds carried out a policy of informing companies from which 
they had disinvested the reasons for withdrawing their funds 
(cited in Harte et al., 1991). These structural constraints, 
curtailing the ability of ethical funds to change reporting 
procedures and reform commercial policies, have been compounded 
by the limited number of enterprises that comply with ethical and 
social criteria. This may result in a situation where ethical 
funds are permanently locked into a vicious circle, where they 
are unable to amass the necessary resources, because the range 
of possible investments at their disposal are limited. On the 
other hand, these funds may occasionally relax their ethical and 
social principles when making investment decisions. 
Investigations by EIRIS have revealed particular cases of ethical 
funds investing in areas that would ordinarily be excluded. 
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In view of the limitations faced by ethical funds, there 
might be considerable possibilities in mobilising institutional 
investors - many of which constitute the dominant shareholders 
in the largest and most powerful corporations - behind ethical 
and environmental causes. Despite the action taken by some 
pension funds belonging to local authorities and university 
investors, their demands for greater information, especially 
environmental data, has proven to be minimal. Most of these 
investment decisions made by institutions are the purview of 
technical specialists, who aspire to financial rather than social 
and environmental goals (Perks et al., 1992). Further 
restrictions have been imposed by the demands of investment law 
on financial organisations. Under the Trustee Investment Act 
(1961) investors and trustees of a fund have to pursue maximum 
financial returns. It is illegal, as demonstrated by high profile 
court cases such as Cowans and Scargill (1984), for trustees to 
forgo a higher return on ethical grounds. Consequently, a 
significant proportion of possible environmental investments are 
closed off to major funds in the capital market because the 
profit yield would not be as high as mainstream investments 
(Ward, 1991; Gray et al., 1993). 
While it seems, then, that the financial markets have only 
a minor influence over corporate procedures, the mobilisation of 
the green movement at the end of the 1980s saw the emergence of 
green consumerism; a phenomenon regarded as having the potential 
to make companies aware of their environmental responsibilities. 
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The greening of consumerism 
The postwar growth of the commodity market alerted social 
scientists to the importance of consumer behaviour in the overall 
functioning of the economic system. Gist writes: 'A fundamental 
tenet of our economic system is that scarce economic resources 
are ultimately allocated by the preference patterns of final 
consumers; that is, we as consumers vote, as it were, for 
particular types of institutions and for particular types of 
products and services' (1971, p. 33, quoted in Craig Smith, 1990, 
p. 93). A recent development within the commodity-purchasing 
market is the emergence of ethical consumer behaviour. Here, 
consumer groups have organised product boycotts or disclosure 
campaigns against commercial organisations seen to be infringing 
ethical and social standards (Johnson, 1986). The rise to 
prominence of these campaigns has led some authors to argue that 
ethical consumerism can act as a force for making companies aware 
of their social responsibilities. While consumers will have 
divergent views over what constitutes socially responsible 
action, 'this is not a disadvantage to the notion of ethical 
purc hase behaviour; it is simply indicative of the essence of 
consumer sovereignty and the right to choose' (Craig Smith, 1990, 
p. 96). Central to the mobilisation of consumer action, according 
to Craig Smith, is the work of pressure groups: these groups 
provide information on ethical purchase issues and educate the 
public in ethical consumer strategies. All of this will alert 
corporate managers to the need for reform. 
In Britain, the issue of ethical consumerism has emerged 
only in the past few years and been brought to public attention 
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largely on the back of the green movement. A number of campaigns 
organised by environmental groups have alerted the general public 
to the fact that certain products, when utilised, can damage the 
environment. Included in this category are aerosols, which 
produce ozone-depleting CFC gases, and detergents, containing 
harmful phosphates and bleaches. Even if a product is inherently 
benign, its actual extraction and production can result in 
unintended harm to the ecosystem. The destruction of dolphin 
populations resulting from tuna fishing is a typical example. The 
proposition of those advocating green consumerism is that, by 
purchasing the right products, individuals can help protect the 
environment. 
This form of consumer activism was initially popularised 
through campaigns by Friends of the Earth in the 1970s against 
wasteful packaging and the importation of products from baleen 
whales (Irvine, 1989, p. 6). The resurgence of the environmental 
movement in the late 1980s gave significant impetus to green 
consumerism. One feature of this was the publication of consumer 
literature, such as Elkington and Hailes's (1988) seminal book, 
The Green Consumer Guide. In addition to these tomes , independent 
agencies - the Ethical Consumer and New Consumer - were founded 
specifically to mobilise the consumer market, which in 1990 was 
estimated to worth a total of E290 billion, into purchasing 
environmentally-safe commodities (Adams et al., 1991). 
The proliferation of green consumerism towards the end of 
the 1980s saw advances being made in the environmental ly-f riendly 
commodities available on the market and improvements in the 
environmental qualities of existing consumer items. Indeed, the 
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prevailing view within business and government circles is that 
the introduction of environmental considerations into the 
production process can be of benefit to profit margins (see 
Elkington et al., 1991). MacKenzie (1989) argues that the 
consumer market f or green products is expanding -af eature that 
makes the production of environmental ly-sens itive commodities an 
attractive business prospect. There are instances where companies 
have been able to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals 
by producing such products. The battery-makers, Varta and Ever 
Ready, succeeded in outwitting their rivals by launching mercury- 
free products in anticipation of European Community legislation 
(Irvine, 1991, p. 22). 
Before green products can be introduced to the consumer 
market, companies need to carry out environmental impact studies, 
a process requiring investment for new research procedures and 
institutional facilities. The branded consumer multinational 
Unilever has responded to changes in the consumer market, 
introducing a number of provisions to monitor commodities at the 
research and development stage of the production process. The 
company's policy document, Unilever and the Environment 
(Unilever, n. d. (a)), notes: 'Environmental considerations are 
recognised as being of major importance to Unilever and are taken 
into account throughout the decision-making, development, 
manufacturing and marketing processes'. Unilever's sensitivity 
to the consumer market is understandable: the company's 
commercial fortunes are intimately tied to the purchasing 
decisions of individual consumers. In fact, 75% of Unilever's 
business is in branded and packaged consumer goods, mainly foods, 
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drinks, detergents and personal cosmetics (Unilever, n. d. (b)). 
The production and use of some of these items has clear 
implications for the biosphere: detergents, constituting 21% of 
the company's product turnover, emits phosphates responsible for 
eutrophication in waterways, and the company's involvement in 
food production, amounting to 49% of its commodity production, 
is associated with the use of pesticides in plantations. As a 
result of new consumer demands for environmental goods and 
European Community legislation, Unilever has introduced new 
research procedures to scrutinise the environmental impact of its 
products. 
The principal innovation is Unilever's new Environmental 
Division, which falls under the company's Safety and Environment 
Assurance Centre (hereafter, SEAC). The division was created as 
a result of restructuring within SEAC to engender a focused 
commitment to the environment. The organisational reshuffle 
consolidated and brought under SEAC's central direction those 
areas of research and product design relevant to the environment 
(Unilever, 1992a, pp. 18-19). One of the central responsibilities 
of the Environment Division is to supervise the range of 
interactions between manufactured products and the environment 
through the adoption of life cycle analysis techniques, which 
evaluate the environmental qualities of a product through its 
entire life cycle, from extraction to disposal. 
Unilever has just adopted this technique for the purpose of 
examining fats and spreads in food products. The company's 
Environmental Division has also used life cycle analysis to 
minimise packaging waste. The foods, detergents and personal 
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products units at Unilever now use lif e cycle analysis databases 
to monitor the use of packaging and reduce the impact of these 
materials on the environment (Skelly, 1993, p. 20). As a result 
of using these databases, the company, 's 1992 Annual Report 
announced that the incorporation of recycled materials into non- 
food contact packaging has increased by about 60%, particularly 
high percentages were achieved with glass and metal packaging 
(Unilever, 1992b) . The life cycle analysis process, though, does 
not guarantee automatic environmental improvements, because it 
is a highly complex process; identifying a product"s journey from 
"cradle to gravel' requires information, and methods for measuring 
impacts that are often out of the grasp of scientists. Thus, the 
results obtained are not definite but highly equivocal. But as 
Gray et al (1993) observe, the main benefit of life cycle 
analysis is in the process of undertaking the exercise rather 
than in obtaining final results. The work of Unilever's 
Environmental Division extends to directing research in the 
Ecotoxicology Section, which examines the pathways followed by 
chemicals in the environment as a way of monitoring and reducing 
the ecological liabilities of products. For example, work has 
been carried out on sucrose polyester in food products, and 
biodegradation and toxicity (Unilever, 1992a, p. 18). 
In terms of actually disclosing the findings generated by 
the Environmental Unit, whether in life cycle or waste analysis, 
the company on the whole remains taciturn. Unilever tends to 
provide general pronouncements on its environmental performance, 
rather than detailed disclosures from the Environmental Unit's 
ongoing research of products (Fieldwork Interview, Unilever, 
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30.6-93). For instance, the company's 1992 Annual Report 
contained a section on 'environmental responsibility,,, which 
included various positive assertions about the companyfs 
commitment to environmental responsibility in terms of product 
analysis and the reduction of packaging. But there was a lack of 
concrete information concerning Unilever's overall environmental 
performance. 
The lack of detailed information on environmental 
performance is very much a consequence of the fact that 
environmental reporting is largely a voluntary matter for 
businesses. This suggests that even producing for an ethically 
motivated consumer market, as Unilever has endeavoured to do, 
might not lead to fundamental changes or improvements in the 
environmental performance of businesses. Like ethical investment, 
environmental ly-motivated purchasing behaviour is thwarted by the 
lack of detailed information emanating from enterprises. Irvine 
writes: 
The green consumer is ... hindered by commercial and 
government secrecy over the results of testing, 
ingredients and much other information that is 
necessary to make a wise choice ... Time after time, the 
cosy relationship between big business and government 
compounds the problem of 'commercial confidentiality'. 
(1989, pp. 11-12) 
Further problems emerge when companies use available information 
or the general lack of environmental data to manipulate 
consumers: green consumerism is susceptible to the possibility 
of having commodities promoted as environmental ly-friendly simply 
in order to generate sales, when the actual environmental 
properties of products may be superficial. The super unleaded 
petrol launched by BP, Esso and Mobil has faced charges of being 
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overpriced and generally negligible in terms of environmental 
improvements (Irvine, 1989). In fact, producers normally charge 
higher prices for environmental commodities, even when such 
products cost less to make. This, as a result, excludes many 
people lower down the class ladder that do not possess the same 
propensity to consume as do those consumers from middle-class 
backgrounds (Irvine, 1991, p. 24). With large sections of society 
excluded from ethical consumerism, the capacity of ethically- 
orientated consumer behaviour to act as a market mechanism which 
can press for social change is very definitely blunted. 
Radical environmentalists point out that green consumerism 
ultimately falters as a tool for reforming capitalist 
organisations because the practice takes place within a dominant 
framework dictated by economic growth and profit orientation; a 
factor requiring only superficial and limited changes in business 
strategies, as many of the causes of environmental damage are the 
result of the developed world's unyielding use of the earthfs 
finite resources and systematic exploitation of the Third World 
in pursuit of economic expansion (Harte et al., 1991) . Hence, the 
point is not to change the style of purchasing behaviour or what 
is consumed, but to reduce the level of consumption in the 
capitalist world. This structural, global appreciation of 
environmentalism will require distinct reductions in economic 
growth and, therefore, business performance (Gray and Morrison, 
1992). As Plant and Albert argue, fthe production of 
environmentally friendly goods doesn't address the major 
structural and institutional obstacles in the way of an authentic 
greening of industrial society. It doesn't deal with the problem 
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of infinite growth being the mainspring of industry on a finite 
planet' (1991, p. 4). 
The complexity of the environmental problems means that 
market solutions like green consumerism, and ethical investment 
f or that matter , can of f er only local and uncoordinated pressures 
for change in the face of deep-seated problems whose 
repercussions can be felt on a global scale. Some commentators 
suggest, in contrast to Bruyn (1987), that the markets are not 
the conduits of social change, but themselves must be challenged 
if the problems of environmental degradation are to be overcome 
(Owen, 1990). Thus, we must conclude that the greening of 
business and the willingness of companies to adopt a responsible 
approach to the environment during the 1980s, although a welcome 
development, has taken place within clearly defined parameters 
which have been acceptable to the private sector in Britain, but 
have only proven to be of marginal significance in dealing with 
the environment as a social problem. 
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PART III CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY IN ITALY 
6 Civic Activism and the Origins of Industrial 
Philanthropy in Italy 
The concern now is to explore the nature of business philanthropy 
and corporate responsibility in the context of Italian society. 
To this end, we will examine the dominant social preoccupations 
and interventions of socially active Italian enterprises. It is 
also important that we compare the development of corporate 
social involvement in Italy with the situation in Britain, where, 
in the past twenty years, social activism in the business 
community has undergone considerable expansion. The objective of 
this comparative analysis is to analyse, more fully, the 
political and social factors that shape corporate responsibility 
and social involvement in capitalist economies. 
our analysis begins, in this chapter, by tracing the history 
of commercial philanthropy. The analysis is separated into two 
epochs: in the first, we examine the social activities of 
commercial institutions and tradesmen in the pre-industrial 
period. One of the distinctive features in this era was the way 
economic activities and commercial institutions were inextricably 
linked to social and religious objectives. Indeed,, from the early 
years of medieval society up until the Renaissance a distinctive 
tradition of civic activism was founded which exercised an 
influence over many facets of Italian societyf including the 
participation of commercial agencies in society. For the second 
part, our analysis turns to the social role of business during 
and after the industrialisation. of Italy in the late nineteenth 
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century. The intention here is to understand how the distinctive 
course of modernisation followed by Italy helped shape the nature 
of business-led social action in contemporary society. 
civic activism in the pre-industrial age 
Guilds in the city-republics of medieval Italy 
Following the demise of the Dark Ages, much of early medieval 
Europe was embroiled in destructive internecine warfare between 
various monarchal dynasties. Events in Italy proved equally 
tumultuous. Although the South of Italy continued to remain under 
monarchal rule for much of the medieval epoch, the imperial 
system of government in the Northern and Central areas of Italy, 
during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, collapsed. But rather 
than disrupting the social and political fabric of the peninsula, 
this period of transition, in contrast to the rest of Europe, was 
relatively temperate and devoid of tyranny. This was due to the 
fact that monarchal rule in these regions was replaced by self- 
governing city-republics and city-states based around the 
political organisation known as the 'commune, ' that relied on 
horizontal forms of collaboration. The communes shared a number 
of features: they operated as secular authorities, with many of 
their ruling officers chosen by rudimentary electoral methods. 
Even though the communes were under nominal monarchal or papal 
rule, they possessed de facto republican independence (Hearder, 
1990) . 
The communes originally emerged in newly urbanised city 
locations. But it was members of the landowning aristocracy 
rather than city merchants that took the initiative to create 
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these political institutions, as they joined forces with other 
rural migrants to collaborate on economic matters and provide 
mutual assistance. A noteworthy political feature of such 
associations was that members placed their allegiance to the 
commune rather than f eudal power centres dominated by bishops and 
monarchs (Lane, 1966). 
The twin attractions of liberalised governmental rule and 
economic prosperity brought ever increasing numbers of migrants 
to the city-republics. One estimate maintains that Padua's 
population grew from 15,000 in 1175 to 35,, 000 by 1320 (Waley, 
1969, pp. 21-2). The expanding urban population brought with it 
a number of new social classes that clamoured f or representation 
in the communes. Thus, by the twelfth century, the cities of 
Florence, Bologna, Genoa, Milan and most other prominent 
locations in the Central and Northern regions of Italy had 
created some form of independent communal government. Initially, 
popular participation was limited and informal, but, as the 
number of inhabitants grew, the administrative machinery of 
government became increasingly sophisticated to accommodate 
opposing interests and conflicts that would inevitably arise 
(Tabacco, 1989,, pp. 222-3). The new middle class within these 
cities contained a growing band of lawyers that were able to 
assume administrative positions in the communes. A medieval town 
like Siena, with an adult male population of around 5,, 000, 
created 860 part-time city council positions (Putnam, 1993). 
Similarly, th i rteenth- century Bologna had 2,000 public servants, 
or notaries, who held positions of responsibility for keeping 
records of business and legal transactions (Hearder, 1990). 
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However, when it came to electing officials and administrators, 
the communes only practised a limited form of democracy in that 
effective political power was, more often than not, located in 
the hands of a small group of men who were members of the 
'consul' . According to Martines (1979), by 1200 the small consul, 
characterised by limited representation, had become the basic 
means of governance in the communes. 
Even with these obvious shortcomings, the city-republics 
were progressive in the art of collective rule and fostered a 
level of popular participation that was alien to most medieval 
societies. In fact, the communal political system was part of a 
manifest 'burgeoning of associative life' (Becker, 1981, p. 36) 
that gave rise to confraternities (religious charitable bodies) , 
and vicinanze (neighbourhood associations). It also facilitated 
the cultivation of highly innovative commercial operations based 
on sophisticated networks of cooperation: the unique context of 
the communal republics provided the necessary social conditions 
for the invention of credit and banking facilities. The spirit 
of mutual cooperation and the integration of communal societies 
were imperative to the use of credit. Usher notes: 'The 
distinctive features of the primitive bank of deposit were 
largely derived from the predominant use of the verbal contract' 
(1934, p. 410). (In etymological terms, 'credit' derives from the 
word credere, meaning "to believe' -) In addition to credit 
facilities, the guild organisations, responsible for representing 
merchants and regulating trade, flourished in the communes. These 
organisations were sensitive to the needs of wider communal 
society and contributed extensively to its well-being. 
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The historical antecedents of the Italian guilds can be 
traced to the compulsory taxpaying trade associations, or 
collegia, of the late Roman Empire. The advance of Byzantine and 
Germanic rule in the late sixth century, together with the 
influence of Roman Catholic bureaucrats, brought the demise of 
the collegia. But some Byzantium protectorates - Naples, Amalfi 
and Venice - were administered and financed by merchants. such 
was the success of these guild-run cities that the Frankish 
Emperor, Lothar I, permitted seven areas located in the North of 
Italy - Bologna, Cremona, Ivrea, Florence, Milan, Padua, Turin 
and Venice - to establish independent associations of craftsmen 
and traders. This eventually culminated in a veritable 
proliferation of guild institutions in the tenth century (Staley, 
1906) . 
By the twelfth century, guilds could be found regulating 
trade and securing monopoly interests for town merchants 
throughout the city-republics. As well as administering trade, 
these trade associations would collect taxes to fund the 
construction of defence fortifications and other public services 
(Hickson and Thompson, 1991). To assist the communes in these 
areas of public policy, it was exigent for guildsmen to be 
integrated into the machinery of communal government. Guild 
representatives did not see this as an unnecessary burden, for 
inclusion gave them an opportunity to promote the interests of 
their own trades within the corridors of power. Hearder (1990) 
reports that artisans and shopkeepers could be found in Modena Is 
town council by 1200; it was not unusual for members of these 
lowly trades, once in government, to use the collective 
193 
organisation of the guild to exert political pressure for 
democratic representation within the communes. It should be 
pointed out that, as institutions, the guilds did not always fare 
as true purveyors of egalitarian virtues, or endeavour to 
represent the interests of popular classes. Some guilds, such as 
the Seven Greater trade guilds of Florence, shared an affinity 
with the ruling and moneyed classes rather than the popolo 
(common people). 
The participation of the guilds in civic life extended to 
the provision of welfare services and mutual assistance to both 
members and individuals not connected with any trade or 
profession. The religious ancestry of many guilds, such as the 
shoemakers' guild at Ferrara which had evolved from a religious 
confraternity, helped sensitise members to the plight of the less 
fortunate, both within and outside the organisation. Sometimes 
membership of a guild required active participation in mutual 
assistance (Hyde, 1973). The guild statute of Verona of 1303, 
probably inherited from a much earlier statute, demanded the 
following: ""Fraternal assistance in necessity of whatever kind", 
"hospitality towards strangers, when passing through the town, 
as thus information may be obtained about matters which one may 
like to learn", and "obligation of offering comfort in case of 
debility" are among the obligations of the members' (Kropotkin, 
1907, p. 174n. )- 
The nascent philanthropic impulse of these local trade 
associations can be explained in part by their religious and 
fraternal origins; but of equal significance was the 
proliferation of charitable activities in communal Italy, which 
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were not without their influence on communal institutions and 
leaders. Using archival sources from medieval Tuscany, Becker 
(1981) records a marked increase in charitable activity after the 
eleventh century. In the diocese of Lucca between 824 and 1008, 
the cause against indigence received only four donations in 
total, compared with 22 registered gifts from 1008 to 1100. A 
similar pattern was recorded for Florence: in the ninth century, 
only three bequests were made for the establishment of pious 
foundations, and none at all in the tenth century before 978. For 
the next 30 years after this date, information exists on 19 new 
foundations - equalling the total for the previous two hundred 
years. 
Becker maintains that there is no straightforward 
explanation for this heightened interest in philanthropy. A 
likely scenario is that the demise of the feudal order - 
characterised by the oppressive power of landowning classes, the 
strict servitude of the masses to the dictates of the church and 
the prevalence of economic uncertainty - and its replacement by 
a society predicated on cooperation and mutual responsibility 
between different orders proved ultimately conducive to the 
development of charitable sensibilities. With this transition, 
the lay associations that were active in the church demonstrated 
a profound concern with this-worldly matters as expressions of 
religious devotion. Becker notes: 'Empathy for the plight of the 
poor was matched by a vital concern for human suffering' (1981, 
37). Even in the ecclesiastical and religious spheres, the 
passion of Christ was celebrated more than the stern figure of 
Christ as judge. This contrasted with the formalism and intricate 
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religious rituals that surrounded charity in the Dark Ages. In 
feudal society, charity was rarely linked to collective ideals 
and was sporadic. In contrast to the communal age, charitable 
action in the Dark Ages was motivated more out of selfish, 
utilitarian needs than human compassion: individuals gave to the 
poor in order to gain God's favour and salvation after death. 
The chasm that existed between the philanthropy in feudal 
society on the one hand, and communal Italy on the other, is 
further highlighted by the fact that, in the former epoch, 
charity was the preserve of leading families and was looked on 
as an expression of pietistic observance rather than pastoral 
concern. After the eleventh century, the world of benevolence in 
Tuscany was Idemocratisedf: philanthropy became an occupation 
open to all those individuals who were genuinely moved by 
deprivation and poverty. Along with ordinary gentle-folk, the 
emerging artisans, shopkeepers and craftsmen of Tuscany were 
similarly welcomed into the philanthropic world, previously 
reserved for the landowning elite and ecclesiastical authorities 
(Becker, 1981,, p. 100) . The guilds, as representative agencies 
of these new entrepreneurial classes, possessed both the 
financial and human resources to undertake a prominent role in 
charitable work. 
Florence was a major centre of guild activity. Apart from 
their importance to the communal economy, the Florentine guilds 
were noted for their charitable work and support of welfare 
services in the city-republics. Following the example of the 
premier guild in Florence, the Calimala guild, various other 
trade associations patronised local monasteries. The guilds were 
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attracted by the religious orientation of these centres, and 
their functioning as rest homes for the infirm. Although the 
guilds would use the monasteries as retreats for their own 
members,, they also used their own premises to care for sick 
members and assist those looking for work (Staley, 1906). 
In their benefactions, the guilds often targeted medical 
centres. In Florence, it was commonplace for leper stations on 
the outskirts of the city to obtain benefactions from individual 
guild members. The propagation of hospital institutions in the 
Northern and Central regions of Italy,, especially Florence, 
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was assisted by 
munificent donations from guild institutions. By 1338, there were 
30 hospitals in Florence, including around 1,000 beds for the 
sick. The guilds of Florence helped to f inance the establishment 
and maintenance of these hospitals, which provided essential 
services to the sick and poor alike (Staley, 1906, p. 538). In 
1338, the Calimala guild built a hospital in the hamlet of 
Campoluccio, endowing it with food and medical treatments for 
patients. Unfortunately, the institution carried on its work only 
until 1529 when, during the siege of Florence, it was demolished 
to build fortifications. 
The social relations that characterised communal society, 
as we have seen, gave rise to civically-minded commercial 
institutions like the guilds and numerous other associations. Yet 
a spirit of egalitarianism and democracy was not all-pervasive 
in the city-republicsf as factionalism was rife and the nobility 
remained an important part of communal life. Nonetheless, the 
cities of Northern Italy maintained a distinct sense of social 
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order and cooperation that was lacking in most other European 
societies at the time. But the ability of communes to maintain 
social order and a vibrant associative life was manifestly 
threatened by a series of internal and external events in the 
fourteenth century - some 200 years after the rise of communal 
republicanism. 
The crisis of communal Italy 
The pinnacle of republican rule came during the late thirteenth 
and early fourteenth centuries. Thereafter, the healthy 
associative life and progressive forms of government that had 
formed a distinct part of medieval Italian society were 
besmirched by a series of catastrophes - famines, wars and 
epidemics (Lane, 1966). 
One of the most injurious episodes in the history of 
communal Italy was the arrival of the Black Death in 1348. This 
plague struck when the resilience of the people was already at 
a low ebb due to a series of famines starting in around 1339. The 
Black Death was probably brought to Italy by Genoese merchants 
coming f rom the Crimea. Once in Genoa, it spread to Pisa and then 
throughout Central and Northern Italy, with Florence being the 
worst-effected republican city state. From historical studies 
that have examined this tempestuous period in pre-unification 
Italy, it would seem that around one-third of Italy's population 
died as a result of the epidemic (Hearder, 1990). The Black Death 
was not an isolated event: other epidemics - less severe than the 
Black Death - broke out at various times during the fourteenth 
century. This retarded the opportunities for economic recovery, 
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and introduced a note of dislocation into the previously cohesive 
communal milieu. Even the number of available administrators and 
political leaders was severely curtailed by the plagues. 
The uncertainty and destabilisation caused by successive 
plagues and famines saw the city-republics place their faith in 
seigniorial rule and hereditary succession to restore stability 
instead of elected representatives and secular administrators. 
Martines argues that - with these traumatic changes afoot - 
, 'residual political feeling of a popular sort evaporated in the 
course of the fifteenth century. The political stability of 
republics came increasingly to be moored in fixed classes and a 
fixed patriciate' (1979, p. 139). The problems caused by 
epidemics and famines were exacerbated when the factional 
hostilities raging throughout Europe began to reverberate within 
these metropolitan centres. Although a belt of cities running 
across Venice, Emilia, Tuscany and Genoa had managed to preserve 
communal rule and resisted subjugation to monarchal authority, 
for many areas authoritarian pedagogy was fast subsuming civic 
republicanism as the dominant form of rule within the communal 
networks of Italy. 
Under these new political conditions, many of the 
institutions, integral to city-republics, were systematically 
dismantled - sacrificed to the dictates and whims of 
authoritarian rulers. In communal Italy, the merchant and craft 
guilds were noteworthy victims of this abrasive political 
culture. More specifically, it was the emergence of Hellenistic 
thought in f if teenth-century Northern Italy that helped erode the 
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legitimacy and function of the guilds (Hickson and Thompson, 
1991) - 
As a distinctly occidental school of thought, Hellenism 
could be traced to the writings of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle 
and was popularised by Alexander and the Caesars throughout the 
ancient world. Hickson and Thompson (1991) argue that the spread 
Hellenistic concerns during the fifteenth century inculcated a 
negative and cynical evaluation of popular democratic rule, 
epitomised by the city-republics. For the guilds, this meant a 
loss of autonomy and subjection to the 'oligarchies of centrally 
directed, Hellenized bureaucrats... I (Hickson and Thompson, 1991, 
p. 152). With these new seigniorial despots, the guilds were 
divested of their entry-restricting powers and bureaucratic 
administrative function in collecting taxes. Because they had 
attained a ceratin amount of importance as commercial and tax 
Coll I ecting institutions, the emaciation of the guilds had severe 
repercussions for many city-republics. This could be seen by the 
way communes, such as Venice and Florence, which had restored 
their guilds, outperformed, in economic terms, despotic cities 
like Milan (Carpanetto and Ricuperati, 1987). Furthermore, the 
active dismissal of the guild system immediately relinquished a 
source of government revenue for defence spending, as, in many 
cities, the guilds were responsible for collecting defence taxes 
on behalf of the local commune. These myopic policies, together 
with the politically volatile situation, rendered the peninsula 
susceptible to colonial domination. Invariably, this is exactly 
what happened during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when 
France and Spain played out their imperial ambitions in Italy. 
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Spanish domination and the rise of the Christian loan banks 
When Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494, the Italian republics 
tried to undermine the French monarch by pitting other European 
powers like Spain against him, but this only ended up dividing 
rather than uniting Italy. A destructive phase of the Franco- 
Spanish war started in 1521: Charles V, Emperor of Spain, drove 
Francis I of France from Milan, resulting in a protracted 
confrontation between the two powers. In this war, Italy was the 
principal battlefield, and the city-states acted as satellites 
for either French or Spanish interests. Spanish successes at 
Pavia and then Rome in 1527 proved decisive in the battle and in 
1559 the war was concluded with the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis. 
This marked the start of Spanish domination over Italy f or nearly 
one hundred and fifty years and, apart from Turin, the loss of 
French sovereignty in the area. 
For many commentators, the start of Spanish domination in 
the early decades of the sixteenth century signalled not only the 
end of the Renaissance but also the demise of independence and 
republican rule for the Northern city-states. As a result of 
these foreign invasions of the early sixteenth century, the city- 
republics experienced a sharp economic and demographic decline, 
which could be gauged by the decision of many Northerners to 
migrate southwards where there was relative peace and prosperity. 
Some historians describe the years following the Renaissance - 
the 'Baroque,, period - as "perhaps the dullest in Italian 
history' (Hearder and Waley, 1963, P. 98); others simply note 
that the republics were moving towards Ire-feudalisation' 
(Putnam, 1993). The great philosophers and thinkers of the 
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Risorgimento - Francesco De Sanctis and Benedetto Croce - argued 
that Spanish rule in Italy caused its vibrant cultural life to 
decay - 
Modern historians have come up with findings at variance 
with orthodox formulations of the 'decadent' Baroque period. In 
seminal works on Florence and Tuscany, the historian Eric 
Cochrane -a pre-eminent revisionist and apologist of the Italian 
Baroque - argues that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
were not dreary historical interludes, but periods of 
intellectual, artistic and political vitality. In one of his 
tomes, Cochrane (1988) shows how the pan-Italian alliance 
established by Charles V of Spain led to a period of stability 
and relative peace; for Cochrane this was not the genesis of the 
Counter-Reformation, but the beginning of the 'age of 
consolidation'. During this period of political stability, Italy 
- especially the war torn areas of the North - witnessed 
demographic expansion and commercial recovery. moreover, the 
ecclesiastical reforms introduced by the decrees of the Council 
of Trent (1545-62), together with a revised catechism,, engendered 
a more religiously devout and well-instructed laity; by the same 
token, this emphasis on piety produced a zealousness for 
religious activism and charity. Even the vita civile - the 
impulse of mutual solidarity and cooperation fostered by the 
city-states - was not totally eradicated by the eclipse of 
communal government. The age of consolidation' saw the rise of 
religiously inspired institutional configurations that shared an 
affinity with the institutions and traditions of the city- 
republics. Foremost among these new associative forma ions was 
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the Monte di Pegno (or the Monti di Pieta) - These were primarily 
f ormed as Christian banks to combat indigence and serve the poor; 
therefore, they have import in the present analysis, as their 
influence is still evident in contemporary Italian society (see 
Chapter 8). 
The central animus of these banks, when they were founded 
in the latter part of the fifteenth century by the observant 
Franciscans, was to relieve the burden of poverty through the 
supply of small loans, either gratuitously or at low rates of 
interest, to the genuinely poor or needful. Although similar 
Christian loan banks existed throughout Europe in the mid- 
fifteenth century, the Monti di Pieta of Italy proved unique 
because they aimed to both relieve the distress caused by 
poverty, and systematically replace Jewish moneylenders and banks 
with Christian-run operations. The predominance of Jews in such 
activities was due, largely, to their marginalisation from 
mainstream economic activities, apart from moneylending, which 
was seen as a necessary evil that had to be performed by non- 
Christians. Even though the Monti di Pieta were established to 
deal with poverty and, more unscrupulously, to eradicate Jewish 
moneylending, the anti-Semitic ecclesiastical authorities treated 
the idea of Christian loan banks with a certain amount of 
suspicion because of their perceived dalliance with usury. This 
financial practice, according to the Catholic Church, was a 
direct contravention of divine law. Nevertheless, the Monti di 
Pieta had the favour of the secularised judiciary that approved 
of loans and interest payments on the grounds of economic 
necessity. Even some religious representatives were apt not to 
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dismiss interest payments out of hand: the Tuscan preacher, 
Bernardino of siena, argued that interest payments could be used 
for charitable purposes (Pullan, 1971). 
After the first Monte di Pieta was established in Perugia 
in 1463, a number of similar institutions were founded in the 
areas around central Italy. The Monti di Pieta gradually gained 
acceptance in the Papal states, providing the movement an air of 
authority (Pullan, 1971). By the late fifteenth and early 
sixteenth century, however, as the Spaniards gained a foothold 
in Italy, the Christian banks could be found widely dispersed 
across Liguria, Lombardy and several territories in Veneto. In 
1515, a Papal proclamation in support of the Monti di Pieta was 
finally granted by the Bull of Leo X. The Bull defended the use 
of interest payments on the basis that banks had to generate a 
certain amount of surplus income in order to employ full-time 
administrative officials. 
Because of their charitable origins, the average rate of 
interest stood at 4-5% - or in the case of smaller banks no 
interest charge was made. The level of income generated proved 
to be of nominal proportions. However, the early Monti di Pieta 
did not expand their capital reserves by participating in 
financial speculation or by providing private banking services. 
Recourse instead was made to a variety of non-prof it fund-raising 
methods. Favoured strategies included the Charity sermon,, 
religious festivals and the implementation of special taxes - the 
vociferous opposition incited by this tax meant that it was 
rarely used. 
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Eventually, it was inevitable in a society where financial 
practices were so advanced that, as Pullan notes, 'the Monti di 
Pieta began to raise capital for the use of the poor by acting 
as deposit or savings banks' (1971, p. 474). A number of 
institutions experienced marked growth during the sixteenth 
century because of their forays into deposit banking. To attract 
deposits, some organisations started to offer interest payments 
in return for investments. However, such displays of 
entrepreneurial ingenuity were in danger of being ruled ultra 
vires on the grounds of usury. The main note of justif icatory 
support f or interest payments on deposit payments was this: that 
an investor deliberately giving to charity was entitled to 
limited forms of compensation. Papal briefs granted to Modena 
(1542) and Vicenza (1555) stipulated that interest could be paid 
to depositors. Other cities, assuming that the Papal brief s given 
to Modena and Vicenza had a general applicability, copied their 
example. The ecclesiastical authorities, on this issue, proved 
less intransigent, for in most cases the ruling public 
institutions would guarantee the return of deposits. 
Despite the inroads being made into deposit banking, the 
contribution to poverty relief - symptomatic of the resurgence 
of religious piety during 'the age of consolidation' - was still 
an integral function of the Christian loan banks. Their main 
contribution towards tackling indigence took the form of low 
interest loans. When requests were made, officials from the Monti 
di Pieta would carry out meticulous investigations to discover 
the reasons behind the petition; this initial screening proved 
necessary in order to distinguish between those who were 
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genuinely in need of loans and those who had decided to obtain 
loans for immoral ends. The cause against poverty went beyond 
munificence in the form of low interest payments: some Monti di 
Pieta would produce large quantities of small currency to secure 
fluid transactions between banks and their claimants. Other banks 
made specific efforts to assist agricultural production in order 
to create jobs and promote economic self-sufficiency among the 
poor in their localities (Pullan, 1971). 
The charitable work of the banks increasingly had to be 
balanced against their involvement in deposit banking. The 
embroilment of the Christian loan banks in such areas attracted 
a clientele other than the destitute or poor. Religious 
organisations that could not invest in land and capital used the 
facilities of the Monti di Pieta, as did those members of the 
middle-class who would not embark on adventurous commercial 
exploits for want of nerve or knowledge. A number of Christian 
banks followed Verona's example of having two separate banks - 
one, exclusively charitable, lent small sums to the poor; the 
other supplied personal loans of any amount to all individuals. 
Thus, throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
the nature of the Monte di Pieta was subtly transformed, as 
capital was increasingly generated through interest-bearing 
deposits. While the Monte di Pieta retained its charitable 
status, external financial demands forced these financial 
organisations ever further into mainstream banking: due to 
several private banking failures in the late sixteenth century, 
the Monti di Pieta were used as a public service banks, with 
their loans guaranteed by ruling authorities. Larger cities 
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utilised funds from these banks to construct defences or purchase 
surplus grain supplies during periods of emergency. The 
embroilment in public banking threatened to dismantle the Monti 
di Pieta, as a series of catastrophes struck Northern Italy 
during the early 1600s. Between 1630 and 1633, a serious epidemic 
to rival the Black Death struck Italy; some towns lost 70% of 
their inhabitants (Hearder, 1990). A second plague hit Italy in 
1656, with the port cities of Genoa and Naples losing 50% of 
their citizens. In addition, by 1627, the relative stability that 
had reigned over Italy came to a sudden end: the struggle over 
Italian territory between France and Spain was resumed. In 1629, 
French and Spanish forces fought over Mantua and Monteferrat - 
a battle subsequently won by the French in 1631. For those Monti 
di Pieta acting as public loan banks, the arrival of wars, 
epidemics and economic instability brought many of them to near 
ruin. The ruling body in Brescia was unable to pay back the loans 
to one of its Monti di Pieta, thus reducing the financial 
capacity of the bank. In the case of the large Christian bank of 
Verona, loans were made to the ruling house of Mantua during the 
war of the Mantuan Succession in the late 1620s. Few conditions 
had been placed on the loan, and when the Duke of Mantua failed 
to redeem his pledges or pay interest on them the bank lost 
around one-third of its capital. 
This period of instability, undermining the position of the 
Christian loan banks, was compounded, as we have mentionedf by 
the resumption of hostilities between France and Spain in 1627. 
During the final phase of this long colonial war in the early 
eighteenth century, the protagonists were joined by the 
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Austrians, who saw this as their opportunity to gain influence 
in Italy. The Peace of Utrecht, marking the end of the war in 
1713,, was significant for it established the Austrian Habsburgs 
as the dominant power in Italy. Under Austrian rule, Italy 
experienced relative tranquillity, especially in the period 
between 1748 and the invasion of Napoleon in 1796. Yet, it had 
all the hallmarks of a discordant society, ill. at ease with 
itself: the contrasts between rich and poor seemed to be more 
entrenched than anywhere else in Europe, and crime was on the 
upsurge (Hearder and Waley, 1963, p. 104). The fragile position 
of Italian society was not helped by a series of free market 
reforms, implemented by the new Austrian rulers, that 
systematically disrupted local economies, and disassembled 
surviving guild institutions. The adherence of Tuscany"s Austrian 
monarchal ruler, Leopold, to physiocratic ideals that centred 
around private landholdings and free markets, resulted in the 
near obliteration of the medieval guild system in the 1780s, 
provoking an economic and social crisis as the number of 
commercial institutions offering stable employment opportunities 
was considerably reduced (Woolf, 1979, p. 131). 
It seems that by the eighteenth century, the civic 
traditions and institutions of the peninsula were either 
eradicated, as in the case of the guilds,, or disrupted by 
despotic rule and the imposition of new reforms by the Austrian 
rulers. But the vita civile of the city communes, so resplendent 
throughout the Middle Ages and during brief interludes like the 
Baroque period, was not doomed. The f ormer locations of the city- 
republics - the Northern and Central regions of the peninsula - 
208 
would be receptive to the resurgence of civic activism, and the 
rise of new, communitarian-based, commercial bodies during the 
nineteenth century. 
The new wave of benevolent institutions 
Our attention now turns to the early years of the nineteenth 
century. This was a period of turbulent and significant political 
change for the Italian peninsula, which saw the emergence of new 
civic associations, including socially orientated commercial 
institutions. The new decade marked the start of Napoleon's reign 
as Emperor of Italy. He assumed this mantle after a prolonged war 
between revolutionary France and monarchal Austria over Italian 
territory. The war raged from 1792 to 1804 and saw Napoleon rise 
from director over colonial policies in Italy to dictator of 
France. In 1804,, four years after capturing Italy"s Northern 
territories from the Austrians, Napoleon declared himself Emperor 
of the Kingdom of Italy. 
From this omniscient position, Napoleon was able to impose 
his form of government authority throughout Italy. The ushering 
in of this new political order, according to Putnam (1993), 
involved officials in France and Italy keeping close scrutiny, 
and sometimes actively suppressing, organised forms of 
sociability, even innocuous associations like workingmen"s clubs. 
In Napoleonic law, there was an inbuilt distrust of institutions 
that were not formally recognised by the state. Hodson observes: 
'the development of law was profoundly influenced by the 
principle that the supremacy of the democratic State should not 
be impoverished by unregulated power given to private 
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institutions, (1991, p. x). Despite Napoleon's undemocratic and 
imperialist tendencies, he installed an efficient administrative 
system and occasionally imposed enlightened monarchal rulers over 
Italian territories. 
Once France's claims over Italy were secure, Napoleon began 
to pursue his imperial ambitions in Eastern Europe. Although he 
enjoyed early successes over the coalition powers of Austria, 
Prussia and Russia throughout the 1805-07 period, and later over 
Austria at the Battle of Wagram (1809), France took the ill- 
advised step of invading Russia. The ensuing battles saw 
significant loses for the French army - In March 1813, Prussia and 
Austria went to war against France, with Italy once again 
providing the battlefield location. Eventually, Napoleon's army 
was defeated at the four-day battle of Leipzig (Hearder, 1983). 
At the settlement in 1815 - incorporating the treaties of 
Vienna and Paris - Metternich, the Austrian Foreign Minister, 
made no secret of his aspirations that Italy should come under 
Austria's sphere of influence - and generally retain the 
monarchal status quo. His wishes were largely complied with: the 
North-East and much of the remainder of Italy came under Austrian 
control; monarchal dynasties were installed at Genoa and Venice; 
and the Treaty of Vienna confined Lombardy, Tuscany and Modena 
to rule by the Habsburg monarchies. 
once in power, the Austrians were loath to dismantle the 
effective administrative system brought in by Napoleon, or even 
sack appointed officials. The Austrians used this system to 
encourage economic development and mutual assistance throughout 
the peninsula. In fact, they helped revive the tradition of 
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social banking - first seen in the Monti di Pieta - through the 
formation of savings banks (casse di risparmio). It was through 
Conte Franz von Saurau, the Interior Minister of the Austrian 
government, that the first group of savings bank were established 
between January and February 1822 in Venice, Padua, Udine, 
Treviso, and Rovigo. Although the casse di risparmio shared an 
affinity with the Monte di Pieta, as they performed the function 
of quasi-public institutions that generated funds through the use 
of interest payments, the savings banks utilised advanced methods 
of commercial banking, and on the whole executed their 
administrative duties with greater proficiency (Senin, 1976, p. 
910). The Monti di Pieta continued to operate in this period, 
despite the economic set-backs that they had faced in earlier 
centuries. However, they were soon surpassed in terms of numbers 
by the proliferation of the casse di risparmio: in 1823, the 
Milan-based Cassa di Risparmio delle Province Lombarde was 
established; the neighbouring region of Piedmont, in 1827, 
witnessed the establishment of the Cassa del Regno di Sardegna; 
and soon after, cities in central Italy - Florence (1829) and 
Rome (1836) - formed their own casse di risparmio. By 1850, there 
were 70 casse di risparmio in the Northern and Central regions 
of Italy, with 20 of these located in the regions of Lombardy and 
Veneto. For the Southern regions, where patterns of sociability 
had been stifled, it was only after the unification of Italy that 
the f irst, savings bank was f ormed in the Mezzogiorno (ACRI, n-d-, 
p. 5). 
The significant Point about the casse di risparmio, from our 
point of view, is that they continued the tradition of social and 
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philanthropic banking (Magini, 1992). The aims of the original 
sponsors was for the banks to cultivate a system of welfare 
assistance, whereby funds would be distributed to the needy and 
indigent. The funding of hospitals, recovery homes, schools, and 
art conservatories for the poor were among the social and 
philanthropic causes that occupied the Cassa di Risparmio di 
Roma. Indeed, when the regulation for instituting the bank was 
passed in 1836, much was made of the need for the bank to partake 
in social and charitable action (Varni et al., 1991, p. 13). In 
addition to these philanthropic interventions, the casse di 
risparmio contributed to the economic and commercial well-being 
of their localities: they provided didactic advice to depositors 
on the practice of saving; investments and loans were furnished 
to artisans and landed proprietors to assist local economies. 
These commercial policies, however, left the casse di risparmio, 
open to accusations that those benefiting most from their 
services were small capitalists, merchant landowners and public 
employees, rather than the underprivileged or the poor. Those who 
most required easy access to cheap loans - the poor and labourers 
- did not possess the financial wherewithal to build up savings 
and, hence, deposits in the banks. Consequently, the banks 
lowered their rates of interest from 4% to 3% in 1830 to attract 
less prosperous customers. With the lower rate of interest 
producing the desired effect, six years later, the maximum limit 
for a single account was reduced from 300 to 75 lire (Neufeld, 
1961f p. 56) - 
The Austrian regime might have been able to retain a 
semblance of administrative efficiency in its rule over Italy and 
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prove instrumental in forming the casse di risparmio, but there 
was a strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction against Austrian 
occupation. Hearder observes that there was particular 
fresentment against the Austrian imposition of a censorship of 
a kind far more rigorous than anything Napoleon's officials had 
imposed' (1983, p. 31). The begrudging acquiescence of the 
Italians towards foreign occupation soon spilled over into active 
opposition by disaffected troops and underground societies that 
had been formed originally to undermine the Napoleonic regime in 
Italy. The Adelfi sect (later called 'Sublime Perfect Mastersf) , 
led by Filippo Buonarroti, and the later La Giovine, Italia (Young 
Italy) , formed by Giuseppe Mazzini, pursued republican 
objectives. These societies, amongst others, proved to be 
important precursors of the Risorgimento movement, and their 
leaders - such as Mazzini - made vital contributions to the 
Unification of Italy in 1861 (Hearder, 1983). 
These politically-motivated societies, though, seemed more 
than epiphenomena of the ground swell of opposition against the 
Austrian regime: they were manifestations of the surge of 
associative and civic behaviour at the turn of the century. The 
associative life of the nineteenth century assumed diverse forms 
of sociability: civic, charitable and educational associations 
emerged in most cities and towns (see Putnam, 1993). This 
resurgence of associative life witnessed new forms of charitable 
and associative action. Despite the formation of the casse di 
risparmio, the traditional conduits of charity and welfare - the 
ecclesiastical authorities and the Monti di Pieta - were in some 
disarray (Clark, 1984). Subsequently the mutual aid societies 
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rose to prominence in order to promote new benevolent 
associations that were in demand during this period. Although 
these associations could be found in the fourteenth century, they 
only became widely established after the mid-18oos. Between 1800 
and 1849, the number of mutual aid societies stood at 38, but 
this total increased to 174 during the years from 1850 to 1859 
(Neufeld, 1961). In terms of geographical dispersion, the North 
of Italy was the prime area f or their operations - The Kingdom of 
Sardinia (incorporating the region of Piedmont), in the 1850-60 
period, held over two-thirds of the mutual aid societies in Italy 
-a characteristic that was facilitated by the Kingdom, 's adoption 
of a liberal constitution that guaranteed the freedom of 
association (Neufeld, 1961, p. 61). 
The rehabilitation of associative life, as was demonstrated 
by the mutual aid societies, brought to the fore a number of new 
commercial organisations with definite benevolent leanings. These 
institutions gained prominent support from members of the middle- 
class, who, due to a religiously inspired spirit of 
humanitarianism, found themselves moved to alleviate indigence 
(Neufeld,, 1961, p. 56). Prominent among this new wave of socially 
inclined business institutions were the cooperatives. As 
commercial institutions, the cooperatives acted more as 
benevolent associations for workers than orthodox profit-making 
enterprises. They grew out of the conservative principle - 
similar to that advocated by the mutual aid societies - of 
facilitating the process of self-help through mutual solidarity. 
The inspiration for the Italian cooperatives, and major advocates 
of the movement, such as Mazzini, could be linked to the 
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Equitable Pioneers of Rochdale and G. J. Holyoake -a prominent 
spokesman of the English cooperative movement. However,, the 
movement in Italy lacked the commercial acumen and solidarity 
found in its English counterpart. But if Italian movement had a 
distinctive feature, it was the sheer variety of industrial and 
commercial organisation that came under the cooperative umbrella. 
The exact temporal appearance of the cooperatives can be 
traced to the post-revolutionary period of 1848. Here, groups of 
craftsmen and artisans, mainly in the North-West of Italy, 
collaborated to form small workshops. The formation of 
cooperatives was facilitated by a statute of King Charles Albert 
of Turin, in 1848, that permitted freedom of association. 
According to leading authorities on the early history of the 
Italian cooperative movement,, the first true producer- cooperative 
was the Associazione Artistica Vetraria (Society of Artistic 
Glassware) of Altare, a village located in the Ligurian hills. 
The cooperative was formed in 1856 when, in the wake of a cholera 
outbreak and local economic downturn, the village doctor, Dr 
Giuseppe cesio, persuaded 84 labourers to form a glass-making 
association as a way of securing their own future and the revival 
of the village economy (Earle, 1986). As a clear indication of 
their affinity with the traditions of the medieval commune, the 
glass-makers marked their agreement with a ritual that revived 
the traditions of the guild of Altare, which had sustained 
successive attempts of repression by ruling monarchs. BY the 
1870s, the Associazione Vetraria had doubled its membership. 
Like the Associazione Vetraria, many of the formative 
producer-cooperatives could be found in the North of Italy: the 
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Printing House of Compositors founded in 1859 in Turin; the 
stonemasons of Milan (1860) ; the Tailors of Genoa (1856) ; and the 
wool-carders in Milan (1862) (Earle, 1986, p. 13). All these 
fledgling producer-cooperatives drew on the most immediate 
cultural resources available - the tradition of civic 
responsibility and associative social action of the Middle Ages - 
as a pragmatic response to changing economic conditions in 
nineteenth Italy. Por observes: 'There is then, in Italy, a well- 
pronounced general tendency among the workers, originating 
perhaps in the traditions of medieval guilds, to fight against 
the sabotage of production by the present economic system, (1923, 
pp. 3-4) . 
The producer-cooperatives performed the important social 
functions - mainly for their members - of providing secure 
employment and insurance services. The cooperative credit 
societies, on the other hand, emerging after the producer- 
cooperatives, served a wider constituency within communities. The 
first cooperative banks or people's banks (banche popolare) were 
founded at Lodi near Milan in 1864 by the Venetian polymath, 
Luigi Luzzatti, who adapted them from the German model of the 
Schulze-Delitzsch. Using this model, members would buy shares, 
normally with a small deposit, and loans would be made in 
proportion to these deposits. Under Luzzatti's leadership, 
cooperative banks subsequently appeared in Milan and Brescia. The 
movement extended beyond the Northern cradle and spread rapidly, 
with the number of credit societies growing from four to 64 
between 1865 and 1871. By 1881, there were 171 cooperative banks, 
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and subscribed capital had nearly doubled within a ten year 
period (Earle, 1986). 
Many of the new benevolent institutions that were founded 
during the 1880s tended to converge around the Centre and North 
of Italy, whereas the South was still shackled to century-old, 
feudalised, authority structures, which were responsible for 
economic underdevelopment and the rise of powerful crime 
syndicates (Gambetta, 1988). on the other hand, by the 1870s, 
according to Caracciolo (1977), the Northern and Central regions 
of Italy had already cultivated a wealth of new associations - 
savings banks, cooperatives, rural credit societies, people's 
banks - encompassing different facets of social life and the 
economy. What needs to be explored in further detail is the 
impact of modernising forces, such as industrial isation, on these 
new civic and business institutions. This will dominate our 
analysis in the next section, as we consider the 
industrialisation of Italy and its repercussions for the wider 
social and philanthropic interests of business enterprises. 
Commercial philanthropy in the age of modernisation 
Industrialisation and philanthropy 
The modern period naturally begins with the industrial isation of 
Italy -a pivotal moment in the peninsula"s history,, for it 
brought about a fundamental transformation of a society based 
around agrarian production. our aim now is to examine how the 
transition from traditional to modern forms of economic 
production effected the social and philanthropic commitments of 
the new industrial class and semi-public commercial entities, 
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like the savings banks and cooperatives, that emerged during the 
early part of the nineteenth century. 
Significantly, Italy delayed her entrance into the 
industrial age. It was not until the early 1890s - by which time 
the most powerful states in Europe were fully industrialised - 
that Italy's economic base made the leap from traditional to 
industrial mode of production; the years between 1896 and 1908, 
as one commentator has described them, were those of 'the great 
push' towards industrial isation (Gerschenkron, 1962, p. 77). The 
reason why Italy lagged behind the rest of Europe can be partly 
attributed to the weakness of the Italian entrepreneurial class 
and its inability to build a hegemonic base, independent of pre- 
industrial landed elites from which it could transform Italy's 
agrarian economy. There were small groups of businessmen, 
influenced by what was taking place in other European states, who 
advocated the adoption of industrial production methods. In 
response, societies and institutes were established to promote 
industrial isation, and schools for instructing workers in modern 
production methods emerged in Milan and Turin (Cafagna, 1973, pp. 
284-5). These modest advances took place in a climate still 
dominated by agrarian production, and where influential opinion, 
that of the Catholic Church and the landowning classes, was 
pitted against industrial isation. Eventually, it was only through 
a heavy dependence on state intervention that the bourgeoisie was 
able to transform Italy's tardy economy. 
Direct state intervention was integral to the 
industrialisation of many European nations. The level of 
government involvement in economic af fairs tended to vary across 
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societies, as different national configurations approached the 
process of industrial isation in a distinctive manner. Prodi makes 
a telling statement with reference to Italy on this point: 
Italy's industrial development has been supported by 
the public sector to a degree that has few equals 
among the nations that operate on the basis of a 
market economy. Italian capitalism was born and 
developed through a continuous series of privileged 
relations with the state... In the history of all the 
European industrial systems, there have been periods 
of strong state intervention. But these have usually 
alternated with periods of pronounced flaissez fairel. 
In Italy, on the other hand, the close tie between the 
public and private sectors developed permanent 
elements even though there were continuous 
institutional changes. (1974, p. 45) 
From the late 1880s onwards, as the economy began to take 
faltering steps towards industrialisation, the government 
capitulated to the demands of the pro-industrial lobby - led by 
the woollen manufacturer, Alessandro Rossi - to intervene on 
behalf of the nascent industrial sector. Thus, from this point 
onwards, the state used a whole panoply of political and economic 
instruments at its disposal - tax concessions, investment and 
tariffs - to prioritise industrial production, mainly in 
expanding areas such as shipbuilding, steel and cotton 
production. Government intervention proved equally significant 
when it came to modernising the infrastructure, such as the 
railways. As other European states had already demonstrated, a 
fully operating railway system was vital to economic and 
industrial growth (Toniolo, 1990). 
By the late nineteenth century, Italy had achieved tangible 
growth and was beginning to industrialise, mainly as a result of 
what Saraceno (1976) terms the guaranteed model of development, 
where banks and companies depended extensively on public sector 
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support. Much of this expansion was concentrated in sectors like 
cotton production, which had a limited market, and the high cost 
industry of steel production, often at the expense of potentially 
dynamic chemical and engineering industries (Toniolo, 1977). And 
even though Italy's economy grew considerably during the late 
1890s, this was confined to the North, while the South remained 
underdeveloped (Eckaus, 1961). There is no doubt that the overall 
economic performance of the peninsula still lagged behind many 
of Europe's leading nations. 
Two of the dominant features of industrialisation - the 
weakness of the business class, and its concomitant dependence 
on the public sector - held significant repercussions for the 
social and philanthropic commitments of entrepreneurs and 
business institutions. 
It is clear that, due to the tardiness of the industrial 
sector and the limited economic capabilities of the 
entrepreneurial class, business owners were not in a position, 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to emulate 
the level of social action demonstrated by commercial 
institutions like the guilds of the city-republics. Indeed, the 
extent of entrepreneurial support for voluntary and charitable 
agencies - largely responsible for providing poverty relief in 
Italy during the nineteenth century (Woolf, 1991) - was limited 
by the fact that charities were brought under state control 
through Crispi's charity reform law of 1890. ThIS law reflected 
state concern over the effectiveness of charity work, and the 
general distrust, emanating from the influence of Napoleonic law 
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in Italy, displayed towards non-state agencies (Farrell-Vinay, 
1989) . 
The centralisation of the Italian economy and society did 
not, altogether, prove a hindrance to philanthropic action on the 
part of commercial enterprises. The ubiquitous presence of the 
state in Italian society helped to safeguard the communitarian 
business institutions that had emerged during the pre-industrial 
period, namely, the cooperatives and the public service banks. 
Although they were structured as business agencies, their main 
function, as we have seen, was to fulfil public duties, such as 
the provision of cheap loans to the poor and the creation of 
small-scale enterprises to support local economies. Special 
government regulations enabled these institutions to remain 
firmly within the public domain and to continue furnishing 
various services, even though economic expansion in the 
industrial age was now at a premium. For instance, the savings 
banks (casse di risparmio) , though privately owned 
in most cases , 
were officially recognised as public service and charitable 
institutions by a series of regulations passed in 1888. In 1890, 
Law no. 6972 publicly confirmed the charitable and public service 
functions performed by the Monti di Pieta (Senin, 1976, p. 911). 
These financial institutions still prevailed in this period, 
albeit on a much reduced scale since the halcyon days of the 
fifteen and sixteen hundreds. As for the cooperative movement, 
it continued to proliferate and expand into new areas of the 
economy during the early years of the twentieth century (see 
Costanzo, 1923). The Liberal government of Giovanni Giolitti 
helped secure the position of the cooperatives by granting these 
221 
institutions access to public contracts and facilities for 
dealing with banks. In addition, the government set up the 
Istituto Nazionale di Credito per la Cooperazione in 1904 (State 
Bank for cooperatives) , as a common fund to invest in, and assist 
the creation of cooperatives (Lloyd, 1925, pp. 25-4; Cohen, 
1967) . 
While the period of industrialisation witnessed vital 
functions of the economy and society coming under state control, 
there were opportunities for private capital to be involved in 
social action. However, the most conspicuous social intervention 
by business owners and firms was the establishment of welfare 
facilities for the workplace. As the most fully industrialised 
sector of the economy, the textile industry demonstrated 
precocity in introducing paternalistic strategies as a response 
to the social consequences, both for employees and wider society, 
of industrialisation. Being a sector that was largely owner- 
controlled - even at the turn of the century, only 18 of the 727 
cotton factories operating in 1900 were shareholder-owned 
companies (Cafagna, 1973, p. 295) - employers enjoyed a high 
degree of discretion in procuring a variety of social and welfare 
facilities for their employees. One of the most notable 
paternalists in the textile industry was Alessandro Rossi,, a 
company owner reputed for his far-sightedness with regard to 
economic policy and the improvement of the factory environment 
(Baglioni, 1974). In the Milan area, employees at the Crespi 
textile firm benefited from social services, including a factory 
village which housed workers and the local police station. The 
paternalism of these early textile factory owners has generated 
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some interest among Italian socio-economic historians (see Merli, 
1972; Guiotto, 1979). However, practitioners who have studied the 
benevolent endeavours of early industrialists generally equate 
paternalism with an ebbing away of autonomy for labouring groups. 
An underlying characteristic of paternalism is that social 
relationships in the workplace are based on vertical principles 
of patronage and deference to the owner's authority (Pollard, 
1965; Joyce, 1982). Wilson notes: 'Paternalist employers were 
basically benevolent dictators, providing facilities for their 
workers and in turn hoping for their loyalty and affection. Their 
employees benefited from their "generosity" but remained entirely 
dependent on the goodwill of the management, for paternalism 
implied no rights to welfare' (1987, p. 190). 
The main features of Italian industrial isation and business- 
led social action contrast markedly with those that prevailed in 
Britain during the same period. For a start, Britain was the 
first state to industrialise, an achievement that took place with 
the minimum of direct state intervention. For Supple, the 
proximate causes of British industrial isation are to be found in 
the market rather than the government: fCompared with the 
continental experience ... the British Industrial Revolution was 
a triumph of individualism ... because its mechanisms of supply and 
demand and resource allocation were geared to the decisions of 
individual economic agents" (1973, p. 314). Furthermore, the 
economic position of industrialists was not undermined by the 
opposition to modern economic trends of pre-industrial interest 
groups. In fact, the industrial class augmented its political and 
social authority in the last third of the nineteenth century by 
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fusing with already powerful landed and financial classes (Scott, 
1985, p. 253). Thus, industrialists and entrepreneurs held 
sufficient levels of wealth and the necessary political autonomy 
to engage in generous acts of munificence and philanthropy. 
Indeed, entrepreneurial and free market ideals were so prevalent 
that there was strong opinion against government intervention, 
even with regard to ameliorating the social and physical impacts 
of industrialisation. We saw in Chapters 2 and 3 how it was the 
responsibility of private charities and business philanthropists, 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to deal with 
the prevailing social problems of the day. In contrast to Italy, 
there was minimal interference with the private system of 
welfare, as the main regulatory body for charities, the Charity 
Commission, had very few statutory powers at its disposal. From 
this, it seems that the political and economic structures of 
nineteenth century Britain were favourable to the social and 
philanthropic involvement of business owners. Even when there was 
an emerging consensus over the necessity for state intervention 
to relieve poverty, sections of the business community, 
particularly at municipal level, helped to improve and extend the 
range of social and welf are services provided by local government 
(see Frazer, 1979). 
In contrast to Britain, Italian capital was in a position 
of relative weakness, enjoyed a less autonomous position and was 
dependent on direct state intervention. This economic and 
political subservience of Italian entrepreneurs to the state 
curtailed the social role of the private sector. By comparison, 
the free market played a more central contribution to the 
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industrialisation of Britain, and private capitalists possessed 
the financial wherewithal and political standing to organise 
grand philanthropic gestures. 
It appears,, then,, that, following industrialisation, the 
economic achievements of the emergent bourgeoisie in Italy were 
generally unremarkable and dependent on direct state 
intervention. Such was the socio-economic standing of the Italian 
business class in this period that its social activities were 
confined mainly to the provision of social and welfare services 
for factory workers. It was only during the early years of the 
twentieth century, as the economic situation in the peninsula 
improved, that advances in commercial philanthropy and social 
action began to appear very gradually. 
The changing status of private capital 
In the immediate years leading up to the First World War, the 
position of private capital changed markedly in several respects. 
Economically, private industry consolidated some of the limited 
gains of the late nineteenth century, as Italy embarked on a 
second phase of industrial development. Central to this later 
phase was the ready availability of hydroelectricity, an energy 
source that was integral to the growth of modern engineering 
industries. This enabled Italy to achieve a modicum of success 
in emerging consumer industries, such as motor vehicle 
production, and new commercial ventures in the chemicals industry 
and typewriter manufacturing (Clark, 1984). In addition, private 
capital started to organise political representation through the 
establishment of employers' associations, allowing industrialists 
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to attain a degree of independence from the paternal tendencies 
of the state. Employers associations developed at a much later 
date in Italy than other European countries, because of the 
general weakness of the industrial class and its reliance on 
state support (Martinelli and Treu, 1984). As the industrial 
economy expanded during the first half of the twentieth century, 
business owners in Milan and Turin gained the confidence to 
establish the first representative associations for employers, 
culminating, eventually, in the foundation of the Italian 
Confederation of Industry in 1910. As private capital achieved 
some advances in terms of economic expansion and political 
representation isolated,, yet conspicuous, examples of social 
involvement of the type demonstrated by the Victorian 
philanthropists in Britain began to emerge. 
Out of these new industries, Olivetti, the typewriter and 
office equipment manufacturer, was the most renowned for its 
social interventions. The company was founded by Camillo Olivetti 
in 1908, who chose the town of Ivrea, within the region of Valle 
DIAosta, as the location for his firm. He followed the tradition 
of Italy's textile sector by providing a range of welfare and 
after-work facilities for his workforce (Olivetti, 1983). 
However, it was Camillofs son, Adriano, who acted as the main 
inspiration behind Olivetti's social policies after joining his 
father in the management of the firm in 1926. 
once Adriano Olivetti began to assume control over the 
company in the 1930s, he organised an ambitious plan to develop 
the infrastructure and services for the entire town of Ivrea. 
Using the increased wherewithal of the company, generated by a 
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threefold increase in production between 1929 and 1937, under 
Adriano's direction Olivetti built hospitals, roads, schools, 
libraries, housing and recreational facilities (Martin, 1991). 
This philanthropic programme touched many of the inhabitants of 
Ivrea, including those not directly involved with the Olivetti 
company. Adriano also gathered a group of young architects - 
Figini and Pollini - who followed the progressive ideas of Le 
Corbusier to design company buildings that would not violate the 
natural beauty of the area, and which would furnish a pleasant 
working environment for employees, averting the impression of a 
closed and hostile institution. Kicherer notes: 
In contrast to other socially conscious companies like 
Zeiss or Bosch, Adriano did not restrict himself to 
the limits of his company. Starting from the narrow 
integration of industry and the surrounding regional 
social structure, he asked for an industrial 
development plan which took into consideration the 
effects on the social and cultural structure. (1990, 
p. 15) 
These social interventions extended to areas outside Ivrea. 
The company contributed resources and ideas towards the 
development of the South, urban planning, and art (see Fabbri and 
Greco, 1988). Adriano Olivetti also launched a political and 
cultural think-tank and pressure group known as the Movimento 
Comunita, a vehicle for stimulating public and intellectual 
debate about a wide range of politico-cultural issues such as 
architecture, the role of the f irm in society, local politics and 
urban planning. As part of this movement, Adriano Olivetti 
gathered a coterie of artists, philosopherst psychologists, 
publishers, academics and politicians to examine how work and the 
quality of life could be improved in an industrial society. Many 
of these discussions found their way into articles, company 
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periodicals and books: Abbagnano and Bobbiofs Rivista di 
Filosofia, Ragghiantils art tome, Sele Arte and Adriano 
Olivetti's political oeuvre, Citta dellfUomo, all of them came 
under the Movimento Comunita Is own publishing house, Edizioni di 
Comunita (Ronci, 1980, pp. 50-1). 
The Fascist period and the dopolavoro 
Adriano Olivetti was the most significant industrial 
philanthropist to emerge from the industrialisation and 
modernisation of Italy's economy. The company showed how the 
economic and political confidence attained by private capital 
enabled firms to engage more fully in communitarian action than 
in the late nineteenth century. 
The political and social position of private capital was 
subject to further vicissitudes as the Fascists led by Benito 
Mussolini came to assume control of the government in 1921. This 
was initially thought to be a fleeting phenomenon, but Mussolini 
remained in power for over 20 years. This period in Italy"s 
history subsequently proved to be relevant in terms of dealings 
between private capital and the state, and the social 
expectations surrounding business enterprises. 
During the Fascist period of rule, there was a continuation 
of the extensive interventionist approach in economic and civil 
life that had been a characteristic feature of Italy since the 
late nineteenth century. The direct interventionist strategy was 
in many ways born out of necessity: in the ensuing industrial 
crisis at the end of First World Wart the government was at hand 
to salvage industries and faltering credit institutions (Posner 
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and Woolf, 1967). The Fascist regime continued along this vein, 
establishing the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale 
(hereafter,, IRI) to operate as a financial investment body for 
industry. Initially, IRI was formed as a temporary remedial 
measure, providing managerial and financial assistance to banks 
and joint-stock companies in danger of collapse. But by 1937, IRI 
had become a permanent industrial holding company, and was used 
to increase military production for the impending war effort. 
The creation of IRI was symptomatic of the regimef s control 
over considerable areas of the economy; even the savings and 
cooperatives were brought under state control. While this 
divested them of their autonomy, it ensured their survival 
throughout the Fascist period. Despite these centralising 
tendencies, the regime was generally supportive of the private 
sector, and granted major businesses and the Confindustria a 
degree of autonomy from the state machinery. At the same time, 
the Fascists provided favourable. conditions for intensive capital 
accumulation by suppressing the trade unions (Martinelli and 
Treu, 1984, p. 265). 
As the Fascist government was keen to fill the void left by 
the subjugation of the trade union movement, it used these close 
ties with the business community to cajole industrialists into 
adopting enlightened practices in the workplace. The origins of 
this campaign can be traced back to the dopolavoro scheme (after- 
work) introduced by Mario Gianni, a former manager at the 
Westinghouse subsidiary in Vado Ligure. His original plan for the 
scheme was to improve work conditions by encouraging employers 
0 to Provide welf are services and leisure f acilities f or af ter-work 
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activities, which would also be open to the wider community. 
Being an opportunist, Mussolini seized upon the dopolavoro as an 
expedient measure to divert labour unrest and engender support 
for the regime among factory workers. The Duce made the following 
comment, during a series of strikes organised by metallurgical 
workers in 1925: 'Intelligent capitalists gain nothing from 
misery; that is why they concern themselves not only with wages, 
but also with housing, hospitals and sports fields for their 
workers' (quoted in De Grazia, 1981, p. 62). To expand the 
scheme, Mussolini created an umbrella organisation in 1923, the 
Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro (hereafter,. OND) . The OND enjoyed 
relative independence as a charitable body. It had the power to 
confer, on work-based institutions and committees, various fiscal 
privileges in support of local initiatives. It was given a modest 
grant of one million lire, which it was expected to supplement 
by organising sponsorship deals and attracting private donations. 
The level of private sector support for the OND began to 
increase after 1925, as economic depression induced unemployment 
and labour unrest. Furthermore, employers were using welfare 
services to ease the introduction of rationalised production 
techniques, which came into force after the mid-1920s because of 
the quadrupling of joint-stock companies between 1913 and 1928 
(De Grazia, 1981). The clearest indicator of the scheme's 
popularity was the number of firms that had joined the OND or 
were providing dopolavoro programmes: according to De Grazia, 
between 1929 and 1931 the number of firms claiming to be 
dopolavoro subscribers rose from 1,660 to 2,938. A 1927 survey 
of firms in Milan showed that 40 companies provided industrial 
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housing, a further 10 had dormitories for their staff and 13 
supplied libraries (Wilson, 1987). 
The regime expected firms to extend these services to the 
wider community because of the concessions that had been granted 
to businesses (De Grazia, 1981, p. 68). To overcome any 
resistance to these plans, the Fascists began using a mixture of 
outright threats and propaganda to ensure business owners 
incorporated welfare and social schemes into their factories and 
made these facilities available to local communities. The 
pressure exerted by the regime helped elicit charitable donations 
from companies in order to finance services outside the 
commercial domain: the Ente Opera Assistenziali -a Fascist- 
operated welfare agency - benefited from these solicited 
donations, as did construction projects, and holiday camps for 
children. When economic conditions were less favourable, some 
employers raised the necessary funds for their benefactions by 
surreptitiously cutting workers wages. 
The dopolavoro showed that, while the scheme was organised 
as a service f or workers, it also gave companies the opportunity 
to become involved in activities of a social nature. Much of this 
expansion, as we have seen, resulted from the promotion of the 
dopolavoro by the Fascist regime. The campaign was successful to 
the extent that the dopolavoro and the OND survived the demise 
of Fascism in 1945. By this time, the OND was mainly preoccupied 
with the organisation of after-work leisure pursuits. In a bid 
to divest the organisation of its Fascist origins, in 1945 the 
OND was renamed as ENAL (the National Organisation for Worker 
Assistance). What is relevant from our point of view, however, 
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is that after the Second World War, ENAL and the dopolavoro did 
not place a great emphasis on company involvement in society. 
Consequently, our task in the next chapter is to examine how 
philanthropic activities fared in the postwar period and to 
elucidate the dominant expressions of business-led social action. 
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7 State-Private Enterprises and Social Action 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the social role of 
enterprises in contemporary Italian society,, def ined here as 
spanning the immediate postwar period to the present. Italy has 
not witnessed a general surge of interest in corporate social 
responsibility similar to that which took place in Britain 
throughout the 1980s. This, however, does not rule out the 
possibility of commercial organisations being able to perform 
social functions: one of the main features concerning the 
expansion of state control over the economy in the postwar period 
is that commercial units, under government ownership, were used 
for social just as much as economic purposes. Indeed, the state 
enterprise sector has throughout the years cultivated an 
important social ethos, one that continues to this day. In the 
sections below,, we shall try to account for the expansion of 
state intervention in the postwar economy and detail how the 
state enterprises have contributed to the well-being of society. 
Throughout the postwar period, the growth of state ownership 
in the commercial sector cannot be disassociated from attempts 
by the ruling political bloc to construct an alternative power 
base to that of the private sector. Hence, for much of the 
postwar period, the private sector was divided and marginalised 
from mainstream power. However, the dominant position of the 
state did not remain unrivalled, as in later decades some of the 
most powerful sections of corporate Italy endeavoured to gain 
more effective political representation. This certainly 
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legitimated greater corporate involvement in social action; but, 
when compared to developments in Britain, the examples of social 
involvement by Italian companies has proved to be limited in 
nature. On the other hand, the state holding sector, although 
rocked by scandal and criticised for its inefficiency, continues 
to perform a significant economic and social role in Italy. 
Hence, our aim in this chapter is to show how a different balance 
in the respective functions of the private and public sectors has 
resulted in modes of commercially-led social action that are 
distinct from dominant expressions of corporate responsibility 
in Britain. This demonstrates that, despite the movement towards 
economic integration across the world, there are still economic 
and political variations between capitalist countries,, underlined 
by distinctive patterns of historical and economic development. 
Thus, the general nature and level of involvement by the private 
sector in wider society is shaped by actions and decisions taken 
within specific social configurations. 
The enlightened state enterprises in the postwar period 
Any examination of the involvement of enterprises in social and 
philanthropic action in contemporary Italian society is 
inextricably linked to the operations of state-owned industries 
in the postwar years. We saw, in the previous chapter, how the 
industrialisation of Italy's economic base was dependent on the 
public sector -a common f eature throughout many European states 
in the nineteenth century. The intervention of the public sector 
in Italy was by its very nature unique: such involvement during 
and after the period of industrial isation. proved to be extensive, 
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albeit lacking in proper administrative coordination. At the same 
time, owing to the inability of the Italian bourgeoisie to bring 
about a mature industrial society and maintain a position of 
political authority, private business was very much dependent on 
public intervention to secure capital accumulation in a rapidly 
industrialising world. During the Fascist period, these features, 
if anything, were exacerbated: the state sector grew considerably 
as a result of military production and the business class managed 
to attain a position of economic and political authority through 
its guarded allegiance to the regime. With the collapse of 
Fascism at the end of the war, there might be some justification 
for thinking that the new political leaders would have brought 
about a decisive break with the economic and political 
configurations that existed under Mussolini. The disbanding of 
the monarchy and the modernisation of political institutions, 
including a new constitution, suggested that postwar Italy seemed 
to be entering a new epoch; but the mechanisms of state 
intervention, utilised by Mussolini specifically for the task of 
preparing Italy for colonial conquest and war, were left intact, 
extended throughout the postwar period, and fundamentally 
reorganised for the purpose of social and political reform. Much 
of this took place, as we shall demonstrate, because of economic 
necessity and political expediency. 
Following the armistice, the economy was in turmoil: much 
of Italy's industrial capacity was either destroyed by allied 
bombers, or predominantly geared to military production, rather 
than the pressing needs of peacetime reconstruction. The Italian 
administrator for the American European Recovery Programme (ERP) I 
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otherwise known as the Marshall Aid Plan, suggested that the 
government should endeavour to coordinate public intervention and 
finance public works to reconstruct the economy and the wider 
social infrastructure (Castronovo, 1975). Even though the level 
of aid was dependent upon a systematic plan of intervention, the 
Italian authorities failed to put forward a coherent policy for 
reconstruction. Indeed, the American government looked upon Italy 
with some bemusement, for the government controlled vital sectors 
of the economy through the state holding company, IRI, but it 
seemed reluctant to embark on a planned reconstruction of the 
economy. Contributing to this period of inertia was the emergence 
of distinct positions on state intervention in the Italian 
polity: those in favour of central economic planning could be 
found on the left of the Christian Democrat Party (Ezio Vanoni 
and Amintore Fanfani) and the Republican Party, while the bulk 
of the Christian Democrat Party, the employers' confederation 
(Confindustria) and powerful industrialists represented by Fiat, 
and leading wool producer, Gaetano Marzotto, rallied against 
interventionism (see Amato, 1972). 
These divergent views were articulated in a number of public 
inquiries conducted on state planning and the future of IRI. The 
conclusions of the Economic Commission to the Constituent 
Assembly provided the pro-interventionist lobby with a 
significant fillip. The Commission ruled out the return of IRI 
to the private sector, as the postwar markets could not absorb 
this huge industrial conglomerate and many of its companies were, 
as a matter of course, simply too unprofitable. With high levels 
of unemployment (19%), the disbanding Of IRI, which had 
236 
maintained pre-war employment figures (in 1942 IRI had 210,000 
employees) would have exacerbated the acute economic crisis of 
the postwar years (Sassoon, 1986). In the end, the prospect of 
disbanding IRI was fraught with such dangers that there was 
bipartisan agreement for the company to be kept under state 
ownership. Thus in 1948, IRI gained a number of new statutes, 
securing its position. Although the reconstruction of IRI and the 
general recovery of the Italian economy faced several obstacles, 
due to the extent of war damage and administrative incompetence, 
IRI managed to recover its pre-war capacity by 1948 in all 
sectors and the conditions were emerging for healthy growth in 
the economy (Allen and Stevenson, 1974, pp. 222-3). 
It appears, then, that Italy's political leaders found 
convincing economic and social arguments for not dismantling the 
state economic sector. However, the prospect of expanding the 
state sector, favoured by some political factions in the 
Christian Democrats, still elicited stern opposition, much of it 
vanquished by political developments following the demise of the 
anti-Fascist coalition. 
The anti-Fascist coalition government made up of Communists 
and the Christian Democrats proved untenable at the end of the 
Second World War. Pressures from the powerful Southern gentry, 
business leaders, the Catholic Church, and even the American 
government f orced the hand of De Gasperi, leader of the Christian 
Democrats. Consequently, in May 1947, De Gasperi excluded the 
Communists and their Socialist allies from the coalition 
government. This eventually forced an election in 1948, where the 
Christian Democrats won an outright majority (48% of the vote). 
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The Christian Democrats - formed in 1942 by members of Catholic 
Action and leaders of the old Catholic Popular Party to organise 
Catholic opposition against the Fascist regime - gained support 
from the Catholic Church, big business and the Southern gentry 
to win the election, for it was seen as the main political 
guardian of the status quo and the political force best able to 
contain the Communist Party. Events show that once in power, the 
Christian Democrats, with the left gaining influence, did not 
implement the sort of reform programme expected by the Italian 
establishment. 
The Christian Democrat Party was not a typical liberal- 
bourgeois configuration; it maintained strong popular sentiment, 
and did not strictly represent the aspirations of a single class. 
The Catholic origins of the Party made it appeal to wide sections 
of society (Maraffi, 1980). The stated aim of the Christian 
Democrats, as revealed in numerous Party documents in the forties 
and f if ties, was to create a broad alliance of workers, peasants 
and middle classes by breaking down antagonism between capital 
and labour, landowner and peasant. This populist strategy spilled 
over into parliament where the Christian Democratic Prime 
Minister, De Gasperi, permitted alliances with the three centre 
parties, even though his Party had an absolute majority in the 
Chamber between 1948 and 1953 (Webster, 1961, p. 181). In terms 
of economic strategies, the Christian Democrats, particularly 
those on the left, were positively disposed - once the realities 
of postwar reconstruction became clear - towards planning and 
state intervention in the economy to create or maintain 
employment. But this caused some consternation among interest 
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groups, such as big business - the steel industry is a case in 
point. The IRI owned company, Finsider, put forward a plan after 
the war -a modified version of the Sinigaglia plan of 1937 - to 
expand steel production and to lower steel prices by adopting new 
production techniques - The proposals encountered stern opposition 
from the Confindustria and Giorgio Falck, a leading private 
sector steel producer (Villari , 1975) - Af ter gaining aid f rom the 
ERP, the plan was eventually carried and, by 1950, it helped 
Finsider reach pre-war levels of steel production of one million 
tons. 
While the Finsider plan was eventually implemented, the 
opposition that it evoked from the private sector highlighted the 
problems faced by the Christian Democrats in trying to carry 
through democratic and populist reforms. Indeed, Christian 
Democrat proposals for expanding welfare services and progressive 
industrial relations strategies were similarly obfuscated by 
private industrialists. From 1950 onwards, the Christian 
Democrats introduced a range of welf are reforms and new spending 
schemes, such as the extension of health insurance funds and old 
age pensions to selective occupational categories, and local and 
national welfare agencies were brought under government control. 
The Confindustria criticised these measures and insisted on the 
formation of a strong right-wing government, prepared to eschew 
popular measures (Weiss, 1988, pp. 142-3). 
The inter-class strategy of the Christian Democrats was also 
threatened by the emergence of militant trade unionism, under the 
auspices of the Communist affiliated CGIL union, during the early 
years of the postwar period. With the Communist Party absent f rom 
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government, CGIL became the organisational vanguard for protests 
against the government and deteriorating economic and work 
conditions. The preponderance of political strikes between 1947 
and 1954 led political leaders to consider ways of curtailing and 
suppressing union action. Such a course of action would have only 
further marginalised the working class and the government"s 
programme of democratic reform (Sabel, 1981, p. 237). 
Whilst the Christian Democrat government denounced these 
political strikes, it was equally quick to single out 
industrialists and private employers in general as partly 
responsible for the spread of worker militancy and for leading 
workers actively to support the Communist Party. The Christian 
Democrat demands for a responsible and progressive approach to 
industrial relations were generally ignored by Italian employers. 
The Confindustria relinquished nothing on employee rights to 
deliberate work-related issues with managers and owners, and f ew 
concessions were given on wage increases (Weiss, 1988). Such 
intransigence against the adoption of enlightened industrial 
relations practices led to bitter acrimony between the business 
community and Christian Democrat leaders, thus undermining the 
close relations that had existed between both sectors in the 
immediate aftermath of the war. By the early 1950s, the Christian 
Democrats began to subject the industrial relations practices of 
employers to critical scrutiny. As several documents emanating 
from central Party organs reveal, references were made 'to the 
disorder provoked by the "antisocial selfishness of certain 
capitalist strata", and employers were criticized for attempting 
to escape their social responsibilities' (ibid., p. 132). Other 
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prominent members of the Party - mainly those associated with the 
centre-left faction and members of the Christian Democrat 
affiliated CISL union - and church leaders reverted to direct 
action: campaigns were organised in the provincial press 
throughout the country, attacking employers over their evasion 
of statutory obligations and for placing oppressive regimens 
within factories (Abrate, 1981). The campaign was so successful 
that the Confindustria pleaded with the Vatican to intervene on 
behalf of the business community. 
The level of private sector opposition over progressive 
industrial relations, together with its public criticisms of 
welf are provisions and state intervention in the economy, led to 
a widening chasm between the Christian Democrats and the Italian 
business class. The Christian Democratic government was thus left 
with a perplexing decision: 'either to abandon its "interclass" 
objectives or to acquire greater organizational and financial 
independence' (Weiss, 1988, p. 141). It is clear that the 
Christian Democrat government would have been unable to implement 
popular social reforms while aligned to dominant class interests, 
as represented by major private employers. In response, it 
embarked on a policy of sottogoverno (subterranean government), 
involving a systematic effort to place key areas of society under 
public control through government spending, political 
appointments and the establishment of ersatz government agencies 
(Clark, 1984). The expansion of the state economy was a vital 
element in the sottogoverno stratagem. In addition, it gave the 
Christian Democrats political and financial independence from 
external interest groups in order to realise social-democratic 
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reforms (Cottino, 1978). These political developments partly 
explain why the state economic sector, as we shall see, came to 
be both extensive and guided by a strong social ethos. 
The gradual disposition of the Christian Democrats towards 
state intervention in the economy was reinforced when the Party's 
seasoned leader, Alcide De Gasperi, died, leading to the election 
of Amintore Fanfani to the position of Secretary General in 1954. 
As a candidate from the left, Fanfani, in line with other like- 
minded colleagues, wanted to reduce the economic power of private 
capital, whilst increasing the level of public planning to f ulf il 
a variety of political and social goals. Pasquino writes: 
, 'Realising that f inancial independence is an important 
prerequisite of an independent policy, Fanfani, in the late 
1950s, decided it was preferable to disengage the party from an 
excessive reliance on the Conf industria... through access to f unds 
to be provided by the public sector of the economyf (1979, p. 
100). A vital element in building the public sector economy was 
the establishment of new state holding corporations and the 
expansion of existing state holding firms, namely IRI. 
Of the new state holding businesses, the formation of ENI 
(Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) was a pivotal event, as it came to 
rival IRI in significance and economic dimensions. ENI was 
created by an Act of Parliament in February 1953, and its 
responsibilities centred on the exploration and supply of natural 
gas and petroleum for Italy's economy. Prior to the creation of 
ENI, a number of companies - both private and public-owned - 
jostled for a place in the energy market after successful gas and 
Oil explorations in the peninsula. Such was the lack of 
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coordination between businesses that, through the creation of 
ENI, the bulk of energy production was brought under government 
control. In addition to the economic rationale, the involvement 
of the state in the energy market was guided by a political 
rationale: the Christian Democrat Finance Minister, Vanoni, in 
his speech to the Senate in 1953, outlined that ENI was 
established to circumscribe private sector control over vital 
areas of energy production. Moreover, it was envisaged by ENI's 
president, Enrico Mattei, that the company, as a public 
enterprise, would allow the benefits of economic growth and 
advancement to be spread throughout the peninsula (Frankel, 
1966). After being formed, ENI expanded into areas of strategic 
interest to private capital, which led to vociferous criticism 
of the government's activities from the larger sections of the 
business community (Sassoon, 1986, p. 40). 
Under the astute presidency of Mattei, ENI achieved a vital 
coup dletat over the private sector when it gained control over 
oil exploration in the Po, Valley. This gave ENI the financial 
wherewithal to obtain dominant stakes in several energy companies 
and achieve rapid growth: AGIP, ANIC, ROMSA and SNAM became ENI 
operating subsidiaries; fixed investment between 1954 and 1962 
rose eightfold, sales by 170% and employment by 250% (Allen and 
Stevenson, 1974, pp. 233-4). Following Mattei's untimely death 
in 1962, the company began to overstretch its resources as a 
result of ambitious investments made in the early 1960s. But the 
energy holding company gained extra government endowments, 
bringing a general recovery during the mid-1960s. Hence, between 
1966 and 1972, sales increased by 130% and employment by 43%; by 
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1972, ENI employed nearly 80,000 workers and controlled more than 
180 operating firms. 
According to Sassoon the expansion of ENI forced its older 
state holding counterpart , IRI II to adopt a more dynamic posture I 
(1986, p. 40). In practice, this meant higher investment to 
increase employment and growth levels. Although IRI had dominant 
interests in iron and steel production, public banks and the 
engineering sector, the company diversified into new sectors of 
the economy: in 1957, the Italian airline company Alitalia was 
bought up by IRI; it moved into transport, as it managed and 
owned the stretch of motorway running from Milan to Naples. As 
well as this, IRI took control of Italian radio broadcasting 
(1952) and telephone service companies (1958). 
These postwar developments in the state holding sector - as 
represented by the establishment of ENI, the diversification of 
IRI and the foundation of new, though smaller, holding entities 
such as EFIM (Ente Participazione e Finanziamento Industrie 
Manifatturiere) - saw many significant areas of the economy 
placed under government ownership. The figures bear this out: a 
sample of some of the largest manufacturing firms found that, in 
the 1963-72 period, public sector output increased from 19% to 
24%, while investment capital went up from 28% to 35% (Weiss, 
1988, p. 139). During the same period, public sector firms 
accounted for 30% of all workers employed in large industrial 
companies (Sasso, 1978, cited in Weiss, 1988). 
The enlargement of the state holding sector and the 
intrusion of the state in crucial areas of the economy enabled 
the government to undermine the ability of the private sector to 
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represent its interests through the Confindustria. This was 
clearly born out in 1953 when the left wing of the Christian 
Democrat Party advocated that the state holding sector should 
withdraw from the employers association (La Palombara, 1966, p. 
28). It was not until necessary legislation was passed in 1956 
that the state holding entities were removed from the 
Confindustria and placed under newly-created employers, 
organisations. Consequently, Intersind was established as the 
employers' organisation for IRI and EFIM, and ASAP for ENI. Both 
bodies were given the responsibility of bargaining with relevant 
trade unions, which endowed the labour movement, after a period 
of militant activism, with a degree of legitimacy. 
The formation of breakaway employers' organisations for the 
state holding companies enabled the public sector economy to gain 
further autonomy and influence. Organised business attempted, 
through various agencies, to oppose state colonisation of the 
economy, including an unsuccessful bid to press its claims in 
parliament by sponsoring the pro-free market Liberal Party and 
business candidates at elections (the Confintesa, see Weiss, 
1988f p. 144). Yet, the Christian Democrat government still 
managed, with consummate ease, to assume control over significant 
areas of the economy. This was partly due to the relative 
weakness of the private sector at this historical juncture 
(Martinelli et al., 1981), but also to a number of political 
developments towards the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, which 
facilitated and gave impetus to the enlargement of the state 
sector. 
Central to this was the dissolution of the alliance between 
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the Communists and socialists, conferring on the moderate left 
a new-found respectability. Towards the end of the 1950s, as the 
centrist coalition became difficult to maintain, the Christian 
Democrats sought an alliance with the Socialists (PSI). The 
centre-left government coalition was finally formed in 1963, and 
was committed to planning and social interventions in the 
economy. One of the most notable reforms to emerge during the 
course of this dalliance between the Christian Democrats and the 
Socialists was the nationalisation of the electricity industry 
through the creation of ENEL. These policies, together with the 
centre-left coalition, were given all important, ecclesiastical 
support with the accession to the Papacy of the progressive- 
thinking John XXIII the so-called I red " Pope. The 
interventionist strategy of the government was reinforced by the 
rejuvenation of Italyfs economy and the general success of the 
state holding sector (Weiss, 1988, p. 151). In the 1959-63 
period, the economy grew at a faster rate than at any point in 
Italy"s history: the average growth rate in the years from 1958 
to 1963 stood at 6.6%, a rate only surpassed by Germany 
(Podbielski,, 1974). All of this allowed the public sector to 
consolidate effectively its presence in the economy. Hence, in 
1959 one-fifth of all investments came from this sector and in 
1962 this figure rose to one-third (Sassoon, 1986f p. 40). 
The Christian Democrats, however, did not build up the state 
sector just to obstruct the operations of the private sector. The 
Party had an important social agenda when it came to power, but 
it was often scuppered by business and other interest groups. 
Hence, it built up the state economy not only as a source of 
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finance and an organisational platform for undermining the 
private sector, but also to spearhead social reforms. This was 
evident in the managerial appointments made by the government to 
the state holding sector. Although the new managerial class was, 
like the Christian Democrats, committed to free enterprise, 
economic efficiency and growth, it was equally sympathetic to the 
Christian Democratic emphasis on managed capitalism and state 
planning (Petrilli, 1967). As Prodi notes, the managers recruited 
by the government were radically different from their private 
sector counterparts: 'This new public manager, while a match for 
private industry in his entrepreneurial instincts, has had a more 
highly developed social conscience as well as stronger ties with 
the political structure of the country' (1974, p. 56). 
By cultivating a managerially enlightened class and in 
placing the state sector under political control, the Christian 
Democrats ensured that the public firms brought social 
considerations both to their own operations and to commerce 
generally. In particular, these holding companies were used to 
overcome the social deficiencies of the free market system. 
Significantly, the state holding sector helped alleviate plant 
closures and mass redundancies by supplying financial and 
managerial assistance to ailing firms (King, 1985). Because its 
commercial interests are located in the heavy industrial sector, 
IRI dominated the task of rescuing firms on the brink of 
collapse. In 1956, it gave various forms of managerial and 
financial assistance to the largest cotton establishment in the 
South (see Lutz, 1962) ; and three years later, it assumed control 
of the Taranto shipyard. There have been occasions when IRI has 
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built up some of the firms on its casualty list into profitable 
concerns - ATES (electronics) and Costruzioni Metalliche Finsider 
(steel structures) have been two success stories (Allen and 
Stevenson, 1974, p. 256). ENI, on the other hand, was less 
involved in rescue operations because it had f ew interests in the 
heavy industrial, which was subject to decline in the postwar 
era. Nevertheless, it did take over one of Italy's major textile 
concerns, Lanerossi, and the engineering firm Pignone. 
The social contribution of the state holding sector has gone 
beyond sectoral or individual business recovery operations to 
include the long-standing plight of Southern Italy. The 
Mezzogiorno refers to all the regions - Abruzzi, Molise, 
Campania, Apulia, Calabria, Sicily, Sardinia, Basilicata - found 
south of Rome. These regions, according to such indicators as 
employment, income, industrial isation, literacy and poverty, have 
not thrived and prospered to the same extent as the Northern and 
Central areas of the peninsula. In order to reduce the sharp 
economic disparities and bring an end to the dualism between 
North and South, the state holding sector was required, following 
a 1957 law, to locate 60% of its investments in new industrial 
plants and 40% of its aggregate investments in the regions of the 
South. Prior to the law, the state holding sector was 
disproportionately concentrated in the North of Italy, with only 
17% of its total investments located in the South. In accordance 
with the socially responsible animus that guided this sector, the 
holding groups closely adhered to these legislative provisions. 
consequently, between 1958 and 1971,49% of this sector's 
manufacturing investment was placed in the South (Allen and 
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Stevenson, 1974,, p. 259). By 1971,49% of the state holding 
sector's total investment was in the South. The IRI holding 
company went beyond the spirit of the law as it placed nearly all 
of its new industrial plants, after 1957, in the Mezzogiorno. 
It appears, then, that if we are to understand the 
communitarian functions of enterprises in contemporary Italian 
society we need to focus on the state sector. This is a 
reflection of both the magnitude of the state holding sector and 
the political control to which it has come under. In addition, 
throughout the postwar years to the present, the state sector has 
both expanded and colonised key areas of the economy, enabling 
it to implement social reforms. Although the public firms were 
established to fulfil vital economic functions, they operated 
according to progressive criteria and were imbued with a public 
service ethos, a characteristic reinforced by the managerial 
personnel installed to administer the state holding sector. Our 
objective now will be to analyse in some depth the recent social 
interventions and programmes of the state holding companies that 
form part of Italy's labyrinthine public economy. 
The state holding sector and social action 
It is our argument that the expansion of the state holding sector 
in the postwar period is central to understanding the nature of 
contemporary corporate social action in Italy; the state sector, 
due to various historical and political factors, has been at the 
forefront in bringing social considerations to Italian commerce. 
In recent years, the state sector has incurred considerable 
losses, which has resulted in attempts to privatise state holding 
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companies. However, the systematic dismantling of the public 
sector through privatisation has been opposed by parties and 
government interest groups in order to avoid the vast economic 
power of these companies being transferred to the three main 
private corporations - Fiat,, Olivetti, and Fininvest - that 
dominate the Milan Stock Exchange (Gianni and Giuliani, 1990). 
According to Prodi and De Giovanni (1993), privatisation measures 
have transpired to be, as we shall demonstrate in Chapter 8 when 
we examine the public banking sector, intermittent and 
superficial. Instead of wholesale privatisation, the likes of IRI 
and ENI have been restructured to restore profitability. The 
former head of IRI in 1986, Romano Prodi, managed to overturn the 
company's considerable losses into a modest profit while keeping 
IRI under state control (Ward, 1990). Hence, the state holding 
companies, by resisting systematic privatisation measures, are 
still subject to political control and have retained a social 
ethos. 
To ensure that state f irms comply with political and social 
requirements, the state holding sector is structured according 
to a descending hierarchy of control, starting from central 
government. At the top of this pyramid structure of control are 
the Interministerial Economic Planning Committee (CIPE) and the 
Ministry of State Holdings. Below this political tier, there are 
f ive state holding entities under the control of the CIPE and the 
Ministry of State Holdings. This coterie of holding companies is 
dominated, in terms of size and importance to the economy, by ENI 
and IRI. In turn, these companies have controlling stakes in 
private, as well as state, owned subsidiaries. The state holding 
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firms, though, are financially speaking wholly owned by the 
government, as the government furnishes all the necessary equity 
capital - 
The maintenance of political control means that there is 
still considerable latitude for state holding companies to use 
their equity funding - supplied by government endowments - for 
pursuing social goals. In some cases, such as in the development 
of the Southern economy, the companies specifically invest their 
funds according to social rather than commercial criteria. The 
point is that the state holding sector, because of its ownership 
structure (the essential subservience to political control) and 
historical origins, has played possibly the most influential part 
in bringing social considerations into the commercial sphere and 
providing a model for business intervention in wider society. 
This is particularly evident if we examine the specialist 
subsidiaries under the ownership of holding companies. 
State subsidiary and specialist enterprises 
The state-owned economy has a number of specialist enterprises, 
normally the subsidiaries of larger holding companies, that 
perform socially relevant functions or public services on behalf 
of the state holding sector. These agencies, often structured 
like commercial enterprises or financial institutionsf have 
played an important part in reinforcing the social objectives of 
the state sector. The activities of these specialist agencies can 
range across a variety of areas: a prominent example of this type 
of state company is GEPI, which was established in 1971 to assume 
from IRI and ENI certain responsibilities for rescuing ailing 
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firms. More recently in 1991, ENEA was established as a 
subsidiary of the national electricity company, ENEL, to research 
and develop new energy-saving and environmentally clean 
technologies, with a view to transferring the results to Italian 
industry. our concern now is to focus on the socially useful role 
that such specialist enterprises can perform by examining the 
contribution made by the IRI owned SPI company in promoting the 
small firm sector. 
Although it is often portrayed as being a transitory 
institution in the inexorable drive towards a mature economy, the 
small, artisan-based enterprise continues to figure prominently 
in the Italian economy. The micro-sector, as a geographical 
phenomenon, is concentrated in the North East and Central regions 
of the peninsula. In the fTerza Italia' (the third Italy), as 
this distinctive geographical configuration around the regions 
of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Veneto and Trentino, is known, 
around 80% of the working population is employed in commercial 
units with less than 200 employees (Bamford,, 1987,, p. 15). 
Authors such as Piore and Sabel (1984) argue that the 
proliferation and vitality of small firms in these districts is 
due to the mutual support networks, or 'industrial districts', 
involving agreed specialisation. and productive divisions between 
enterprises. 
But in addition to the socio-geographical features of 
Central Italy, the small firm sector gained an important boost 
f rom the state in the immediate postwar period. It seemed rather 
anachronistic that the government in these years should choose 
to enlarge the micro-sector when major capitalist economies were 
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attempting to centralise and concentrate the means of production. 
Nevertheless, a vibrant network of small enterprise units made 
some economic sense for Italy, ' s beleaguered postwar economy: such 
f irms required only small quantities of investment capital, they 
would bolster export potential and help stimulate internal demand 
for goods. Significantly, the small firm sector was an integral 
part of the Christian Democrat Party's inter-class strategy and 
reform programme. The small enterprise fitted in with the Party fs 
solidaire conception of dispersing property ownership to all 
classes (Weiss, 1984, p. 235). Hence, the government, in this 
period, made available extensive and generous provisions to 
effect dramatic increases in the number of small business units, 
particularly in the Central regions where the small f irm network 
was already well-developed. The cornerstone of this legislative 
support was the Artisan Statute of 1956. The Artisan Statute, 
more than any other piece of legislation, signalled the 
government's intent to promote the small business sector. It 
provided various benefits to establishments with less than twenty 
employees: cheap loans, lower taxes, exemptions from keeping 
accounts and reduced premiums. The f avourable legal and financial 
position of artisans, understandably, produced a significant 
expansion in the small workshop economy throughout the 1950s and 
the 1960s (Barberis, 1980). In the years from 1951 to 1971, the 
number of units with under 100 employees increased by 16% from 
636,500 to 737,700; and of the 744,725 industrial enterprises 
censured in 1971,99.5% had fewer than 100 employees (Weiss, 
1984F p. 216) - 
To assist the distribution of financial support for the 
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small firm sector and generally focus state assistance on the 
development of this sector, a number of specialist credit 
institutions were formed, such as the Cassa per il Credito alle 
Impresse Artigiane (1947) and GEPI (1971). In recent years, one 
company that has operated as a conduit of state support for the 
small business sector is SPI (Promozione e Sviluppo 
Imprenditoriale) . Originally established in 1955 as an industrial 
credit institution, SPI in the mid-1980s, during a period of 
reorganisation, was transformed into a small credit company 
1992). Although in legal terms SPI is a joint-stock company, a 
Societa per Azioni (SpA), it is wholly owned by IRI. The 
company's main objectives are social rather than economic: it 
promotes small firm development, predominantly in areas that have 
undergone industrial or general economic decline. This is 
reflected by the geographical locations of its 19 local offices. 
They are, in the main, based in the North West, where industrial 
decline has been evident, and the underdeveloped South (SPI, 
n. d. ) . In many ways, SPI has started to redress the 
imbalance in 
government funding for the small firm sector; Weiss has 
calculated from official statistics of funding bodies, such as 
the Artigiancassa, that artisans from the third Italy absorbed 
over nine-tenths of the total loans and investment funds 
available between 1953 and 1976 (1988, p. 63). Within these 
regions of industrial decline, most of the company's financial 
assistance is directed to small enterprises in the industrial 
manufacturing and high tech sectors. These financial subsidies 
and investments are based on the provision of mixed f orms of risk 
capital - the acquisition of minority holdings, the setting up 
254 
of joint ventures and subscribing to ordinary bonds. SPI also 
acquires shares in firms,, and it currently has stakes in 55 
enterprises, such as the Genoa-based textile company sLAm, in 
which it has a 15% holding,, and the information technology 
company, Spectrum Umbria, where it has a 30% stake (IRI, 1992). 
Normally,, SPI provides around 30% of total investments.. but 
interest repayments are below the prime rate, as the company does 
not seek to make a profit from its loans. 
In addition to its role as a conduit for financial 
subsidies, SPI provides a range of non-f inancial support services 
to small firms, including those where it does not necessarily 
have a financial stake. Entrepreneurs are given assistance in 
devising comprehensive business plans and in locating external 
sources of investment and finance. As part of these support 
services, the company has established a number of specialised 
workshop units known as Business Innovation Centres (BICs) and 
CISI (Centre Integrati per lo Sviluppo dell'Imprenditorialita). 
The BICs are f ound in various locations of interest, such as the 
industrial crisis areas in the North and Centre of Italy 
(Trieste, Genoa, Massa Carrara, Terni, Teramo) and cities in the 
South (Naples, Taranto, Cosenza, and Catania). 
Small enterprises are able draw upon a number of services 
furnished directly by the BICs. Each BIC has a specialist 
department that performs various functions on behalf of small 
enterprises. These direct services include a range of support 
functions, from marketing to legal assistance. The Genoa-based 
BIC Liguria, for example, has around 20 companies housed in its 
workshops, and a further 67 companies located around the city are 
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part of the BIC support network (le aziende del network). All 
these enterprises have access to personalised tutorial assistance 
whilst they are devising business plans, as well as professional 
assistance in starting and maintaining commercial links (BIC 
Liguria, n. d. ). Enterprises attached to BIC Liguria, whether in 
the workshops or in the network, also enjoy the facility of being 
able to contract out various administrative functions to the 
services department, such as tax accounting, PAYE tax 
declarations, and legal affairs, at a nominal cost. In a similar 
fashion to BIC Liguria, the BIC based at Trieste offers 
administrative and management services, including budget control, 
tax and fiscal assistance, consultancy in marketing and patents, 
and a range of secretarial functions (BIC Trieste, n. d. ). A 
senior official of BIC Trieste observed: 'In February 1989 we 
opened our workshops to the first companies. We also offered 
services - telephone, fax and so on. In the second year we began 
to offer accounting services, wages, salary and so on. Now we can 
operate like an internal department of the companies themselves' 
(Fieldwork Interview,, BIC Trieste, 8.6.93). In terms of direct 
services, one of the most important functions performed by the 
BIC agencies is that of tracing new market outlets for small 
entrepreneurs. Apart from making sense commercially, these market 
outlets, particularly those located abroad, have enabled small 
industries to resist dependency on the large firm sector (Piore 
and Sabel, 1984). Hence, in the region of Liguria, where steel 
and shipbuilding industries have figured prominently, the local 
BIC centre has assisted those small supplier firms affected by 
the downturn in steel production during the late 1980s to find 
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alternative market outlets in Europe (Fieldwork Interview, BIC 
Liguria, 21.2.93). 
According to Jones and Saren (1990), this form of direct 
assistance is not just confined to SPI, but is prevalent 
throughout Italy, especially in areas where there is a high 
concentration of small firms. The artisan association, 
Confederazione Nazionale dell'Artigianto (CNA) provides a range 
of key services, bookkeeping and advice on export finance. 
Moreover, provincial and regional governments can provide 
finances for support services, and coordinate relations between 
banks, trade unions and central government. Small f irms are able 
to entrust significant functions to external organisations like 
CNA or regional authorities, because such bodies closely 
represent the interests of small enterprises and are, according 
to Jones and Saren (1990), politically accountable to the 
artisans. The process of rendering the BICs accountable for the 
services they provide is secured by the fact that they are 
essentially public agencies. Indeed, the BICs also attempt to 
involve other public bodies or local institutions - regional 
government, public banks, the state sector and chambers of 
commerce - in the support process. 
The function of external support for the small enterprise 
sector provides a useful point of comparison on the issue of 
corporate involvement in the small firm sector between Britain 
and Italy. In Britain, there have emerged a whole panoply of 
support agencies - local enterprise agencies, Technical and 
Enterprise Councils, and urban development corporations - and 
legislative measures to stimulate the creation and growth of 
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small firms. These external support agencies, argue Jones and 
Saren (1990), primarily furnish advice, information and training 
to small business owners than with direct forms of assistance. 
In addition, as seen in Chapter 4, many of these support agencies 
have been established specifically to harness expert resources 
and personnel from private corporations, because they are viewed 
as best able to improve the competence and abilities of owner- 
managers to perform business functions. For Jones and Saren, such 
involvement may prove to be detrimental rather than beneficial 
to the small firm sector: 'In Britain the relationships are often 
dependent rather than representative through direct ownership or 
contractual ties with larger companies; or, indirectly, through 
various f orms of patronage on the part of larger companies" 
(1990, p. 289). 
Some authors have perceived the preponderance in Britain of 
corporate support for the small micro sector to be part of the 
wider dependency of small firms on their larger counterparts (see 
Shutt and Whittington, 1987). For example, in the metal 
engineering sector, small firms have found themselves dependent 
upon the contracts of larger firms, which have practical control 
over their smaller subcontractors. This is particularly true in 
the vehicle component industry of the West Midlands (see Jones 
and Saren, 1990). In Italy, on the other hand, small businesses 
have attained relative autonomy from larger companies. This was 
evident during the early 1970s when many large Northern firms 
responded to the economic crisis of this period by subcontracting 
to small firms; but these enterprises were able to achieve some 
independence from their larger contractors by recourse to 
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Iflexible special isation, ' (Brusco, 1982). The ability of the 
small firm sector to assert its autonomy has also been 
facilitated by the fact that large corporations do not feature 
prominently in the small business support network. This external 
support network, dominated, as it is, by small business 
associations, regional government and public companies, such as 
SPI, is likely to empathise and relate to the needs and 
predicaments of the small and medium firms they are assisting. 
The mobilisation of private capital 
In the previous sections, our analysis has shown how the state 
holding sector, from the early 1950s to the present, has made an 
important contribution to the economic, political and social life 
of Italian society. However, the early confidence placed in the 
state holding sector as the harbinger of industrial democracy and 
social reform was unsettled by economic and political 
circumstances. While this did not lead to the dismantling of the 
state sector, it had the effect of transforming relations between 
private corporations and the government -a factor that had 
repercussions for the social function of private capital. 
The immediate threat to the state sector came as Italy's 
economic fortunes began to falter. The 'economic miracle' of the 
years 1950 to 1963 provided the state companies with an important 
fillip, but indicators showed that, by the mid-1960s . the economy 
was entering a period of recession: GNP fell, and productive 
investment dropped, while the level of unemployment and unit wage 
costs in manufacturing rose dramatically. According to Podbielski 
(1974), the economy moved into a situation where high inflation 
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and low demand emerged as near permanent features. In response, 
the Christian Democrats, who at this point were the dominant 
partners in a centre-left coalition government, were forced to 
deflate the economy. Thus, in September 1963, two months after 
the formation of the centre-left government, the neo-liberal 
personnel in the Bank of Italy imposed a harsh credit squeeze. 
Central to the deflationary strategy were the curbs on public 
expenditure. overall, this limited the intended social policies 
of the government. For instance, in its agricultural policy, the 
coalition government concentrated on existing entrepreneurs in 
rural areas rather than impoverished agricultural labourers, 
leading to a decrease in the numbers employed in this sector 
(Sassoon, 1986). The credit squeeze imposed by the Bank of Italy 
had a detrimental social impact by contributing to reductions in 
investment, leading to a 2.5% fall in employment by 1965. In 
addition, the government was unable to implement the Pieraccini 
Plan, approved by parliament in 1967, with its provisions for 
state intervention to achieve full-employment. Although there was 
some respite when the semblance of a recovery emerged after 1966, 
the profits generated were exported abroad and public spending 
was increased through higher levels of taxation, which proved 
detrimental to lower-income groups. This upturn in the economy 
was also a short-lived affair. The historical achievements of the 
labour movement in gaining significant concessions over pay and 
working conditions during the 'hot autumn' of 1969 precipitated 
another economic crisis, as profits and economic growth were 
increasingly difficult to secure. After 1969, wages increased at 
higher rate than productivity, inflation increased in line with 
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other developed countries, and the growth rate decreased f rom an 
average of 6.56% in the 1959-63 period to 3.36% during the years 
from 1974 to 1970 (Sassoon, 1986, p. 73). 
The state sector, though it still maintained an important 
presence in the economy, was not immune from commercial 
difficulties caused by the general economic crisis of the late 
1960s and early 1970s. The achievements of the state holding 
companies in this period were mediocre: in the late 1960s, IRI's 
net profits averaged 0.1%, while ENI's reached 0.2% (Allen and 
Stevenson, 1974, p. 252). IRI managed stable profit levels in 
1973, but the companyfs losses after 1975, particularly in the 
steel, shipping and telecommunications sectors, spiralled 
upwards, reaching 900 billion lire (around E2 billion) in 1977. 
Typifying the fall in profitability was IRI's Alfa Romeo plant 
near Naples, which experienced a fall in profit that was greater 
than any other car plant in the world (Clark, 1984, p. 380). 
These economic difficulties were compounded by allegations 
of corruption surrounding the state enterprises. As the Christian 
Democrats held controlling majorities in most postwar coalitions 
up to the late 1980s, the Ministry of State Holdings, remaining 
in Christian Democrat hands, functioned as a source of patronage, 
whereby Party supporters and activists were rewarded with 
lucrative jobs and careers. Indeed, there have been public 
pronouncements alluding to this point by a former Christian 
Democrat minister for the state holding sector, Ciriaco De Mita, 
and Marcello Colitti, a manager from the public sector (Pasquino, 
1979) . 
Martinelli argues that the crisis of the public sector 
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'reversed the situation of the late fifties and early sixties, 
when public firms represented innovation and industrial 
democracy' (1979, p. 84). In contrast, a number of the largest 
private sector companies - Fiat, Pirelli, and Italcementi - 
responded to the economic crisis by attempting to consolidate 
their respective positions in the economy: these enterprises 
embarked on mergers and buy-outs that led to industrial 
concentration. Hence in 1967,29 private firms owned 34% of all 
shares, while the top ten firms (out of a total 60,000 firms in 
manufacturing industry) controlled 40% of all exports 
(Castronovo, 1981, cited in Weiss, 1988). This, in turn, created 
favourable conditions for the Confindustria to reassert its 
position, as it had been weakened by divisions in the 
organisation and the government's decision to form separate 
employers' organisations for the state holding companies. The 
, 'hot autumn, ', which highlighted the Confindustria-s lack of 
direction and the fact that it was riddled by factional 
infighting, eventually led a coalition of private sector 
representatives to sponsor Gianni Agnelli, the head of Fiat, as 
a presidential candidate for the Confindustria -a move that was 
not opposed. Under Agnelli's presidency, the employers' 
association began to challenge the Christian Democrat ic-dominated 
government, and assumed an explicit political stance in 
representing the interests of private capital. The main elements 
of Agnelli's strategy was to transform the Confindustria into an 
autonomous political force, modernise the organisation, 's internal 
structures and embark on a dialogue with trade unions. Martinelli 
and Treu argue that, with Agnelli at the helm, the Confindustria 
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sought to unite the private sector and regain a key political and 
bargaining role (1984, p. 286). 
The enhanced political stature of the Confindustria, under 
Agnelli's leadership, was helped by set-backs to the Christian 
Democrat government. The Christian Democrats experienced 
significant defeats in the referendum on divorce in 1974 and the 
general election of 1975, resulting in key positional changes 
within the Party - Benigno Zaccagnini was made the new Secretary 
and Giulio Andreotti returned to head the government. The 
difficulties of the state holding sector, together with the 
growing power and assertiveness of the Confindustria and the 
private sector, led the Christian Democrats to modify their 
relations with the private sector. In contrast to the strategy 
of containment during the 1950s, the Party used the economic and 
political leavers at its disposal to mediate on behalf of private 
capital. There is the case of the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, 
a state insurance fund designed to cover the costs of redundant 
workers for a period of time, that has allowed companies such as 
Fiat to gain the upper hand in industrial relations disputes 
(Chiesi and Martinelli, 1989). 
These developments contained repercussions for the social 
operations of the state sector. Throughout the 1950s and early 
1960s, the state holding sector was utilised to enact public 
policies and they helped tinge commercial activities with social 
considerations. We have already outlined how one of the most 
sustained and important social interventions made by public firms 
was in the industrialisation of the South. As we shall outline 
in the next section, it was symptomatic of the changing balance 
263 
of power and realities of the new economic situation that the 
private sector gradually began contributing to this area of 
social policy. This was in contrast to the 1950s and early 1960s 
where the state holding companies dominated Southern policy. 
The Mezzogiorno and private industry 
We have seen how the state holding sector was deliberately 
harnessed to bring about economic prosperity in the South by 
investing in new plants, infrastructure and services. The rise 
in investment from public companies proved to be impressive: 
Southern manufacturing investment rose ninefold in the 1958-61 
period and sevenfold between 1968 and 1971. Such financial 
backing had a considerable impact on the structural arrangement 
and growth rates of the Southern economy; they helped to 
restructure the long-standing bias of the Southern economy from 
agricultural production -a contributory factor in the 
underdevelopment of the South - in favour of industrial 
production. Thus, in the 1951-71 period, the contribution made 
by agricultural production to the GDP of the Southern economy 
went down from 34% to 18%, whereas it increased from 24% to 39% 
for industry (Allen and Stevenson, 1974). 
These figures tend to belie the difficulties faced by the 
state holding businesses in addressing the deep-seated structural 
problems of the Mezzogiox-no. Despite increasing levels of 
investment in the South, the state holding companies were still 
unable to bridge the age-old disparities between the North and 
South of Italy. Although its economic structure had become 
weighted towards industry, the levels of agricultural production 
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and employment in the South during the postwar years have, on the 
whole, been far higher than the North. By the early 1970s, 
agriculture represented 30% of employment in the South compared 
to around 13% in the North (Allen and Stevenson, 1974, p. 34). 
on the other hand, the converse was true for industry. In 
addition, the relocation of firms to the South did not absorb the 
unemployment created by the gradual reduction of agricultural 
production and population growth. Although construction and 
public works had created 350,000 extra jobs in 1975, these could 
not compensate for the 2.1 million who had given up agricultural 
work (Clark, 1984, p. 359). 
It was evident, by the early 1970s, that the endeavours of 
the state holding firms had not brought about the intended 
economic rejuvenation of the South. In response, the government 
introduced tax and credit concessions, in a 1971 law, to attract 
private sector investments and factory relocations to the South 
(Graziani, 1972). Although legislation in 1965 admitted loans to 
large businesses investing in the South, the actual f iscal 
incentives were limited, as the government was wary of allowing 
this area of policy to escape from political control and into the 
hands of private sector companies. But by the early 1970s, the 
continued spectre of underdevelopment in the South, together with 
the fundamental changes in the political and economic standing 
of the private sector, led the government to introduce a generous 
array of loans to attract private sector investment in the South. 
The subsequent legislation passed in 1971 meant that large firms 
were eligible to receive grants worth between 7% to 12% of their 
investment expenditure in plants, buildings and equipment, and 
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between 30% and 50% of loans for establishing new plants in the 
South. However, the law also added the proviso that firms would 
have to obtain authorisation from CIPE (Interministerial 
Committee f or Economic Planning) for investment programmes worth 
upwards of seven billion lire (E1.5 million) - an indication that 
government officials intended to maintain a semblance of 
political control over Southern policy (Amato, 1976). 
The process of providing fiscal incentives to attract 
capital investment in underdeveloped economies is common to most 
Western states. The inclusion of the private sector, as a partner 
in Southern economic expansion, has marked an important shift in 
the direction of policy; up to the mid-sixties, these 
interventions were mainly the preserve of the state holding 
sector. There are distinct commercial advantages in relocating 
plants because of the subsidies involved and the new markets 
which are opened up. However, the private sector has emerged as 
an important partner with government in this area of social 
policy and as such, for companies involved, this form of 
engagement can be perceived as an important contribution to the 
overall vitality and standing of the national economy. A notable 
example of this joint approach in Southern investment was Fiat's 
recent decision to construct a high-tech, Japanese-style car 
plant (Fabbrica Integrata) at Amalfi near Naples (Fiat, n. d. (a)) - 
While consideration was given to other locations, such as 
Portugal and Eire, the company eventually decided it would be 
favourable to the national interest of Italy and socially 
responsible to locate the plant in the South, where it already 
had considerable interests (Fieldwork Interview, Fiat, 2.2.93). 
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Subsequently, Fiat negotiated with both central government and 
local authorities to obtain subsidies and services towards the 
construction of the plant. As part of the agreement reached 
between various parties, Fiat committed itself to creating over 
7,000 jobs over a five-year period. The company also agreed that 
80% of the workforce would be hired and trained from the locality 
of Amalf i. 
These attempts by the government to involve the private 
sector in the South are based on the idea of servicing capital, 
whereby financial incentives and institutional support is 
provided for private investment in order to regenerate the 
economy of the South and create jobs. However, such endeavours 
to harness the private sector in the South have contained rather 
than solved the problem of Southern underdevelopment. By 1973, 
industrialisation was mainly confined to the coastal areas of 
Apulia, Sardinia and Sicily. According to Clark (1984), this 
created around 150,000 jobs in modern industries such as 
engineering. But these were secondary jobs in branch factories, 
and the operational sites did not produce the ancillary 
production in the surrounding localities. Indeed, between 1951 
and 1975 the actual number of jobs in the South went down by over 
500,000, and unemployment by the mid-1970s was three times the 
Northern rate (Clark, 1984, p. 359). There are other general 
political objections levelled at the strategy of economic 
rejuvenation based on the servicing of capital. Governments and 
local authorities,, in their determination to attract inward 
investment for deprived local areas, render the local polity, 
economy and trade unions subordinate to the dictates of the 
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private f irms they are trying to attract (Crowther and Garrahan, 
1988). Fiat's investment at the Amalfi plant was agreed by the 
company on the understanding that competitive and flexible 
working arrangements, such as six-day week, twenty-four hour 
operations and the just-in-time system, would be instituted in 
the plant. 
Despite these shortcomings,, the government still uses fiscal 
incentives to attract investments from Northern firms. 
Nevertheless, one recent legislative initiative - Law no. 44 of 
1986 - has seen a conspicuous change in emphasis towards 
harnessing private sector resources f or the purpose of promoting 
small firm development in the South. What is interesting, from 
our point of view, is that this scheme has involved companies in 
the more socially active capacity of providing advice and 
managerial training for entrepreneurs and firms indigenous to the 
South. 
Law no. 44 of 1986 established a small business development 
scheme specifically for young entrepreneurs between the ages of 
18 and 35. The main purpose of Law no. 44 has been to create 
long-term growth and employment in the South. The provision of 
funding by the Comitato per lo sviluppo di Nuova 
Imprenditarialita Giovanile (Committee for the Development of 
Young Enterprise, hereafter, the Comitato) - the public agency 
responsible for implementing and monitoring the progress of this 
legislation - is highly selective, restricted only to those young 
entrepreneurs or owners with feasible business plans. Recipients 
also have to comply with demographic and age requirements; that 
is, they have to reside in the South and be within the age range 
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mentioned above (Comitato, 1988). If selected,, the Comitato 
provides grants for initial capital outlays and subsidies for 
running costs, and thus far, 826 business proposals out of the 
3,707 submitted have obtained assistance (Comitato, 1993). 
As the scheme specifically targets fledgling entrepreneurs 
and artisans in the South, those who have been accepted for 
funding enter a period of training, organised and administered 
by the Comitato. Following this initial phase, and for a period 
of two years, the Comitato assigns a team of consultant tutors 
to the entrepreneurs being supported. It is here that private and 
public sector businesses, such as Elea-Olivetti, Agnesi, Isvor- 
Fiat, Comerint, Snamprogetti and Bonifica, feature prominently 
as suppliers of tutorial services in the scheme (Comitato, 1991, 
pp. 38-9) . 
once assigned to a particular entrepreneur, tutors perform 
three main functions: firstly, they provide specialist advice on 
production and managerial issues to enhance the capabilities of 
young entrepreneurs. The Olivetti managerial consultancy company, 
Elea, has tutored around 15 enterprises for the Comitato. Since 
becoming involved with the CoMitato in 1987, the company has 
provided entrepreneurs under its tutelage with general 
instruction on business management and specialist advice on 
artificial intelligence, information systems and the location of 
foreign markets. For this specialist training, Elea has recourse 
to various experts from Olivetti (Fieldwork interview, Elea, 
20.5.93). The company tutorsj, as part of their work, are enlisted 
to help cultivate relations within and without the commercial 
establishment. The tutor can act as an external arbiter during 
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conflicts between the personnel of new firms. The relational 
function of the tutor extends to establishing contacts with 
markets, potential partners and other enterprises. Finally, those 
providing tutorial services are expected to monitor closely the 
progress of the young entrepreneurs under their tutelage. 
According to one tutor from the Isvor-Fiat company, over a two 
year period this will involve regular visits by the tutoring 
company, with the aggregate consultancy time totalling between 
70 to 100 days (Fieldwork Interview, Isvor-Fiat, 14.5-93). In 
f act the tutors, by working closely with the young entrepreneurs, 
are in a position to feed back information on the progress of the 
enterprises to the Comitato (Comitato, n. d. ). 
Although those contributing to the tutorial service are 
reimbursed by the Comitato, the nature of this pedagogic service 
- the level of monitoring, training and advice required by new 
businesses - means that the companies provide a social service. 
Indeed, the social dimension of the scheme is further underlined 
by the fact that tutoring companies are promoting the small f irm 
economy in the South that has been diminishing since the early 
sixties. One senior member of the Elea consultancy team notes: 
You ... become part of the [company]. Consultancy 
is a 
matter of providing advice and then leaving those who 
require assistance in the first place to act upon it 
themselves. Tutoring involves integrating with the 
young entrepreneur, doing it in partnership ... I don't 
tell the entrepreneurs what to do, but I perform the 
task with them. (Fieldwork Interview, Elea, 20.5.93) 
The service is monitored by the Comitato, as it tries to 
ensure that the companies involved are effectively assisting the 
young entrepreneurs. This careful scrutiny, together with the 
screening of applicants, has helped to achieve a considerable 
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success rate for the scheme. Of the 826 new enterprises supported 
since 1987, only 15 - 1.8% of successful applicants - have been 
disbanded or dropped out from the scheme (Comitato, 1993). But 
while the scheme has a low failure rate, it would be another 
issue to presume that it could help the South to reproduce the 
dynamic network of small enterprises found in the Central and 
Northern regions; f or this to happen in the South, the government 
would have to systematically address the decline of the small 
business sector -a situation partly resulting from the 
disproportionate level of government subsidies and financial 
assistance received by companies in the regions of the 'third 
Italy" since the fifties. 
It appears then that the private sector has come to play an 
important role - whether through investing in the South or 
assisting the small business sector - alongside the state holding 
companies in trying to deal with the endemic dualism between the 
North and South. It must be noted that the growing involvement 
of the private sector in the Southern question since the early 
1970s has not diminished the importance of the state holding 
sector in this area of social policy. The IRI owned SPI company, 
as we have seen above, has extensive interests in the small 
business sector, and the number of state owned firms involved in 
the tutoring service of the Comitato f ar outweigh private sector 
firms participating in the scheme (Comitato, 1991). However, the 
involvement of the private sector in an area of social policy 
previously dominated by the state holding companies is 
significant. our aim now is to examine whether the private sector 
has assumed a responsible policy in other areas of society. 
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more expansive social role for business? 
official information - statistical or narrative - on corporate 
social action in Italy is very thin on the ground. There is 
evidence, though, of private sector firms making active, non- 
profit contributions towards the betterment of various aspects 
of social life. Some of Italy"s largest private corporations have 
engaged in social action over the years. The Fiat company 
provides a notable illustration: although the company does not 
have a central department for dealing with social interventions, 
there are various functions spread across the company structure 
that administer and manage community based interventions on 
behalf of Fiat. For instance, the Fiat per i Giovani (Fiat for 
the Young) programme forms part of the company"s vocational 
education facility that has been operating since 1922 (see 
International Labour Office, 1932, pp. 53-8). The scheme was 
unveiled in 1986 to inform schools in the Turin area about the 
company's activities, and, at the same time, recruit school- 
leavers for the company. With the company reducing its intake of 
new employees from local schools in recent years, this recruiting 
function has become less important. The Fiat per i Giovani is now 
mainly involved in organising seminars and work-experience 
placements for pupils (Fieldwork Interviewf Fiat, 2.2.93). 
Another significant social initiative has been encapsulated by 
Fiatfs interest in environmental protection. In 1989, the company 
appointed an environmental officer, based at Fiat headquarters 
in Turin, to coordinate and improve performance in this area 
across different sectors of the company. To ensure uniformity in 
different sectors, Fiat, in 1990, launched an environmental 
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policy statement, which committed the company to an assortment 
of environmentally-friendly practices such as waste management 
and the recycling of disused cars (Fiat, 1992a). 
These social interventions are not only the preserve of 
Italy"s larger corporations: there is still a preponderance of 
medium-sized, family-owned businesses that, mainly through the 
work of their owners, have built up philanthropic reputations of 
significance. For example, the family-owned pharmaceutical 
company Angelini has a charitable giving scheme that generates 
funds through direct contributions from employees. The funds 
accumulated by these contributions are matched by the Angelini 
family and then distributed to a chosen cause. Senior managers 
within the company have also helped a local charity for 
handicapped children,, Lega del F-ilo D-'Oro, to raise funds by 
organising local and national campaigns (Fieldwork Interview, 
Angelini Pharmaceuticals, 12.2.93). 
Regarding the interventions of smaller businesses, Fratelli 
Dioguardi, the Bari construction company, has gained a notable 
reputation for its social and philanthropic work. The director 
and owner of the company, Gianfranco Dioguardi - who is also an 
author and a professor at the University of Bari - has used his 
business to promote social-democratic and progressive ideals in 
the world of commerce. The most significant action to date has 
been Dioguardi's adoption of a local secondary school in Bari - 
Scuola Media Statale Lombardi - located in the notorious San 
Paolo district, which has all the problems associated with inner- 
city areas. To support the school and assist the education of its 
Pupils, the company has bestowed computers, videos, televisions 
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and telecommunications equipment to establish a multi-media 
learning centre in the school. For Gianfranco Dioguardi,, who 
brokered this link in the first place, the rationale for helping 
the school has been to steer pupils away from criminal activities 
and demonstrate the rewards and potential of the world of work 
and education (Villa, 1991). Dioguardifs involvement with the 
school has generated a great deal of curiosity throughout Italy, 
as testified by the number of articles which have appeared in 
both local and national newspapers. However, the government has 
made no attempt to coordinate or engage non-state participation, 
such as the private sector, in the education system, that largely 
remains under strong centralised administration (Monasta, 1994). 
We can conclude from these examples that, in addition to 
participating in the Southern economy, private sector companies 
have cultivated interests across a range of modern social 
problems and issues. While these instances of social action 
provided by Fiat, Angelini and Fratelli Dioguardi are significant 
in their own right, they do not form part of a comprehensive 
movement in terms of private sector involvement in society. 
General evidence suggests that socially active businesses operate 
in isolation, with little support from external agencies or 
coordination by the government. Indeed, while a number of private 
company owners have attempted to develop social action 
programmes, there has not been a surge of general interest in 
corporate social responsibility among private operators, as there 
was in the States from the mid-1950S onwards, and in Britain 
during the 1970s. Certainly, in contrast to Britain, there have 
not emerged the same provisions, in terms of coordinating 
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agencies, information sources and fiscal mechanisms, furnished 
by the government or the business community to consolidate the 
isolated and scattered instances of social involvement that 
prevail in Italy. 
To this, we should add some rejoinders relating to the 
nature of corporate social activism in Italy. Throughout the 
postwar period, the state holding companies, rather than the 
private sector, were at the forefront of pursuing socially 
responsible practices. In fact, many of the innovations in 
progressive work methods and socially responsible action in wider 
society tended to rest with state holding firms. The expectations 
surrounding the state companies have been deflated by poor 
economic performances and accusations of corruption. Despite 
these problems, the state sector still remains largely intact and 
features prominently in the economy. Moreover, sections of the 
state sector continue to fulfil the social expectations that 
surrounded the expansion of the state holding companies in the 
postwar period. The other point is this: while the social 
interventions have been ad hoc, and coordination of a limited 
nature, it is a conspicuous feature that Italian businesses have 
began to assume an active part in supporting the cultural sphere 
of society. This will form the subject of our analysis in the 
next chapter. 
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8 The Aesthetic Motive: Corporate Patronage of 
Cultural Heritage in Italy 
Article 9 of the Italian Constitution, which came into force in 
January 1948, committed the Republic to the principle of 
protecting the nation's artistic heritage. In the main, it has 
been the state's responsibility for safeguarding this Article of 
the Constitution, as much of Italy's cultural and artistic assets 
are legally under the auspices of the government. 
Since the mid-1960s, however, there has been increasing 
public speculation over the condition of Italy's vast cultural 
patrimony. This not only resulted in direct and coordinated 
action by the government, but it also gradually created channels 
of opportunity for local government to become involved in the 
task of preserving cultural patrimony. By the 1980s, there was 
a general surge of interest, particularly among the larger 
corporations and public service banks, with regard to supporting 
the preservation and restoration efforts of central and local 
public agencies. One of the distinctive features of this growing 
interest is that a number of companies have become active patrons 
of the arts. Therefore it appears that, while there has not been 
the same level of corporate community involvement as in Britain, 
the task of preserving Italy's cultural heritage has mobilised 
corporate engagement in social action, albeit of a highly 
Specialised nature. Our task in what follows is to examine the 
factors behind these developments, and to elucidate what they 
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tell us about the corporate philanthropy and social action in 
contemporary Italian society. 
The state and the preservation of cultural heritage 
In Italy, as in most modern societies, cultural and artistic 
activities can either form part of a profit-making industry or 
a publicly financed service for the collective well-being and 
education of society. The actual balance between public and 
private sector involvement will fluctuate according to specific 
areas of the arts: cinema, popular music, television and 
publishing are mainly funded by private means of advertising and 
consumer expenditure. The 'traditional" features of cultural life 
- museums, libraries, art galleries, archaeological sites and 
historical archives - are, on the whole, financed and 
administered by the public sector. The state covers over 80% of 
the expenditure incurred by the traditional cultural sector, 
including nearly 36 million pieces of artistic and cultural 
heritage, many of them the most important and prestigious 
cultural treasures in the world (Antonini, 1991, p. 50). The 
concentration of cultural heritage in Italy has come about as a 
consequence of the renowned art movements and different 
civilisations that have influenced Italian society since 
antiquity. 
The state, as the chief mainstay of cultural and artistic 
treasures, has, over time, had chequered results in safeguarding 
and promoting cultural heritage in the peninsula. In terms of 
legislative provisions, it was just over 40 years after 
Unif ication bef ore the Italian state passed its f irst law f or the 
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maintenance of the nation's cultural heritage. Law No. 185 of 
June 1902 was soon superseded by a more comprehensive piece of 
legislation, Law No. 364 of 1909. The 1909 Law was very much the 
legal standard bearer, establishing definitive guidelines for 
protecting cultural heritage: all objects under state ownership 
of historical, artistic and archaeological value were declared 
inalienable. Law no. 364 also empowered the government to issue 
compulsory purchase orders for valuable objects on the private 
collectors, market, and the export of moveable cultural treasures 
was permitted only on condition that they did not constitute a 
, 'serious loss' to the collection of national cultural treasures. 
On the whole, such provisions reinforced declarations about the 
inalienable status of cultural assets under public ownership. 
These legislative measures, according to major public 
inquiries conducted during the 1960s, were failing to provide 
sufficient protection for cultural and artistic heritage. The 
Franceschini Commission (1966) and the Papaldo Commission (1968) 
pointed out in their final reports that, despite the lofty 
attempts by governments down the years, Italyfs cultural and 
artistic heritage had been neglected and left to decay (Palma and 
Clemente, 1987). To rectify the situation, both Commissions 
recommended a coherent policy Of government intervention through 
the establishment of a specialised government department for 
culture. It was not until 1975, however, that these 
rec6mmendat ions were implemented. The Ministry of Cultural and 
Environmental Heritage (Ministero per i Beni Culturali e 
Ambientali) was solely responsible for maintaining heritage and 
art treasures -a function previously under the Ministry of 
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Public Education (Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione). The 
Ministry of Cultural and Environmental Heritage had financial 
resources, a vast administrative network of specialist offices, 
and advisory councils at its behest. But in addition, it 
established several local supervisory offices (Soprintendenze per 
i Beni Artistici e Sto-rici) to oversee maintenance and 
restoration programmes (Antonini, 1991). 
This specialist government department was a welcome and much 
needed innovation. Yet the geographical dispersal of artistic 
treasures across several Italian cities - Florence, Rome, Milan, 
Bologna, Venice - all of which are major world centres of culture 
in their own right, meant that the systematic upkeep and 
protection of cultural and artistic artefacts was logistically 
a very dif f icult task. The establishment of a system of regional 
government in 1972, however,, added a vital new agent to the 
heritage process. At first, the cultural responsibilities of 
regional governments were restricted to managing local museums 
and libraries. From the mid-1970s onwards, a number of regional 
authorities overstepped this limited remit and began contributing 
to the preservation of heritage in their own locality; 
consequently, from 1976 to 1981, regional authority spending on 
culture quadrupled, with 50% of this new expenditure being 
allocated to conservation projets (Bodo, 1984). In qualitative 
terms, the cultural budgets have been subject to greater 
democratic control: the discretionary powers of regional 
governments to fund restoration works were in many cases 
regulated by regional councils, often with the assistance of 
representative bodies (consulte per la cultura). 
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The establishment of public machinery for culture by central 
and local government helped to redirect and concentrate financial 
resources towards the preservation of heritage. In the decade 
prior to the formation of the Ministry of Cultural and 
Environmental Heritage, most of the state's cultural expenditure 
had gone into the performing arts (Campa. and Bises, 1980, cited 
in Palma and Clemente, 1987). Figures from the Ministry of 
Culture and Environmental Heritage for 1989 show that nearly 98% 
of its budget went on restoration and maintenance work (see 
Brosio and Santagata, 1992, p. 232). The emphasis on placing 
resources into preserving the vast cultural patrimony in Italy 
was sustained by the mobilisation of the environmental lobby 
during the 1980s -a common feature in many societies during this 
period (see Chapter 5). The green movement initially comprised 
of those disaffected with traditional politics and former left- 
wing activists (Biorcio, 1988), but by the mid-1980s, there was 
a shift in popular opinion towards green awareness. Between 1983 
and 1986, the League for the Environment doubled its membership 
from 15,000 to 30,000; the membership of the World Wide Fund for 
Nature went up from 30,000 to around 200,000 from 1983 to 1989 
(Diani, 1990, p. 162). As the green movement mobilised popular 
support, the message of environmental pollution was equated, by 
practitioners, with the degradation of cultural and historical 
patrimony (see Alibrandi et al., 1983; Moratto, 1986). For 
Lumley, 'there was increasing awareness that threats to natural 
life were also threats to cultural artefacts, so the idea of 
conservation was broadened..., (1990, p. 125). 
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The generic appeal of conservation influenced the business 
and industrial community to take ameliorative action. The energy 
company ENEA developed technologies to be used as diagnostic 
tools for safeguarding artistic and cultural artefacts. The 
company has made techniques, such as neutronic activation, 
gammagraphy, and various chemical processes, available to the 
Central Institute for Restoration. The Istituto Bancario San 
Paolo of Turin has funded research by the Consiglio Nazionale 
delle Ricerche (National Research Council) into new methods for 
protecting monuments damaged by pollutants in the atmosphere 
(Fondazione Sanpaolo di Torino, 1991). Moreover, the municipal 
electricity company for Milan,, Azienda Energetica Municipale 
Milano (AEM) , has made available specialist technology to protect 
exhibited art works in galleries (Fieldwork interview, AEM, 
29.1.93) . 
While the green movement has helped sustain and broaden 
interest in the preservation of cultural heritage, the percentage 
of total government spending on this area has remained low. In 
1955, expenditure on the arts rose to 0.74% of total government 
spending. However, available statistics show a marked decrease, 
from 0.75% to 0.62% of total government spending, for the years 
between 1976 and 1981 (Bodo, 1984, p. 43). Research has also 
shown that, due to the lack of administrative efficiency, 
government bodies have problems in actually utilising the funds 
available to them. According to Palma and Clemente, from 1945 and 
1982, between 43% and 66% of available funds for culture and the 
arts were expended (1987, p. 95). The lack of administrative 
Planning over the disbursement of funds is exemplified by the 
281 
fact that the dispensing of available funds tends to vary from 
year to year (Palma and Clemente, 1987). This situation is not 
helped by the frequent changes in government, which have 
bedevilled the Italian polity. This feature of political life 
often results in specialist ministries, like the Ministry of 
Cultural and Environmental Heritage, being assigned to coalition 
partners from minority parties that have little technical 
competence in this field (Bodo, 1989). Not all public agencies 
for culture have been characterised by such limitations: the 
devolution of responsibility for preserving cultural heritage to 
local regional government was a positive step. But at the 
beginning of the 1980s, as public concerns over the condition of 
cultural patrimony heightened, the government seemed to accept 
the need to generate funding and resources for the maintenance 
of cultural heritage from outside the public sector. 
The willingness of the Ministry of Cultural and 
Environmental Heritage to open up the cultural sphere to new 
partners was made evident by its attempts to harness corporate 
support through the introduction of fiscal incentives. In order 
to encourage private sector involvement, Law No. 512, approved 
in 1982, gave unlimited tax concessions for expenses incurred in 
the maintenance of specific cultural treasures and for donations 
made towards the restoration of artistic and cultural artefacts 
(Casiccia,, 1989, p. 294). A further change in the fiscal system 
in 1985 allowed tax deductions of up to 2% of income for gifts 
made to musical, film and theatrical productions. Although VAT 
deductions had been in place since 1978, these two laws 
constituted the first attempts by the Italian legislature to 
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attract new patrons, especially private enterprise, in the 
protection of artistic and cultural patrimony - an area of social 
policy traditionally the terrain of state agencies. The 
government introduced further provisions in 1988, whereby 
businesses making contributions to the arts would receive 
deductions of up to 20% of taxable income, but this was available 
for only three years. 
The legislation seemed successfully to fulfil its intended 
objectives: during the 1980s there occurred a surge of corporate 
involvement in the arts and culture. Significantly, according to 
a report commissioned by the EEC in 1986, the contributions by 
Italian corporations towards the support of culture and the arts 
surpassed corresponding totals for France and Britain, and was 
one of the highest in the European Community (De Chalander and 
De Brebisson, 1987). However, we would have to question whether 
adjustments to the fiscal system were directly responsible for 
the augmentation of corporate endowments for preserving cultural 
heritage. As Bodo (1989) observes, these fiscal provisions were 
seldom made available due to the lack of enforcement regulations. 
In addition, the incentives made available proved to be uneven, 
as heritage donations enjoyed more tax relief than the performing 
arts. Even if the tax deductions had been more generous and 
efficiently distributed, there is little certainty whether these 
indirect mechanisms would be able to attract external funding. 
O"Hagan and Duffy (1989) found that, despite popularity of 
indirect fiscal measures among European governments, these 
policies have failed to attract the level of private sector 
investment for the arts envisaged by policy makers. For example, 
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while British governments in recent years have provided numerous 
incentives to attract private sector involvement in supporting 
the arts, including a matching grant scheme launched in 1984 . the 
results, in terms of actual increases in business support, have 
overall been fairly modest (see Allen and Ward, 1990; Arthur 
Andersen, 1991, p. 5). A survey by the Association for Business 
Sponsorship of the Arts found a 13% decrease in real terms of 
corporate donations to the arts between 1991 and 1993, despite 
the many fiscal provisions implemented throughout the 1980s in 
Britain, (ABSA, 1993, p. 3). Davidson Schuster writing about 
private arts sponsorship in Europe notes that tax incentives on 
their own cannot guarantee consistent and lucrative benefactions 
from the private sector: 
A charitable deduction or a deed of covenant alone is 
not sufficient to ensure a healthy stream of private 
support for the arts, even if the financial incentives 
are generous and the field of application 
broad ... Although technical adjustments may be of 
primary interest in establishing a fair and efficient 
system of tax incentives, these adjustments will have 
little effect in a system with little precedent for 
private support. Many of the Western European 
countries are currently struggling with the problem of 
how to increase private support for the arts... For 
them, the key does not lie in the implementation of 
tax incentives; most of them already have tax 
incentives for charitable contributions in their 
national tax laws. The key lies ultimately in a 
changing view of the relative roles of the private and 
public sectors, a much more difficult problem to 
address. (1986, p. 331) 
In the context of Italy, there was a growing appreciation, 
certainly among larger firms, that the private sector could 
assume a significant role not only as benefactors to the arts, 
but also as active patrons of cultural and artistic heritage. As 
we have already asserted,, the involvement of the corporate sector 
in the cultural sphere cannot be attributed to either concerted 
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government coordination or adjustments to the fiscal system. An 
important factor in the shifting balance of responsibilities for 
the traditional arts between the public and private sectors can 
be located to the contemporary advancement of the media industry. 
The advertising industry and cultural heritage 
In the mid-1970s, there was a gradual concentration of ownership 
within various sectors of the media industry, and significant 
advances were made by advertising companies. This reflected, as 
we saw in the previous chapter, a general improvement in the 
political and economic position of the private sector in this 
period. These are important considerations in attempting to 
account for the general boom in corporate support for the arts. 
Prior to the 1980s most of Italy's private television 
stations were locally based and funded by small-scale 
advertising; the state broadcasting company, RAI, dominated the 
national networks and, through a special accord with the 
newspaper and publishers association, FIEG, it vigorously 
regulated broadcast advertising - its form and quantity. The 
private media lobby campaigned vigorously for deregulation of the 
air waves in the early 1970s when RAI's exclusive concession came 
up for renewal. In 1976, the Constitutional Court ruled RAI's 
monopoly of local networks to be unlawful, but its monopoly at 
national level was upheld (Forgacs, 1990, pp. 143-4). For those 
seeking privatisation, this was a significant step towards 
launching national advertising through the television networks. 
The local stations, however, did not possess a high level of 
technical and commercial competence in selling advertising space. 
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This gap in the market was seized upon by specialist advertising 
concessionaries, many of them under the ownership of publishing 
houses (Forgacs, 1990). These agencies plugged the gap in the 
market by sending out ready-made video packages with programmes 
and advertising space to television channels. Since the spin-offs 
of national advertising allowed private television to develop on 
an industrial scale, the obvious move was for local stations to 
form into a national network (Forgacs, 1990). By the early 1980s 
two television stations constituted the network: Canale 
composed of 27 local stations, and Italia 1 made up of 18 
stations. 
As we have pointed out, the advertising agencies, which 
distributed programme-advert packages, made a significant 
contribution to this general expansion of the television 
industry. In the sphere of private television and advertising, 
the building tycoon and media mogul (and former Prime Minister 
of Italy) Silvio Berlusconi, through his Fininvest company, 
became the pre-eminent operator. Berlusconi opened new viewing 
slots and increased audience figures, but his greatest skills 
were reserved for the sale of advertising. Initially, Berlusconi 
created Publitalia in 1979 for the acquisition and sale of 
advertising slots, and introduced smaller firms to television 
advertising on his Canale 5 (Forgacs, 199o, pp. 182-3). But once 
these programmes increased their audience figuresf Berlusconi 
roped in a number of large corporations, attracting the likes of 
Procter & Gamble, Unilever, Fiat and Nestle. The success of this 
strategy is demonstrated by the profit margins: Publitalia"s 
revenues grew from $9 million in 1980 to $630 million in 1984 
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(Caraman, 1993, p. 7). From this position of power, Fininvest 
proceeded to acquire controlling stakes in other channels, such 
as Italia 1. In Machiavellian fashion, Berlusconi pressurised the 
government into passing relevant laws that would legitimate his 
commercial operations, particularly the concentration of media 
ownership under Fininvest. 
The pre-eminence attained by Berlusconi's Fininvest group 
in the broadcast media world held important repercussions for 
cultural heritage. From 1986, the media entrepreneur used his 
three national channels to promote cultural exhibitions through 
the medium of popular television advertising. several events 
benefited from television exposure: the 1988 Van Gogh exhibition 
in Rome; Miro at the Rivoli Castle in the same year; and the 
Caravaggio and Michelangelo exhibitions of 1992 in Florence and 
Rome. From actually promoting exhibitions, it was a logical step 
for Fininvest to promote cultural sponsorships as a new 
advertising forum for business. Publitalia, Fininvest's 
advertising company, began to advise businesses on how to run 
cultural sponsorships and made available advertising space on 
television and in publications to promote such campaigns. The 
Fininvest company recently created the specialist Grande Eventi 
department within Publitalia to organise cultural sponsorships 
on behalf of companies, and to liaise between cultural 
institutions and possible commercial benefactors. For instance, 
the Grande Eventi department was commissioned by Cremona City 
Council to f ind sponsors and organise a series of events to 
celebrate the work of musician Claudio Monteverdi (Fieldwork 
Interview, AMI, 11.5.93). From this analysis we can see how 
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Fininvest has helped to raise cultural awareness in the business 
community by pioneering a form of support for cultural heritage 
guided by the commercial dictates of corporate advertising. 
Considering Fininvestfs unique contribution towards 
involving the private sector in promoting Italian art, it was no 
coincidence when Berlusconi's media group co-founded, together 
with Italy's Foreign Minister and the director of the Italian 
Association of Banks, the first association for commercial 
patrons of art and culture in 1991. The organisation known as 
Associazione Mecenati Italiani (Italian Association of Patrons,, 
hereafter, AMI) was founded to orchestrate and encourage private 
sector participation in supporting the arts. Its significance 
does not pertain only to the arts world, as it is the first 
modern associative forum for socially active corporations in 
Italy. 
In different ways AMI and Fininvest subsidiaries, such as 
Publitalia, have attempted to coordinate and organise corporate 
involvement in the arts. Certainly, this process has gained 
partial assistance from the growth and deregulation of television 
advertising. But one of the features regarding corporate 
involvement in cultural preservation is the tendency for 
companies to act autonomously as cultural agents in their own 
right. According to Bodo, 'major corporations now aspire to 
produce culture on their own and often prefer to take their own 
autonomous decisions with the least interaction with public 
authorities' (1989, p. 146). This may partly explain why since 
its inception in 1991 only 14 organisations have joined AMI 
(Fieldwork Interview, AMI, 18.5.93). Our objective in the 
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following sections is to examine this trend in detail by 
referring to the current cultural interventions of prominent 
italian enterprises. Two factors stand out: firstly, an important 
feature of this trend is the influential role played by the 
olivetti company; secondly, publicly-owned banks, such as the 
casse di risparmio, have emerged as generous benefactors and 
supporters towards the preservation of cultural heritage. 
Commercial enterprises as the new cultural patrons 
In the past twelve years, major Italian corporations have aspired 
to contribute towards the maintenance of traditional cultural 
patrimony on their own autonomous terms. The main influence 
regarding this proactive engagement in the preservation of 
heritage is the Olivetti company: since the late 1960s, the 
typewriter and off ice equipment manufacturer, turned information 
technology multinational, has developed a thorough and systematic 
form of intervention in the traditional arts. Even before this 
period, the original owners of Olivetti demonstrated a 
sensitivity to the cultural world around them. Such cultural 
sensibilities were made manifest when Camillo Olivetti restored 
a series of frescoes at the Church of San Bernardino, located in 
the vicinity of the company"s first factory site in Ivrea. 
Camillo's son Adriano, as seen in Chapter 6, had a pronounced 
interest in industrial architecture, and was highly influenced 
by Le Corbusier. The special emphasis placed on industrial design 
infused Olivetti's products with a certain amount of cultural 
significance in their own right; during the 1950s the company was 
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occasionally approached to provide information and exhibits for 
museum collections (Olivetti, 1983). 
It was during a critical period of transition in the 1960s 
that Olivetti's modern cultural policies took shape. In the wake 
of Adriano Olivetti's untimely death in 1960, the company was 
plunged into a financial crisis, mainly because of Adriano's 
earlier acquisition of the American typewriter company, 
Underwood, which at the time of purchase was a liability. The 
decline in Olivetti's fortunes were not helped by the general 
economic depression that overwhelmed the Italian economy after 
the boom years of the 1950s. After a directionless four years 
under the control of Adrianofs son Roberto Olivetti, the company 
found itself submerged in debts and was bailed out by a syndicate 
of state-owned industries and private enterprises; effective 
control of the company now passed from the Olivetti family to the 
board of directors. The syndicate take-over was not entirely 
successful and failed to diversify into the fledgling electronic 
equipment market. However, it succeeded in overhauling the 
company's organisational structure from a centralised system, as 
it had been under Adriano, to a devolved structure of separate 
autonomous divisions (Kicherer, 1990, p. 51). 
During this period of transition, Renzo Zorzi - an Adriano 
Olivetti acolyte since 1948 and editor of the company's newspaper 
Comunita - was given a free hand by the main board to reorganise 
Olivetti's external relations policy. Zorzi, 's main organisational 
contribution to the business involved the establishment of a 
Corporate Image Department, responsible for conveying specific 
ideas about the company and its philosophy through products, 
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sales, advertising and cultural activities (Kicherer, 1990). In 
the transition from owner to board management, the Corporate 
image Department provided a certain amount of continuity between 
the old and new regimes. More importantly, the board and its 
chairman - Bruno Visentini - gave the Corporate Image Department 
autonomous status within the Olivetti organisation structure 
(ibid. ) . 
Following the establishment of the Image Department, the 
company, under new management, made its first purposeful 
incursion into the cultural field. This intervention was 
specifically precipitated by a serious flood of the river Arno 
in Florence during the mid-1960s that threatened to destroy much 
of the city's vast collection of artistic treasures, especially 
the world famous frescoes that adorned Florence's churches. The 
flood led to a major relief operation, involving volunteers, 
technicians and specialists from all over the world. once the 
restoration had been completed, it was planned that the frescoes 
should be returned to their original sites, but with Olivetti's 
influence, a travelling exhibition of the restored artef acts was 
planned as an expression of Italy's gratitude for the 
international assistance. Hence,, in 1967 Olivetti helped organise 
an exhibition of 'Florentine Frescoes Saved from the Flood'. The 
travelling exhibition opened at the Metropolitan Museum in New 
York and then went on to the capital cities of Europe. Since 
then, the companyfs Cultural Activities Division has organised 
around 52 exhibitions worldwide in collaboration with 
institutions such as the Metropolitan Museumf British Museum and 
Royal Academy. out of all these exhibitionsf 33 have been 
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organised since 1980, coinciding with the general expansion of 
cultural intervention by the private sector. 
With the expansion of its Cultural Activities Division, the 
company has diversified into new areas of cultural interest. The 
most conspicuous advancement in recent years has seen Olivetti 
becoming involved in the restoration of artistic patrimony. This 
has led the company to collaborate, on a number of occasions, 
with the Ministry of Cultural and Environmental Heritage, local 
superintendent offices, and cultural institutes. A number of 
illustrious cultural artefacts in need of restoration have 
benefited from Olivetti's interventions: the frescoes of 
Masaccio, masolino and Lippi at the Brancacci Chapel of Florence; 
the Baroni room at the Castle of Manta, Piedmont; and frescoes 
by Masolino at the Castiglione Chapel in Rome. Since 1982, 
Olivetti has financed the ongoing restoration work being done on 
Leonardo Da Vinci's 'The Last Supperf under the direction of the 
Central Art Restoration Institute (Olivetti, n. d. ) . In all these 
restoration projects, the company has gone beyond mere financial 
contributions: it has placed computer-operated 
electrophotographic equipment at the disposal of restorers and 
scientists. For Leonardo's masterpiecef X-ray and specialist 
microscopic technology was made available to recover the original 
surface of the painting. Furthermore, the Cultural Activities 
Division is co-Publisher with the Ministry of Cultural and 
Environmental Heritage of an academic journal, Quaderni del 
Restauro, dedicated to examining the progress made in restoring 
cultural monuments and works of art. 
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Most of these cultural interventions have taken place under 
the auspices of Renzo Zorzi, one of the main influences behind 
the company's modern aesthetic Policies. Through his direction, 
Olivetti's participation in the cultural sphere has not been one 
of a distant and passive sponsor: the Cultural Activities 
Division, now a sub-unit of the External Relations Department, 
is actively involved in the exhibitions and heritage restorations 
that the Olivetti company supports. One senior manager of the 
division noted thus: 'The aim of supporting art exhibitions is 
not to provide sponsorship: we are directly involved with the 
project and the museum, but without any other agency, (Fieldwork 
interview, Olivetti, 9.2.93). As part of this collaborative 
approach, the Cultural Activities Division draws upon various in- 
house resources. The staff responsible for corporate design 
materials have occasionally contributed equipment for 
exhibitions. In a similar vein, the Graphic Design Department has 
worked on catalogue designs for Olivetti sponsored art events. 
Renowned Olivetti designers Ettore Sottsass and Mario Bellini 
have contributed their own work to exhibitions or designed the 
layouts for conferences and museum displays (Fieldwork Interview, 
Olivetti, 28.5.93). The former director of the Corporate Image 
Department, Renzo Zorzi, maintains that such a comprehensive 
system of in-house support is the distinguishing feature of 
Olivetti's cultural policy. 
Today, a very great many companies and organisations 
from every area of business promote the arts, but, in 
my opinion, providing financial support or sponsoring 
an event from the outside is one thing; 'doing, ' is 
quite another, by which I mean having ideas, planning, 
organising, directing studies and special projects, 
coordinating research, in a word, being an active part 
of an event. If anything distinguishes us, it is not 
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the quantity of resources employed but this 
propulsive, non-passive involvement, which has made 
Olivetti a significant and recognisable participant in 
this field. (Olivetti News, 1992, p. 34) 
Although Zorzi retired from his position as director over 
Corporate Image Department in 1987, he is still employed as a 
freelance consultant and has special responsibilities for 
cultural publications. Subsequent directors of the Corporate 
Image Department have not wavered from his vision of a 
distinctive and all-embracing cultural strategy to promote 
Olivetti as a commercial entity, and so bolster its reputation 
for social responsibility. 
It would be fair to argue that Zorzils lengthy involvement 
with Olivetti not only had a formative influence on the company's 
cultural interventions, but also helped safeguard its cultural 
programme, even during the 1970s when it faced financial ruin in 
the face of foreign competition. In 1978, entrepreneur Carlo De 
Benedetti bought a controlling stake in Olivetti, injecting much 
needed capital into the company. In addition, De Benedetti 
streamlined the corporate organisation, restored profitability 
and overhauled its corporate image: Olivetti was forced to 
abandon its relaxed and friendly style, and instead prioritised, 
in contrast to the company philosophy fostered by Adriano 
Olivetti, the twin objectives of efficiency and profit (Martin, 
1991, p. 145). While many of the company's traditional social 
commitments have receded under De Benedetti's reign, Olivetti, 
partly through Zorzils influence, has continued to be one of the 
most influential corporate patrons of the arts - This may also be 
attributed to the fact that patronage of the arts, as research 
has shown (Useem, 1984), is considered by corporate executives 
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as an ef f ective way of reaching a wider and influential audience. 
Although there is no tangible evidence that corporate patronage 
of the arts can develop a positive company image or bolster sales 
in the long-term, those who are likely to be influenced, 
according to Useem (1987) . will be other company executives. The 
example of Olivetti is a case in point: as a leading Italian 
corporation and among one of the first modern private sector 
firms to champion the arts and culture, Olivetti's active 
involvement in this area has set an influential precedent that 
has been followed by a number of corporations during the 1980s, 
Fiat among them. 
During the early 1980s, when corporate support of the arts 
underwent rapid expansion, the Fiat company emerged as one of the 
most prolific exponents in this new movement of corporate 
patronage of the arts. The company dedicated extensive financial 
and technical resources to cultural activities. These were 
portrayed not only as a contribution to the protection of Italian 
culture, but also as an outward demonstration of its sensitivity 
to the needs of society: 'Its (Fiat] involvement in this area 
stems from the awareness that a corporation's mission in modern 
times must not be limited to its basic economic responsibilities. 
It is imperative, in f act, that corporations help to promote the 
general progress of society and try to meet the ever-increasing 
needs of a community which ascribes greater importance to 
culture' (Fiat, 1992b, 
The company's cultural activities are wide-ranging; they 
encompass exhibitions, architectural restoration, and urban 
rejuvenation. Echoing Olivetti, Fiat's cultural policy is 
295 
characterised by the same independent determination to make a 
purposeful and active contribution towards the preservation of 
artistic heritage. Fiat, though, has also participated in joint 
cultural ventures with government departments, specialist bodies 
and private companies. In 1985, the company, together with the 
Tuscan regional government and the public bank, Monte dei Paschi 
di Siena, became involved in the Etruscan Project. The event 
composed of a series of exhibitions on the various aspects of 
Etruscan civilisation (Bodo, 1989). Moreover, the Group 
construction subsidiary Fiatengineering joined IBM in 1987 in the 
'Neapolis Consortium' -a project to catalogue the information 
on the artistic and archaeological resources around the Vesuvius 
area. 
More typical of the cultural projects embraced by Fiat 
throughout the 1980s was its restoration of the Palazzo Grassi 
in Venice. In 1984, the Fiat Group purchased the neglected palace 
-a notable creation of the eighteenth century architect Giorgio 
Massari - for $6 million. Fiat used its own engineering and 
electronics subsidiaries to renovate and transform the former 
aristocratic residency into a modern museum and exhibition 
centre. After 14 months,, the restoration of the palace was 
completed at a total cost,, according to Fiat reports, of $12 
million (Fiat,, n. d. (b) ). The Grassi Palace, since 1986, has 
housed eight travelling international exhibitions from 'Futurism 
and the Futurists' to a celebration of the work of Andy Warhol, 
and formed links with august cultural institutions such as the 
Museum of Modern Art in New York, the State Museum of Berlin and 
Spainfs Museum of Contemporary Art. 
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The company has been careful to restore cultural monuments 
and historical architecture in the area around Turin, where Fiat 
has its central headquarters. In accordance With the pattern 
established by the Palazzo Grassi project, the company financed 
the refurbishment of a number of renowned buildings in Turin, 
because of their social and historical importance to the city. 
For instance, in 1986 the company employed architectural 
specialists Roberto Gabetti and Aimaro Isola to improve and 
extend visiting facilities for the public at the Royal Palace of 
Turin. In the same period, plans were initiated to transform the 
disused Fiat Lingotto factory into an exhibition centre. At the 
start of 1991, Renzo Piano, the renowned Italian architect, was 
commissioned to oversee the planned reconstruction of the 
Lingotto factory -a project seen by Fiat as an opportunity to 
revitalise the surrounding urban zone. 
From this, it is clear that Fiat has strived, like Olivetti, 
to be an influential and autonomous cultural agent in its own 
right. significantly, in recent years, a plethora of companies - 
Benetton, Parmalat, Galileo Industrie Ottiche, Generali, and ENI 
- have adopted similar cultural policies. This has resulted in 
a prominent role for the private sector in maintaining cultural 
heritage - an area still dominated and controlled by government 
finances and public institutions. According to Bodo (1989), while 
there has been a discernable increase in active corporate 
support, much of this patronage is directed towards prestigious 
cultural events and monuments that are best able to generate 
kudos for those involved. Examining the field of corporate 
patronage, Useem maintains that fcompany giving in culture and 
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the arts is strongly skewed toward the most prestigious 
organisations in the region. Corporate patronage of the arts is 
undertaken with discretion, but it is a discretion exceedingly 
well placed' (1987, p. 349). 
While this may be a legitimate claim to make for larger 
corporations, our analysis so f ar has not taken into account the 
participation of the public service and social banks in the 
cultural sphere. One of the most conspicuous features surrounding 
the expansion in business support of the traditional arts and 
cultural institutions is the contribution made by Italy's public 
banks, particularly the socially-orientated savings and 
cooperative banks. Because the public service banks have retained 
a strong social ethos which can be traced back historically to 
their founding statutes (see Chapter 6), we might expect that the 
cultural interventions of these institutions are guided less by 
matters of public profile and corporate image-construction than 
by the needs of preserving heritage, regardless of how 
illustrious the cause. 
The public banks and their cultural responsibilities 
The Italian banks have played a central part in the general 
increase in commercial support for the traditional arts and 
heritage during the 1980s. A 1991 survey of the level of private 
sector endowments to the arts in Piedmont found that 86% of the 
aggregate total given by companies to artistic and cultural 
endeavours originated from banking and financial institutions 
based in the region (IRES, 1992). Although the situation in 
Piedmont may not be entirely representative of all Italian 
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regions, the banking sector is now widely regarded by cultural 
practitioners and commentators as a major commercial benefactor 
of the traditional arts. This situation has come about because 
several banking institutions - around 80% of which are under 
public ownership - are for various historical and legal reasons 
obliged to furnish part of their profits to social and charitable 
causes. In recent years, public banks haVe used the erogazione 
sociale (social donations) to assist the maintenance of cultural 
and artistic heritage. 
The Bank of Italy has over the years classified the myriad 
of Italian banking institutions into five main categories. Out 
of these five categories, it is the casse di risparmio (the 
savings banks) that have amassed a notable reputation for funding 
the traditional arts. The communications company Gruppo 
Prospettive carried out a cursory examination of 210 culturally 
active enterprises. Of those enterprises included in the survey, 
45% came from the banking sector, while just under half of this 
number were savings banks (Gruppo Prospettive, 1992). As 
recounted in Chapter 6, historically - in the tradition of the 
Monti di Pieta - the savings banks came to be formed as 
philanthropic institutions in the early nineteenth century, a 
feature subsequently safeguarded by a number of government 
regulations. Most worthy of note was the Fascist Banking Law of 
1936 that regulated the ability of deposit banks to provide long- 
term industrial credit (Ceriani, 1962). The 1936 Law, at the same 
time, placed the savings banks under public control, which 
confirmed the philanthropic status of these institutions. This 
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entailed a legal obligation to divide operating profits between 
reserves and gifts to charity organisations. 
As the government still had effective control of the 
financial sector after the Second World War -a legacy from the 
Fascist period - banks were able to open up new branches only 
with government authorisation. In an ef fort to extend banks into 
areas with limited financial services, mainly rural localities, 
and to small business establishments, the government tended to 
grant such authorisation to institutions like the savings banks, 
as they often served single localities and generally dealt in 
small credit loans. Thus, 83% of the new bank offices and 
branches opened between 1948 and 1960 belonged to the smaller 
categories of savings, cooperative and credit banks (Ceriani, 
1962). For the savings banks, this phase of expansion, in 
geographical terms, was by no means even: much of it took place 
in the Northern and Central regions of Italy. The distinctive 
nature of the savings banks, over time, has become less 
pronounced; they have exploited the opportunities for commercial 
expansion, and now operate throughout the peninsula and the 
economy. But despite modernisation, they continue to operate as 
public corporations, possessing constitutional and legal 
obligations to donate part of their profits to causes of a social 
nature. 
The savings banks, though, are not the only financial 
institutions that operate as public corporations. of the five 
main banking categories operating in Italy, the public law banks 
and cooperative people's banks are in legal terms essentially 
philanthropic commercial institutions or 'foundations' as they 
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are known. For example, the public law banks - the Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro, Banco di Napoli, Banco di Sicilia, Monte 
dei Paschi di Siena and the Istituto San Paolo di Torino - are 
mainly involved in dealing with small business operations, but 
they also engage in long-term credit operations. All these 
institutions, in addition to their ordinary commercial 
activities, finance local public bodies, charitable and social 
organisations. 
Since the mid-1980s, these socially-oriented public banks 
have been increasingly subject to modernising forces. To begin 
with, the centralised control over commercial outlets was 
scrapped by a special regulation. The most radical break with 
past orthodoxies was encompassed in Law no. 218 of 1990, 
otherwise known as the Amato-Carli Law. It was passed to 
authorise the privatisation of all public banks, including the 
savings banks and the public law banks. The Amato-Carli 
privatisation is less a doctrinaire response to current neo- 
liberal economic fads than a pragmatic response to the Single 
European Market and the competitive pressures this will create 
for Italy"s indigenous banks. Those who framed Law no. 218 
envisaged that the rationalisation and commercial efficiency 
afforded by privatisation would better equip financial 
institutions to sustain competition from their powerful European 
neighbours. The Amato-Carli Law also aimed to remove various 
restraints from banks in order to facilitate their commercial 
eXpansion. Hence, these banks now have easier access to capital 
markets; there is the possibility of forming strong strategic 
alliances with other banks; and it encourages the philanthropic 
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banks to establish organisational provisions that concentrate on 
commercial activities. 
To ensure that these former public banks would be able to 
retain their philanthropic and social characteristics, the Amato- 
Carli Law decreed that the newly privatised institutions would 
have to place 51% of their shares into the ownership of specially 
created foundations within the corporate organisation or under 
the control of external public institutions. In effect, it 
attempted to create a dual structure within these public 
corporations: the privatised section of the banks would control 
all banking and commercial activities, while the foundations 
would distribute part of the profits to social causes on behalf 
of the bank. What has taken place since the Amato-Carli Law is 
a superficial form of privatisation; most of the newly privatised 
banks have reverted simply to being controlled by their own 
internal foundation organisations. In one notable instance, 
Cariplo (Cassa di Risparmio delle Provincie Lombarde) . Italy's 
largest savings bank, placed all the shares from its newly 
privatised banking company under the ownership of a specially 
created social foundation (Fieldwork Interview, Cariplo, 2.6.93). 
The Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino managed to privatise 
20% of its capital, dispersing it between 65,000 investors, which 
allowed the bank to increase its equity base. However, the 
Compagnia di San Paolo, which has inherited the function of the 
ancient charitable institution, holds the remainder of the shares 
contained in the holding Sanpaolo banking group (Sanpaolo, n. d. ) . 
Although the Banca di Roma was one of the few joint ventures to 
result from the privatisation law, all of the bank's shares are 
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equally divided between two public institutions - Ente Cassa di 
Risparmio di Roma and IRI (Banca di Roma, 1992). Hence, at 
present, there has only been a nominal privatisation of the 
banking system; the public-dominated status quo of the banking 
system has, for all the efforts made by Law No. 218, remained. 
The limited privatisation of the public banking sector reflects 
the general reluctance of the state to sell public industries. 
Although privatisation would produce receipts worth $10-15 
billion (Davidson and Roche, 1993). many politicians are 
unwilling to carry out extensive privatisations, as the investors 
would be dominated by the handful of under-capitalised family- 
owned firms - Olivetti (De Benedetti), Fiat (Agnelli), Fininvest 
(Berlusconi) - that dominate Italy's private sector and stock 
market (The Economist, 1993). 
The moribund privatisation of the banking sector has meant 
that many public banks can still be legitimately categorised as 
non-prof it institutions. Hence, savings and cooperative banks are 
still obliged by their legal statutes and articles of association 
to distribute a proportion of their yearly profits to charitable 
works or social initiatives that promote the wider public good, 
including such things as charity work and cultural heritage. The 
actual amount donated against the level of profits retained for 
reinvesting in banking and commercial activities tends to vary 
from year to year. Some banks have definite percentages that they 
are obliged to use as social benefactions, but even here some 
flexibility is employed. The statute of the Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena, reputed to be the oldest bank in the world, stipulates 
that the bank must give up to 50% of its yearly pre-tax profits 
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to social causes, but its yearly endowments never reach this 
exacting level (Monte dei Paschi di Siena, n. d. ). However, in 
1992 the bank gave 20% of its prof its to social causes (Fieldwork 
interview, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, 4.6.93). The cooperative 
bank, Banca Popolare di Milano, has been committed to giving up 
to 6% of its profits, but when the bank's statute was modified 
in April 1990, this was reduced to 2% (Banca Popolare di Milano, 
1990) . For most of these social ly-orientated banks, the arts and 
cultural heritage present varied and worthwhile outlets for their 
community donations. The savings banks, often regional or 
provincial in character, use their contributions to support the 
maintenance of cultural and historic patrimony, as distinctive 
contributions to the communities in which they are located. 
The limited number of studies on the cultural policies of 
the public banks (see Confindustria, 1988; Gruppo, Prospettive, 
1992) show that banking institutions tend to favour the 
traditional arts and the maintenance of historically significant 
artefacts in their cultural benefactions. The statutes of certain 
banks proscribe that cultural endowments must be directed at 
traditional areas. Cariplo's (Cassa di Risparmio delle Provincie 
Lombarde) cultural policy is mainly concerned with the 
maintenance of antiquarian forms of art, and excludes the 
possibility of supporting the work Of living artists (Fieldwork 
Interview, Cariplo, 2.6.93). The Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze 
(Savings Bank of Florence) has an unwritten code that precludes 
it from sponsoring exhibitions or acquiring paintings by 
contemporary artists (Fieldwork Interview, Cassa Risparmio di 
Firenze, 1.6.93). However, there are some exceptions regarding 
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the emphasis placed on supporting the traditional arts and 
cultural heritage. The Banca Popolare di Milano organises art 
exhibitions of contemporary artists, photographers and sculptors 
(Banca Popolare di Milano, n. d. ) . The Cassa di Risparmio di 
Reggio Emilia has financed exhibitions of the contemporary local 
artist Gino Gandini as well as the renowned Joan Miro (Fieldwork 
Interview, Cassa di Risparmio di Reggio Emilia, 3.6.93). 
The sums dedicated to supporting Italian culture and the 
type of projects adopted tend to vary between banking 
institutions. Generally, the level and quality of support for the 
cultural sphere is determined by the size, geographical location 
and internal milieu of the banks. A notable development among the 
larger public banks concerns their tendency to emulate the active 
cultural interventions made by large private corporations such 
as Olivetti and Fiat. The public law bank, Istituto Bancario San 
Paolo di Torino, has since the mid-1980s gained a reputation for 
organising a number of prominent and long-term restoration 
projects. originally, the bank was established in 1563 in Turin 
by seven local notaries to perform charitable acts and is now one 
of Italy's largest domestic banks: it has assets worth 200,000 
billion lire, a presence across all principal financial areas, 
and 782 branches in all twenty regions, including 200 operations 
abroad (Sanpaolo, n. d. ) . Although the Istituto Bancario 
San Paolo 
underwent restructuring and selective privatisations during the 
1980s, the bank still remains a public institution. Istituto San 
Paolo shares are wholly owned by the Compagnia di San Paolo, 
which is a public foundation that has inherited the social 
obligations of the old institution. The Compagnia di San Paolo 
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administers the cultural and public policies of the bank. Towards 
this, it operates through the Fondazione dell'Istituto Bancario 
San Paolo di Torino per la Cultura, la Scienza, e l'Arte (the 
Sanpaolo Foundation for the Promotion of Culture, Science and 
Art) . The Foundation was established in 1985 by the bankis 
president, Gianni Zandano, in order to create a clear demarcation 
within the organisation between those areas responsible for 
banking and those involved in social operations. The central 
objective of the Sanpaolo Foundation "is to engage in major 
projects ... supervising all the stages from the planning to actual 
completion, not limiting its role to that of mere provider of 
funds' (Fondazione Sanpaolo di Torino, n. d. ) . The Foundation has 
15-20 full-time staff. With these organisational resources, it 
is able to organise major cultural projects on behalf of the 
bank and develop its reputation as a cultural patron of the arts. 
The Foundationfs first intervention has proven to be its 
most prolific: in 1985, it signed an agreement with the Ministry 
of Cultural and Environmental Heritage to restore the 
Schiaparelli Wing of the Egyptian Museum in Turin. In accordance 
with its proactive strategy, the Foundation did not pass on the 
necessary funds to either the Museum or the Ministry of Cultural 
and Environmental Heritage to carry out the restoration work, but 
used its own organisational facilities to employ construction 
firms and technical experts for the project. Although plans for 
its restoration were hatched in 1985, work on the Museum did not 
begin until 1988 and was eventually completed in August 1990 at 
a cost of E5 million (Fondazione Sanpaolo, di Torino, 1991). The 
hiatus between signing the actual agreement and completing the 
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restoration was mainly down to the inertia of the public 
bureaucracy. However, the Istituto San Paolo and other sponsors 
of restoration projects have no choice but to collaborate with 
the Ministry of Cultural and Environmental Heritage, because it 
owns much of the cultural treasures in the peninsula - For senior 
personnel of the Istituto San Paolo, the bank's involvement in 
the Egyptian Museum was an opportunity to bring commercial values 
into the arena of government: 'In practical terms we intervened 
with the intention of bringing private experience into the public 
sector. In Italy, there are great problems in the sense that 
state interventions are always very long. Instead, we want to be 
characterised as having a timed agenda that we can keep to. In 
our cultural interventions, we set out a particular time 
schedule, which we make public and try earnestly to keep' 
(Fieldwork Interview, Fondazione Sanpaolo di Torino, 20.5.93). 
In addition to its work with the Egyptian Museum, the Turin based 
bank has, since 1986, organised the restoration of the Abbey of 
San Fruttuoso and its village houses at Camogli, near Genoa 
(Fondazione Sanpaolo di Torino, 1991). The project lasted three 
years - from 1986 to 1989 - at a cost of E1.5 million. In July 
1987, the -Tstituto San Paolo 
helped restore the Basilica of 
Superga of Turin at the cost of E2.5 million. 
The Cassa di Risparmio delle Provincie Lombarde (Cariplo), 
like the Istituto San Paolo, is one of Italy 's biggest public 
banks. As the largest savings bank operating in the peninsula, 
Cariplo has 711 branch es across ten regions - a unique feature, 
as the savings banks normally operate in single regions or 
provinces. Like the Istituto Bancario San Paolo, Cariplo, 
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subsequent to the Amato-Carli Law, created a separate foundation 
that is the sole owner of the newly created joint-stock banking 
company, Cariplo Spa. The foundation has a specialist department 
responsible for organising cultural activities. With the 
financial resources at its disposal, Cariplo in recent years has 
funded the restoration of 35 different artefacts, of historical 
and cultural significance, mainly in the region of Lombardy 
(Gruppo Prospettive, 1992, pp. 98-100). One of the most ambitious 
schemes adopted by the bank was its support of the restoration 
of Milan's prestigious library, the Biblioteca Ambrosiana. The 
bank came up with E6.5 million, spread over a four year period, 
for a structural refurbishment programme to preserve the 
library's building structure, which at the time was being 
threatened by humidity. The vast financial resources for cultural 
projects at the hands of the larger public banks is exemplified 
by the Banca di Roma. In what is the bank's most prestigious 
intervention to date, it has agreed to sponsor restoration work 
on the Colosseum in Rome, following direct intervention by the 
Ministry of Cultural and Environmental Heritage and the former 
Prime Minister, the now disgraced Giulio Andreotti. Work on the 
Colosseum began in September 1992, and is projected to last a 
total of four years. The Banca di Roma, by the time the project 
is completed, will have donated around E16 million towards the 
restoration, a financial commitment which, according to the 
bank's president, Pellegrino Capaldo, could not be refused 
because it would act as an important reminder of the bank's 
humanitarian origins (Banca. di Roma, 1992). 
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The above cases outline the interventions of the largest 
public banks and they very much emulate the high-prof ile cultural 
programmes found in the corporate sector. However, many of the 
public banks in Italy, such as the savings banks (casse di 
rispa. rmio),, where there are over 100 separate organisations, 
operate on a provincial or regional basis, and thus have only 
limited funds at their disposal. Although the smaller banks do 
not possess the organisational and financial wherewithal to 
finance prestigious cultural programmes, they are in the 
position, because of their confinement to single provinces or 
regions, to provide support for the preservation of less 
prominent monuments or artefacts that are often overlooked by 
larger institutions. The Cassa di Risparmio di Prato has 
contributed finances towards the restoration of local monuments, 
including unspectacular, though practical tasks like renewing the 
electrical circuiting of the local Duomo (cathedral) . The Cassa 
di Risparmio di Reggio Emilia has funded restoration work on the 
Battistero di Reggio Emilia, helping to remove humidity that had 
built up in its foundations (Cassa di Risparmio di Reggio Emilia, 
1991). While these interventions are generally more parochial and 
less noteworthy than those of some of the metropolitan-based 
public banks, this should not diminish their importance. As one 
senior executive from the Cassa di Risparmio di Prato observed: 
The large companies involve themselves in great 
restoration programmes, which gives them publicity 
returns. The casse di risparmio are involved in 
smaller interventions in the local community where 
they are based... It is important to restore these 
larger monuments, but it is probably more important to 
restore all the smaller monuments in a city or town 
because this would render the city more habitable. 
This is one of the merits of the casse di risparmio. 
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(Fieldwork interview, Cassa di Risparmio di Prato, 
1.6.93) 
From this analysis, it seems that the public banks have made 
a range of contributions towards supporting cultural heritage: 
large banks such as the Istituto San Paolo have been able to 
replicate the type of proactive cultural interventions 
demonstrated by conglomerates like Fiat and Olivetti. The banks 
have come to treat culture as an integral part of their 
contributions to the community. However, most of the public 
service banks do not have the same organisational or financial 
wherewithal to sustain the type of cultural programmes adopted 
by their larger counterparts. Be that as it may, the smaller 
public banks, like many of the casse di risparmio, have made 
unspectacular though important contributions in supporting 
traditional cultural heritage. 
We have seen how the traditional arts and the cause of preserving 
cultural heritage has attracted wide-ranging support from Italy, ' s 
commercial sector in recent years. Indeed, the cause of 
supporting cultural patrimony has, in contrast to other areas of 
government policy or society, witnessed a general and active 
mobilisation of commercial enterprises behind voluntary social 
action. This has come about with little systematic government 
coordination; and where the government has attempted to coax and 
encourage corporate intervention through fiscal incentives, the 
provisions made have had little effect. of greater import has 
proven to be the growth of the advertising industry and the 
cultural activities of prominent corporations such as olivetti. 
Moreover, the social banks - casse di risparmio, Monti 
di Pieta 
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and banche popolari - have emerged as generous patrons of the 
arts. Because such banks are largely under public ownership and 
have retained their charitable statutes, these institutions, in 
recent years, have made extensive and active contributions 
towards the support of cultural heritage. Although the government 
has passed measures to sanction the privatisation of these 
institutions, the social banks have resisted these measures and 
retained their philanthropic functions. This not only reflects 
how pervasive the public sector economy is in Italy, but also its 
importance to business philanthropy and in sustaining the social 
ethos of commercial institutions that predate industrial isation. 
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9 Conclusion 
In the preceding chapters, we have analysed the philanthropic 
role of commercial enterprises, and the contribution that they 
can make to the well-being of society, especially in tackling 
social problems. Within the context of a capitalist economic 
system, this has involved companies, executives and business 
owners going beyond narrow commercial objectives and the 
sectarian interests of shareholders to pursue wider 
communitarian, social goals. 
As part of this analysis, we have focused specifically on 
the incidence of business participation in social action in the 
context of Britain and Italy. There are, in both societies, 
notable historical and contemporary demonstrations of business 
philanthropy and social action. During the course of this 
analysis it was found that, in historical terms, the dominant 
expressions of industrial and commercial philanthropy proved to 
be distinct in both societal contexts -a feature linked to the 
development and organisation of modern society. Our analysis of 
this progression begins in the Middle Ages. 
During the Middle Ages in Europe, commerce was organised, 
on the whole, within self-contained provincial and regional 
locations. The guilds, which were essentially organisations that 
provided collective representation on behalf of traders and 
craftsmen, were responsible for administering commercial 
transactions. These organisations were not wholly responsible for 
regulating trade, for, as the guilds of medieval Britain and 
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italy demonstrated, they also functioned as benevolent 
institutions, a legacy of their religious origins. Hence, the 
guilds subjected economic activities to moral scrutiny, and 
became actively engaged in the organisation of welfare and 
poverty relief for town inhabitants. Eventually, the advance of 
modernising forces in the economy after the sixteenth century, 
together with the emergence of new socio-economic interest 
groups, led to the abrogation of the guild system in Britain and 
Italy. But from this point, the progress of both societies 
towards economic modernisation assumed distinct courses, which 
had a bearing over the communitarian role of business owners and 
dominant expressions of commercial philanthropy. 
The development of corporate philanthropy 
Central to Britain's economic advancement from the fifteenth to 
the seventeenth century were the small band of urban-based 
merchants. Despite the size of this new socio-economic grouping, 
it actively contributed to the dismantling guild regulations, and 
expanding trade. Historical evidence shows that the merchant 
class also gained prominence in the social sphere, as merchants 
assumed much of the responsibility for supporting private welfare 
services and poverty relief. Here, commercial philanthropy, in 
contrast to the communitarian impulse of the Middle Ages, was 
predominantly shaped by the beliefs, whims and interests of 
individual merchants, who were increasingly influenced by 
Protestant doctrines. 
From the expansion of economic trade through the activities 
of merchants, Britain, by the eighteenth century, was preparing 
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for further economic growth, principally as a result of 
industrial isation. There are several factors that account for the 
process of industrial isation, but significant contributions were 
made by individual economic agents - business owners, 
entrepreneurs and traders - and the mechanisms of the free 
market. Although government assistance was a vital factor in the 
move towards industrialisation, the role of the public sector was 
indirect, as it established a framework - in terms of political, 
legal, social and imperial ambitions - whereby the efforts of 
individual entrepreneurs and business owners could bring about 
the Industrial Revolution. From this position of economic power, 
the business and industrial class augmented its status in wider 
society by fusing with already powerful landed and financial 
classes. What is relevant from our point of view is that the 
early industrialisation of Britain gave business owners the 
wealth and standing in society to undertake major acts of 
philanthropy. In addition, business involvement in wider society 
was facilitated by the fact that the system of poverty relief and 
social care was dominated by the efforts of private charity, to 
which industrialists were munificent contributors. At the same 
time, the prevailing influence of Liberal thought, and the 
proliferation of Nonconformist, humanitarian religious 
denominations provided moral and political sanction for those 
business owners engaged in philanthropic action. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, the inexorable advance of industry 
brought with it a whole panoply of social problems, such as urban 
blight and poverty, that could not be contained and resolved by 
private philanthropy and the selective largesse of business 
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owners. The realisation of the deficiencies surrounding private 
charity as the basis for relieving poverty and deprivation, 
during the late nineteenth century onwards, led public 
authorities, mainly at municipal level, to assume responsibility 
for the provision of welfare and social services. The 
intervention of the public sector into the area of welfare 
provision began to gain decisive momentum during the twentieth 
century. The interwar period, characterised by high levels Of 
unemployment and economic turbulence, witnessed major strides in 
state services, like unemployment benefit and health insurance. 
But it was as a result of the welfare reforms after the Second 
World War that a proper system of universal provision, across 
many essential areas, was established. Although the state came 
to assume control over essential welfare services previously 
administered by private institutions, after the Second World War, 
the voluntary sector continued to flourish, diversifying into new 
areas and pioneering modern charitable techniques. As Prochaska 
(1988) argues, even public institutions like the national health 
service, in its formative years, were reliant on voluntary 
effort. Hence, industrialists still had opportunities to be 
involved in social action or to support charitable action during 
the early and middle part of the twentieth century. 
In Chapter 3, we argued that the nature of business 
philanthropy and the extent of business involvement in society 
throughout the twentieth century was influenced by the new 
structure of ownership that was emerging during the early years 
of the twentieth century. What proved most significant at that 
time was the gradual replacement of the small family-owned 
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business unit by the oligopolistic commercial organisation under 
the impersonal proprietorship of shareholders. 
The concentration and expansion of commercial institutions, 
which gained considerable momentum in the interwar period, meant 
that philanthropic action and charitable giving became 
increasingly problematic. As a result of the changing structure 
of business ownership - the move from individual to shareholder 
owned entities - those running enterprises, in legal terms, could 
not easily expend resources for purposes which were not directly 
related to the interests of shareholders. Hence, there are 
isolated examples where shareholders attempted to bring 
injunctions, such as the Evans v Brunner Mond case (1921). 
against their companies for making charitable donations. 
Nevertheless, there were some outlets for industrial 
philanthropy, such as the cause of higher education, that seemed 
to combine self-interest with charitable motives. But as the 
twentieth century progressed, resulting in greater industrial 
concentration, company directors enjoyed less autonomy when it 
came to organising support for philanthropic activities. Thus, 
throughout the early postwar years, corporate involvement was 
mainly characterised by companies making formal donations to the 
subscription lists of large charitable and voluntary 
organisations such as the National Council of Social Service. 
This situation concerning the nature of corporate philanthropy 
in Britain began to change during the early 1970s. 
It was then that the political and economic situation 
started to alter dramatically, and with it the social 
expectations surrounding the business community. Central to all 
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this was the economic recession during the second half of the 
1970s, in the wake of the OPEC induced oil crisis of 1974, which 
undermined the social-democratic consensus of the postwar period. 
This, in its turn, helped create the institutional and political 
conditions for the type of modern interest in corporate social 
involvement and responsibility that had been prevalent in America 
since the 1950S. out of the economic recession came an increase 
in discussions about the limits of state intervention in society 
and the need for non-governmental involvement, especially the 
private sector, in forming policies and tackling social problems. 
Thus, there was a conspicuous increase regarding the 
interlocution between government and business - mainly among the 
larger and powerful sections of the business community - in 
response to escalating economic and political difficulties. The 
links between both sectors created the necessary institutional 
opportunities for business involvement in areas of social policy, 
such as inner-city rejuvenation, the promotion of small firms and 
environmental protection. 
Further momentum was given to corporate social involvement 
in the 1980s by the changing nature of politics in Britain, as 
the electorally-dominant Conservative Party pursued a New Right 
political agenda and a monetarist economic strategy. In this new 
political climate, corporate social involvement proved to be an 
objective for Conservative governments in its own right and an 
important part of the policy-making process. The emphasis on 
private sector engagement was deemed to be necessary in order to 
compensate for the perceived deficiencies and limitations of 
state intervention. Because the prevailing policy orthodoxy came 
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to conceive of modern social problems overwhelmingly in economic 
terms, the need to harness private resources and expertise in the 
formation and implementation of Policy strategies was 
increasingly stressed. For instance, we saw in Chapter 4 how the 
private sector contributed to inner-city and local economic 
policies through initiatives like City Challenge and the urban 
development corporations. The growth of corporate social 
responsibility in Britain throughout the 1980s was exemplified 
by the expansion of organisations - like Business in the 
Community - that coordinated corporate social involvement. More 
importantly, companies were making concerted efforts to insert 
measures within their corporate organisations for directing 
social intervention. In our research, we f ound how, in the decade 
under discussion, companies like Shell, BAT Industries, Unilever, 
and BT all established or expanded existing institutional 
provisions for community and social affairs. 
In the above we have tried to summarise the main arguments 
covered in our text relevant to contemporary interest in 
corporate philanthropy in Britain. Certainly, it would seem that 
the involvement of companies in activities of a communitarian 
nature has been intimately linked to the specific route assumed 
by this society towards economic and social modernity, and the 
vicissitudes regarding the arrangements of state-business 
relations. The importance of these processes became evident when 
we turned to the case of corporate philanthropy in Italy. A 
similar analytical strategy was adopted as we examined business 
in philanthropy in Italy. Here, we looked at how the new social 
and institutional arrangements, brought about by Italy's 
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transformation into a modern economic entity, shaped the dominant 
expressions of commercial engagement in social action, which were 
influenced less by the aspirations and undertakings of individual 
business owners, and more by the growth of public institutions 
and state enterprises. 
When compared to other major European states, the 
industrial isation of Italy, ' s economy was relatively late, coming, 
as it did, in the latter stages of the nineteenth century. It was 
shown in Chapter 6 that the comparatively slow rate of 
modernisation can be located in the weakness of the Italian 
entrepreneurial class. As a group looking to promote economic 
growth, it was shackled by the opposition on the part of 
landowning classes and the Catholic Church against industrial 
development. Subsequently, it was through extensive reliance on 
state intervention that Italy's business class could transform 
a predominantly agrarian economy into an industrial power. 
Italian business owners, who due to their relative weakness were 
dependent on the state to bring about economic growth, did not 
emulate the philanthropic achievements of the British industrial 
and business classes. On the whole, social intervention by these 
industrialists was mainly based around parochial and 
paternalistic welfare schemes within the workplace. 
These features of Italian industrialisation, however, did 
allow certain opportunities for philanthropic action on the part 
Of commercial entities. The far-reaching intervention of the 
state in the economy and society did help to preserve 
communitarian institutions that had emerged prior to 
industrialisation during the mid-nineteenth century. Regulations 
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and laws were passed, helping maintain the essential social and 
philanthropic status of the savings banks and cooperatives. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, private capital 
was able to advance its position in both commercial and political 
terms, as Italy underwent a second phase of industrialisation. 
This phase of economic growth, which brought with it new 
commercial and industrial innovations such as engineering, 
chemical production and car manufacturing, witnessed some notable 
instances of business-led social action. The most significant 
social achievements in this period were those of the typewriter 
company, Olivetti. As a result of successes in the commercial 
market, the owners of Olivetti implemented and administered a 
number of significant social programmes in Ivrea, where the firm 
was located. These interventions shared an affinity with the 
civic achievements of industrial and entrepreneurial 
philanthropists in Britain, like the Rowntree family, Samuel 
Morley, William Hesketh Lever, George Cadbury and Josiah Mason. 
The expansion of private industry and the philanthropic 
endeavours of the Olivetti family were of historical import for 
the peninsula. Yet, the spectre of the state continued to have 
a profound influence over society -a fact that was compounded 
by the Fascist coup d-etat in 1922. Throughout the Fascist 
period, there was a continuation of the far-reaching 
interventionist measures that had typified Italian society since 
the late nineteenth century, because of the urgent need for 
Planned and centrally directed reconstruction following the First 
World War. But the regime also intervened on behalf of private 
industry in order to secure the necessary conditions for capital 
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accumulation. However, Mussolini's Fascists were keen to build 
a mass support base through all sections of society, including 
the working class. Hence, Mussolini and a variety of Fascist 
apparatchiks became involved in the dopolavoro campaign. Here, 
employers and industrialists were advised to adopt enlightened 
practices in the workplace, and to assume social 
responsibilities. The dopolavoro scheme was very much symptomatic 
of the way the private business sector had become subservient to 
the centralising tendencies of the government. 
We might have expected, with the demise of the Fascist 
government and the end of the Second World War, that a radical 
break with past institutional arrangements and policy orthodoxies 
would ensue. The Christian Democrat Party, as the dominant 
electoral force in postwar Italy, was relied upon by the Italian 
establishment, as well as business interests and Western powers, 
to safeguard the interests of private business and the Church, 
mainly against the perceived threat of Communism. But we saw in 
Chapter 7 how the Christian Democrats cultivated a strong inter- 
class and social reform agenda that they ventured to pursue in 
government. But it was obvious that, while the Party was tied to 
interest groups such as the private sector, landowners and the 
Catholic Church, it would be unable to implement this reform 
agenda, involving new landholding schemes, welf are provision and 
public intervention in the economy to safeguard jobs. Gradually, 
the Party moved in favour of the continuation and reinforcement 
Of state planning in the economy. Hence, from the early 1950s, 
the Christian Democrats, influenced by those on the left of the 
Party, began a campaign against the poor employment practices of 
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private sector employers. In addition, it assumed control, 
against the wishes of company owners, over vital areas of the 
economy through the expansion of the state holding system. For 
companies such as ENI and IRI, the government established 
separate employers organisations, so that trade unions could 
enjoy an equitable bargaining position. 
Although the enlargement of the state holding sector enabled 
the Christian Democrats to undermine the capability of private 
capital to monopolise areas of the economy, the government used 
the state sector to spearhead enlightened reforms in the 
workplace and society. During the 1950s and early 1960s,, the 
state holding companies - mainly ENI and IRI - were used to 
rescue ailing firms in order to avoid mass redundancies and 
stimulate economic and social rejuvenation in the deprived 
regions of the South. It is our contention that the state sector 
and its expansion in the postwar period is central to the social 
contribution of businesses in contemporary Italian society. 
Indeed, the major state holding companies own specialist 
subsidiaries which perform social rather than profit-making 
functions. For example, as we saw in Chapter 7, there are f irms 
involved in promoting small business growth, such as SPI, and, 
as shown in Chapter 8, there is the ENEA companyr a subsidiary 
of the nationalised electricity company, ENELI that specialises 
in creating environmental ly-sensitive technologies to be used by 
industry. Indeed, these businesses have largely remained intact 
despite recent efforts to introduce privatisation measures. 
The colonisation of vital areas of the economy by the state 
holding sector did not rule out the possibility for private 
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sector involvement in socially useful programmes. In the 1970s, 
as the economy and the performance of the state holding sector 
began to falter, the government attempted to develop the South 
by involving private sector firms, which by this time had began 
to reorganise themselves politically and economically. Throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s, the issue of modernising the South was a 
policy area dominated by the state, namely ENI and IRI. The fact 
that the government by the 1970s was beginning to provide various 
fiscal and structural incentives to involve private capital in 
the South demonstrated how far relations between the state and 
business community had changed. Indeed, as the private sector 
began to assert its position throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
resulting in the government making concessions to industrial 
capital, the private sector organised support for the 
environment, the voluntary sector, and small enterprise promotion 
in the South. But, on the whole, the private sector has operated 
in isolation, in a limited range of fields, and with little 
coordination by either business or government agencies. Overall, 
it is the state holding institutions which continue to play a 
leading position in bringing social considerations into commerce. 
However, the recent surge of active involvement by both private 
sector and state firms in supporting the maintenance of artistic 
and historical heritage, as recounted in Chapter 8, provides one 
instance where the Italian business sector has come to assume 
some of the features that have characterised corporate 
0 responsibility in Britain or the United States. 
In the above, we have attempted to outline the main findings 
from our research of corporate social involvement in Britain and 
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Italy. The whole rationale behind this analysis has been to 
identify general factors at a societal and Political level that 
are responsible for setting the agenda for and extent of 
corporate social involvement. Previous theoretical propositions, 
such as those offered by managerial theorists and those 
advocating a contingency approach,. have proven to be, as was 
shown in Chapter 1, unsatisfactory. As such, it was reasoned that 
an alternative model of analysis would be required. 
In this analysis we have attempted to trace the origins and 
nature of modern society and how this has influenced the 
communitarian role of the business community. In order to achieve 
this, it has been necessary to place corporate social involvement 
in the wider political and social context. In terms of the 
organisation of modern societies, these social and political 
influences are often mediated through the structure of the state 
and its links with the business sector. To a varying extent in 
the contemporary Western world, the state has some influence 
across many areas in society. The relationship between the state 
and business across capitalist societies is not constant but 
subject to political, economic and social vicissitudes. In turn, 
this can influence the wider social responsibilities expected of 
business institutions. With regard to contemporary Britain, 
throughout the 1980s governments very much acted as the enablers 
for corporate social responsibility. As demonstrated in Chapters 
4 and 5, they created numerous institutional opportunities, 
spurred on by ideological commitments, for corporate engagement 
in society and public policy, spanning across the areas of urban 
development and environmental protection. The Italian state, 
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however, has played a limited role in terms of harnessing the 
private sector behind social action. It was shown in Chapter 7, 
though, that postwar governments amassed extensive interests in 
the economy that have allowed the state to spearhead social 
reforms through publicly-owned holding companies. Indeed, state- 
owned businesses, such as ENI and IRI, have played a major role 
in bringing social considerations to the commercial arena. 
Affirmative social action versus the negative injunction 
The search for a general framework to understand why companies 
engage in philanthropy has demonstrated the importance of placing 
this phenomenon in its wider historical context. In addition, 
contemporary interest in corporate responsibility is better 
understood by recourse to the analysis of specific political and 
social factors surrounding the emergence of these business 
concerns - an observation reinforced by analysing corporate 
social involvement across societies. In making such an assertion, 
though, we are not suggesting that our study of corporate social 
responsibility is so context or socially specific that it 
precludes us f rom making general pronouncements about the nature 
of corporate participation in social and philanthropic 
activities. one area of discussion, especially when the 
characteristic features of the modern era of corporate 
responsibility in Britain are taken into account, is the extent 
to which businesses can contribute towards the good of society. 
The expansion of interest surrounding corporate social 
responsibility in Britain during the 1980s gained considerable 
Momentum as prevailing orthodoxies in political thinking were 
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radically transformed: increasing emphasis was placed on the need 
to involve companies, market mechanisms and business 
representatives within the ambit of constructing public policy 
in order to improve the functioning of society, and in dealing 
with contemporary social problems. In Britain, many of these 
measures were symptomatic of the political hostility that had 
built up against the public sector. 
In our study - specifically Chapters 4 and 5- we examined 
some of the predominant areas where businesses have made social 
and communitarian interventions in recent years. From this 
analysis, it was concluded that a note of caution has to prevail 
in assessing the ability of the private sector to address public 
problems. It seems that the advocates of corporate social 
involvement, both those within government and in the business 
community, have made exaggerated claims about the capabilities 
of firms to devise private led solutions to public problems. 
To begin with, private enterprises are constrained 
financially by what they can achieve in the social sphere. As the 
modern corporate economy came into being f rom the late nineteenth 
century up to the end of the Second World War, the family or 
individually owned enterprise was replaced by the large, 
shareholder-owned firm. This has introduced considerable 
restrictions over how company resources can be expended. The 
executives who administer corporations are legally bound to use 
the resources at their disposal primarily to advance the 
interests of those who own the company, that is, the 
shareholders. However, charitable giving is generally seen as 
justifiable by shareholders and the courts alike, on the grounds 
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that they can bring goodwill to the companies making donations. 
Since the 1970s, as interest in corporate social responsibility 
expanded, the social contributions of corporations have also 
increased: in 1977 the contributions of the top 200 company 
donors amounted to E13.9 million; by 1991,213 out of the 400 
largest corporate donor furnished around E190 million to social 
and non-prof it activities (Lane and Saxon-Harrold, 1993, p. 24) . 
These increases in corporate giving, though, prove to be of 
marginal significance when compared against the profit margins 
of these companies. Figures show that corporate support for the 
non-profit and voluntary sector as a percentage of pre-tax 
profits fluctuated from 0.54% in 1989 to around 0.69% in 1992 
(Lane and Saxon-Harrold, 1993, pp. 25-6). 
Such corporate support may be vitally important to some 
areas of voluntary and charitable work, but the level of 
resources is unlikely to make serious inroads when it comes to 
tackling public problems like unemployment and urban deprivation. 
Thus, Shell's Community Relations Department in 1992 received a 
budget of E6 million, which was placed into the Enterprise unit, 
the Education Service,, funds for environmental projects and 
donations (Fieldwork interview, Shell UK, 12.11.92). This total, 
though, should be compared to the Shell Groupfs pre-tax profits, 
which reached E7.4 billion in 1989. BTIs community and social 
budget for 1992 reached an impressive E15 million, but this had 
to be spread across f ive dif f erent causes and 10 regional of f ices 
(Fieldwork Interview, BT, 4.12.92). However, the company did make 
a pre-tax profit of over E2 billion in 1990 (Adams et al., 1991, 
P. 187). Moreover, for organisations that depend on corporate 
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benefactions, the limited supply of corporate funding may 
jeopardise their operations. For instance,, it was shown in 
Chapter 4 how the local enterprise agencies, which emerged in the 
early 1980s as non-profit support bodies for the small enterprise 
sector, have faced difficulties in attracting corporate funds. 
It was the government's intention, as the main backer of the 
local enterprise agencies, that these organisations should be 
able obtain private sector resources in order to expand their 
operations. However, research has shown that long-term corporate 
funding is not necessarily guaranteed, and corporate funds tend 
to be concentrated in the most successful and largest agencies. 
This uncertainty over private funding and the prospect of 
businesses withdrawing their support can restrict the work of the 
agencies. In some cases, they have either tried to rely on 
generating profits through private consultancy work,, or they have 
been forced to rely on public assistance to avoid insolvency. 
Though the actual extent of corporate funds and resources 
set aside for social and community projects may be limited, in 
the past 15 years, the corporate sector has assumed a certain 
degree of influence in society and government. The efforts of 
recent governments to reduce the function and scope of the state 
have gradually seen public services replaced by state-sponsored 
private provision (Grant,, 1993). of interest have been the 
attempts to create opportunities for private sector involvement 
in policy-making. Specialist agencies, such as the urban 
development corporations (Chapter 4), local enterprise agencies 
(ibid. ) , the Advisory Committee on 
Business and the Environment 
(Chapter 5) and wide-ranging reforms in the public provision of 
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social services have enabled companies and their representatives 
to make a telling contribution towards shaping policies across 
a wide variety of areas - urban rejuvenation, small firm creation 
and the environment. These policies have partly come out of an 
ideological commitment to the private sector, but also from an 
emerging perception that inputs from the business community can 
help find solutions to social problems. Research has shown, 
though, that commercial mechanisms and agencies may be ill-suited 
to dealing with public and social issues: the environment in 
which executives operate does not necessarily provide the 
specialist skills and knowledge for dealing with complex social 
matters, where solutions tend to be long-term. 
A greater concern for some practitioners is that private 
sector involvement in government policy-making has undermined 
democratic institutions, especially local authorities. In certain 
policy initiatives, the interests of business were equal, 
sometimes predominating over those of other social groups that 
may have a stake in the intended strategy. As was shown in 
Chapter 4 regarding the field of urban policy, certain 
responsibilities for implementing local economic strategies have 
been devolved from local government to unelected agenciesf such 
as the urban development corporations and City Action Teams, 
often dominated by corporate representatives. Againf there are 
definite limits as to how far companies can influence and control 
public services. Indeed, there are some company executives who 
are critical of the way normal democratic agencies and 
institutions have become eroded by government efforts to 
privatise public policy (see Chapter 4). Neverthelessf such 
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points must not detract from the fact that considerable changes 
have taken place in the provision of public services. These 
transformations, in turn, have expanded the opportunities for the 
private sector engagement in public policy. But, as we have seen, 
they do have a number of limitations. 
From this, we might justifiably argue that corporate 
engagement in wider society is problematic. Nevertheless, there 
is no doubt that the private sector should be contributing in 
some way towards safeguarding the well-being of wider society. 
The pertinent question though is what form this contribution 
should take. Some commentators argue that corporate resources 
should not be placed in affirmative social action - one of the 
dominant characteristics surrounding the modern era of corporate 
social responsibility in Britain - but in the careful scrutiny 
and adjustment of, when required, the impact of their commercial 
strategies on wider society. Simon et al (1972) argue that this 
process involves the placing a negative injunction against social 
injury. Parkinson makes a similar point: fIt might be 
argued ... that the need f or companies to observe moral as well as 
legal constraints on their conduct is more pressing than the need 
for them to use their resources to provide private solutions to 
public problems' (1994, p. 16). There are decision-making areas 
where certain strategic and commercial options may not be 
illegal, but they will have socially detrimental consequences. 
Those companies that implement mass redundancies, transfer 
investment from one area to another to maintain profit, 
needlessly pollute the environment and reduce their 
in-house 
skills and occupational training schemes are culpable of 
330 
activities that are deleterious to employees and, ultimately, 
wider society. In recent years, there are well-documented cases 
where companies have actively infringed social considerations. 
on occasion this has resulted in human disaster on a considerable 
scale, such as the capsize of the P&O-owned Herald of Free 
Ell-Lterprise of f Zeebrugge, and the Union Carbide explosion at 
Bhopal, killing 2f 5000 people (Crainer, 1993) . In addition,, there 
have been criticisms levelled against the long-term impact of 
certain industries, especially on the environment. Thus, if 
enterprises devise community interventions and engage in social 
action, yet are unwilling to subject their commercial decisions 
to social considerations, this can lead to stark contradictions 
and paradoxes. Moore et al write: 'The contributions are 
undoubtedly seen as significant by the companies concerned... 
without really impinging on the strategic decisions of companies 
in areas like purchasing and contracting, employment and 
training, or the development of new products' (1989, p. 149). 
The process of shaping commercial decisions according to 
social considerations may require enterprises to restrict profit 
levels; for social and economic goals, as we have seen, are not 
necessarily congruent: 'the solutions to many of contemporary 
society's critical needs will require us to choose between those 
solutions and profitability, and to reorder our priorities in the 
market system, even to the extent of accepting a cutback in the 
private standard of living' (Simonet al., 1972, p. 36). But the 
exigencies of the modern economy are likely to limit the extent 
to which enterprises will integrate social matters within their 
mainstream commercial objectives. For example, 
it was 
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demonstrated in Chapter 5 that, while an increasing number of 
businesses have attempted to monitor their impact on the 
environment through green reporting, audits and product analysis, 
these provisions f or improving environmental perf ormance , though . 
have proven to be of limited value. Overall, they have not 
resulted in a substantial shift from commercial to environmental 
objectives, as these measures are implemented within a context 
where the commercial and financial objectives are prioritised 
above other points of interest. Hutton notes in a recent article 
that the search to maintain high financial rates of return and 
the growth of dividends, which are among the highest in the 
industrialised world, has forced British corporations to be 
ruthless in the maximisation of profit opportunities (Hutton, 
1994, p. 2). This, according to a number of economists, has led 
to an overemphasis on short-term gain to the neglect of the 
longer term interests of both business and society. 
Even though there are difficulties in making private 
businesses willing to subject their operations to social 
scrutiny, this does not preclude the possibility of having 
commercial enterprises, operating in capitalist societies, that 
can fulfil communitarian objectives and avoid social harm in 
their decisions. In Italy, for instance, some of the state 
holding entities and savings banks exemplify this mode of 
commercial organisation. In Chapter 5, it was shown how, despite 
the financial strictures of finance capital, there have emerged 
in recent years a variety of ethical and environmental financial 
institutions. These organisations are not merely guided by 
objectives centred around the maximisation of profit. They also 
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attempt to instil within their commercial activities a negative 
injunction to avoid social injury, and an endeavour to pursue 
activities that are beneficial to the wider social good. 
Perhaps the debate over corporate social responsibility 
should focus as much upon the need for companies to avoid 
socially harmful consequences emanating from their commercial 
operations as upon socially positive interventions. These 
discussions should also begin to consider the type of 
institutional structures required which might allow social 
objectives to be more firmly integrated within business 
operations. 
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Appendix: Research Materials 
General details on fieldwork interviews 
As part of the research and assessment of company involvement in 
society, a total number of 114 interviews were conducted with 
personnel from British and Italian-based organisations. The 
interviews generally can be separated into two categories: 
firstly, representative practitioners from companies that are 
involved in administering and coordinating social and community 
programmes. Secondly, interviewees representing non-profit or 
semi-government agencies that are either supported by companies 
or work alongside businesses, assisting their social 
interventions. Regarding company personnel, multiple interviews 
were conducted, in a number of cases, within the same company, 
particularly the larger enterprises that have several operational 
subsidiaries. The decision to conduct multiple interviews within 
single organisations was taken in order to gain a detailed 
picture of the social and community activities organised by 
companies. 
These interviews were conducted over a period of some 18 
months, spanning the years 1992 (September) to 1994 (February). 
This period of interviewing included two separate, month-long 
research trips to Italy between January and February 1993, and 
May to July 1993. In all cases, the interviews were informal, 
often lasting 45-60 minutes; they followed a semi-structured 
question schedule of topics and analytical issues that was 
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different for each respondent, depending on the type of 
organisation/company being represented. 
The general aim of these interviews was to obtain detailed 
information on the social action programmes of companies, 
especially details which are not furnished by official company 
reports. The following issues were of particular interest: the 
historical development of social responsibility policies; the 
organisational structure of departments responsible for 
implementing social programmes; the type and level of resources 
put into social action programmes; the expectations surrounding 
social interventions of company managers and executives. When 
interviewing respondents attached to organisations directly 
benefiting from corporate benefactions, especially those 
emanating from the businesses in our study, efforts were made to 
elicit information about the nature and quality of these 
collaborations with the private sector. 
Each interview was tape recorded, transcribed verbatim and 
committed to computer disc. The Italian interviews were 
translated by the author, using his working knowledge of the 
language. Due to limitations of space, only a few extracts are 
included from the copious interview transcripts, and many of 
those interviewed were not quoted directly whatsoever. None of 
the respondents requested to approve the material from their 
interviews that was intended to be used in our text. 
Nevertheless, the identities of each respondent is kept 
anonymous, as the listing of names was viewed to be unnecessary; 
only the organisation represented by the interviewee and the date 
of when the interview was conducted are indicated in the extracts 
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included in the text. Below we provide a list of all the 
organisations and companies from which relevant personnel were 
interviewed. For the sake of simplicity, Italian and British 
organisations involved in the study are listed separately. 
Moreover, a list of details concerning the interviews are 
provided: the dates of when they were conducted, together with 
the position, duties, and representative companies/agencies of 
respondents. 
List of British companies and organisations that partook in the 
study and brief descriptions of their activities 
ABSA (Association for Business Sponsorship of the Arts) : business 
funded body to attract private sector support for the arts and 
culture. 
Age Resource: organisation based at Age Concern offices, which 
attempts to promote voluntary work among 'active elders'. Shell 
UK played an integral part in the setting up of this 
organisation. 
Allied Dunbar: insurance subsidiary of BAT Industries. 
ARC (Action Resource Centre) : agency that brokers secondments and 
placements of business personnel and professionals to community 
or voluntary organisations. 
BAT Industries: one of Britain's largest companies, which has its 
main interests in tobacco products and financial services. 
Brixton Enterprise Centre: former department store (Bon Marche) 
on the Brixton Road, which was redeveloped by BAT Industries into 
workshops, offices and studios for around 100 small and medium- 
sized businesses. 
Brooke Bond: Croydon-based Unilever tea and soft drinks 
subsidiary. 
Brunswick Enterprise Centre: Liverpool-based centre that houses 
workshops and of f ices for 12 0 small and medium-sized enterprises; 
the centre was established by BAT Industries. 
BT (British Telecommunications): formerly the publicly-owned 
telecommunications company, which was privatised in 1984. 
BT North-East Regional Centre: regional headquarters based in 
Leeds. 
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BT Northern Home Counties Regional Centre: regional headquarters 
based in Bedford. 
BT Southern Home Counties Regional Centre: regional headquarters 
based in Canterbury. 
Business in the Community: organisation established to coordinate business action in all aspects of society. The organisation 
currently has around 400 member companies. 
Charities Aid Foundation: organisation set up by the NCVO to 
provide support for charities and generate funds from private donors, particularly companies. 
City Technology Colleges Trust: organisation established to 
promote and find sponsors for the City Technology Colleges. 
Corporate Social Responsibility Group: London-based discussion 
forum for large corporations involved in social action. There are 
some 30 companies involved. 
Elida Gibbs: London and Leeds-based Unilever operational 
subsidiary involved in the production of cosmetics and personal 
hygiene commodities. 
Groundwork Foundation: national environmental body, part funded 
by the government, which oversees a number of local trusts 
involved in helping companies redevelop derelict sites near 
factories and in trying to involve enterprises in general 
environmental conservation. 
John West: Liverpool-based Unilever subsidiary involved in the 
export of sea food products. 
Lambeth City Challenge: cross-representative group from Lambeth 
Council to organise the bid for DOE City Challenge scheme. 
LENTA (London Enterprise Agency): privately-funded London-based 
local enterprise agency that channels private sector expertise 
into the tasks of tackling unemployment, encouraging enterprise 
awareness, and assisting small businesses. 
Lever Brothers: Port Sunlight and Kingston-based Unilever 
subsidiary which produces domestic cleaning products. 
Macmillan College: the Teesside City Technology College. This is 
one of fifteen secondary schools outside the state system, partly 
funded by the private sector, that provide a greater emphasis on 
technological and scientific education. This college was founded 
with financial assistance from BAT. 
Norfolk and Waverley TEC: one of 80 quasi-public agencies managed 
by representatives of the private sector, which were established 
to organise training and school/industry links on a local basis. 
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PSI (Policy Studies Institute) : independent social research body. 
Most of its research contracts are with government departments. 
Shell UK: main British subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch petroleum 
company, the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company. 
South London Business Initiative: local enterprise agency f or the 
south London area, providing support, through the private sector, 
for small businesses in areas such as Peckham and Brixton. The 
chairman of the organisation is the BAT Industries supremo, Sir 
Patrick Sheehy. 
THORN EMI: electrical and technology multinational. 
Unilever: British parent company of the Anglo-Dutch branded 
consumer multinational; Europe's largest non-oil company. 
List of Italian companies and organisations that partook in the 
study and brief descriptions of their activities 
ABI (Associazione Bancaria Italiana) : the association of Italian 
banks. 
ACRI (Associazione fra le Casse di Risparmio Italiane): 
representative association of the casse di risparmio (savings 
banks) and Banche del Monte. 
AEM (Azienda Energetica Municipale Milano): the municipal 
electricity company for Milan, which supplies electricity for the 
municipal services and private consumers. 
AGIP: petroleum holding company, which is owned by ENI. 
Amersham Italia: Italian subsidiary of the British biotechnology 
and health science group. 
AMI (Associazione Mecenati Italiani): support agency for 
companies involved in the arts and culture. 
Angelini Pharmaceuticals: Ancona-based pharmaceutical company, 
which is still owned by the Angelini family. 
Associazione Italiana per la Ricerca sul Cancro: the association 
for cancer research. 
Banca Popolare di Milano: the cooperative bank of Milan. 
Banca di Roma/Cassa di Risparmio di Roma: the public sector bank 
which is part owned by IRI and the foundation of the savings bank 
for Rome. The Cassa di Risparmio di Roma, which part owns the 
Banca di Roma together with IRI, distributes social funds on 
behalf of the bank on a yearly basis. 
338 
BIC Liguria: Genoa-based SPI subsidiary involved in the promotion 
and creation of small enterprises. 
BIC Trieste: Trieste-based SPI subsidiary involved in the 
promotion and creation of small enterprises. 
Cariplo (Cassa di Risparmio delle Provincie Lombarde): the 
savings bank for the region of Lombardy. 
Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze: the savings bank of Florence. 
Cassa di Risparmio di Prato: the savings bank for Prato, located 
near Florence. 
Cassa di Risparmio di Puglia/Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di 
Puglia: the savings bank for the region of Apulia and its social 
foundation. 
Cassa di Risparmio di Reggio Emilia: the savings bank of Reggio 
Emilia, located near Parma. 
Cirio Bertolli de Rica (Societa Generale delle Conserve 
Alimentari) : IRI owned company involved in the production and 
marketing of foodstuffs. 
CITER (Centro Informazione Tessile dell 'Emilia-Romagna) : limited 
liability service company for small and medium-sized textile 
firms in the region of Emilia-Romagna. 
Comerint: training and management consultancy company owned by 
ENI. 
Comitato (Comitato per lo Sviluppo di Nuova Imprenditorialita, 
Giovanile): government committee for the development of young 
entrepreneurs in the South of Italy. Its main function has been 
to implement the provisions of Law no. 44. 
00 COMOI (Compagnia Mobiliare Investimenti) : Milan based investment 
and portfolio company. 
Coop Nordemilia: the consumer cooperative for the region of 
Emilia Romagna. 
Coopsette: a manufacturing cooperative based in Reggio Emilia. 
Elea: training and management consultancy company owned by 
Olivetti. 
ENEA: the national agency for new technology, energy and the 
environment. 
ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) : state energy company involved 
in the extraction and distribution of gas, petroleum and 
chemicals. 
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Fiat: motor vehicle manufacturer and engineering multinational, 
predominantly owned by the Agnelli family. 
Pondazione Adriano Olivetti: cultural foundation established in 
memory of the former owner, Adriano Olivetti. 
Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli: the cultural and social foundation 
established in 1966 by Fiat in memory of Giovanni Agnelli, one 
of the original founders of the company. 
Fondazione Italiana per il Volontariato: agency established by 
the Banca di Roma to support and provide services to the 
voluntary sector and charities in Italy. 
Fratelli Dioguardi: family-owned construction company, based in 
Bari. 
Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino/Fondazione Sanpaolo di 
Torino (Fondazione dell'Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino per 
la Cultura, La Scienza e l'Arte) : Turin-based public law bank and 
the charitable foundation attached to the Istituto, which owns 
the majority of shares in the commercial bank. 
Isvor Fiat (Istituto per lo Sviluppo Organizzativo) :a Fiat-owned 
company providing services in education, training and 
consultancy. 
Main Management: Milan-based management consultancy centre. 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena: the Siena-based public law bank. 
Olivetti: the Italian typewriter company, now a multinational 
involved in the information technology market. 
Procter & Gamble Italia: Italian subsidiary of the American 
laundry and cleaning products manufacturer. 
SIP (Societa Italiana per 1'Esercizio delle Telecomunicazioni): 
the IRI-owned telecommunications company. 
SNAM: ENI-owned holding company involved in the supply, 
transmission and sale of natural gas. 
SNAMPROGETTI: ENI-owned holding company involved in the design 
and construction of petrochemical refinery and gas treatment 
plants. 
SPI (Promozione e Sviluppo Imprenditoriale): IRI Group holding 
company, which promotes the development of small enterprises. 
Studio Lentati: Milan-based fund raising and charity consultancy 
company. 
Telethon - Combatti la Distrofia Muscolare e le altre Malattie 
Genetiche: telethon event charity established to raise funds for 
research into genetic diseases. 
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List of f ieldwork interviews for the British phase (dates of when they were conducted, and the representative company or 
organisation of the interviewees, together with their position 
or departmental responsibilities) 
ABSA: senior official (22.4.93). 
Age Resource: seconded official from Shell UK (13.12.92). 
Allied Dunbar: senior manger from the community affairs 
department (6.10.92). 
ARC: senior manager (4.11.92). 
BAT Industries: head of community affairs (25.9.92). 
Birds Eye Wall's: senior company manager who is the chairman of 
the Norfolk and Waverley TEC (21.1.94). 
BITC: official that performs the role as the national information 
officer for education (7.4.93). 
Brixton Enterprise Centre: senior manager of the centre and 
former BAT manager (15.9.92). 
Brooke Bond: senior corporate/ external affairs manager (3.12.92). 
Brunswick Enterprise Centre: senior manager (4.1.93). 
BT: non-commercial sponsorship manager, mainly responsible for 
sponsorship of the arts (23.9.92). 
BT: general discussion with representatives from the Community 
Affairs Division (23.9.92). 
BT: central education liaison officer (23.9.92). 
BT: Community Affairs Division officers responsible for community 
and economic regeneration projects (23.9.92). 
BT: external promotions manager (23.9.92). 
BT: manager of Action for Disabled Customers (23.9.92). 
BT: senior manager of the Community Affairs Division (4.12.92). 
BT: senior Community Affairs Advisor (30.4.93). 
BT: senior manager from the Environmental Policy Unit (30.4.93). 
BT: Community Affairs Division officer (economic regeneration) 
(7.1.94). 
BT North-East Regional Centre: Community/Public Affairs manager 
(7.1.93). 
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BT Northern Home Counties Regional Centre: Community Affairs 
manager (14.12.92). 
BT Southern Home Counties Regional Centre: Corporate Relations 
manager (21.6.93). 
CAF: senior manager (24.3.93). 
Corporate Social Responsibility Group: senior representative (26.10.92). 
CTC Trust: chief executive (4.5.93). 
Department of the Environment Official: former senior DOE civil 
servant, who was involved in the setting up of BITC (23.3.93). 
Elida Gibbs: national accounts manager seconded to community 
projects (16.12.92). 
Groundwork Foundation: senior official (7.5.93). 
John West: public relations officer (5.1.93). 
Lambeth City Challenge: seconded official from Eagle Star 
Insurance, a BAT subsidiary, who promoted the Lambeth City 
Challenge bid (17.12.92). 
LENTA: senior manager involved with the local enterprise agency 
movement and BITC (16.11.92). 
Lever Brothers: social and public affairs officer based in 
Kingston (18.11.92). 
Macmillan College: principal of the Teesside City Technology 
College (11.2.94). 
Manchester Business School: environmental management expert 
(6.1.93). 
PSI: senior researcher (24.11.92). 
Shell UK: Community Relations Department manager for the 
environment and arts sponsorship (1.10.92). 
Shell UK: management consultant of the Shell Enterprise Unit 
(8.10.92). 
Shell UK: Community Relations Department head manager for the 
Shell Education Service (28.10-92). 
Shell UK: head manager of the Community Relations Department 
(12.11.92). 
Shell UK: senior official of the Shell Enterprise unit (23.4.93). 
342 
Shell UK: former head of the Community Relations Department 
(30.6.93). 
South London Business Initiative: executive director (5.10.92). 
THORN EMI: public affairs manager (30.9.92). 
Unilever: Unilever education liaison officer (8.9-92). 
Unilever: head manager of Community Affairs (5.1.93). 
Unilever: secretary of the Unilever Appeals Committee that 
administers the company's charitable giving programme (23.6.93). 
Unilever: deputy head of Safety and Environment Assurance, the 
in-house department that oversees environmental practices 
(30.6.93). 
List of fieldwork interviews for the Italian phase (dates of when 
they were conducted, and the representative company or 
organisation of interviewees, together with their position or 
departmental responsibilities) 
ABI: senior official from the Italian Association of Banks 
(3.2.93). 
ACRI: senior manger (11.2.93). 
AEM: manager for the public communications department (29.1.93). 
AGIP: manager f rom the social activities and security department 
(17.5.93). 
Amersham Italia: director general and administrator (1.2.93). 
AMI: seconded official from the Fininvest company (11.5.93). 
AMI: secretary general (18.5.93). 
Angelini Pharmaceuticals: senior manager involved in organising 
charity giving (12.2.93). 
Associazione Italiana per la Ricerca sul Cancro: director general 
(25.5.93). 
Banca di Roma/Cassa di Risparmio di Roma: senior official 
responsible for the distribution of charitable and social 
benefactions (5.2.93). 
Banca Popolare di Milano: bank official and expert on the 
cultural and social activities of the bank (2.6.93). 
BIC Liguria: senior manager responsible for providing assistance 
and consultancy to small enterprises (21.2.93). 
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BIC Trieste: senior controller and advisor to small enterprises 
(8.6.93). 
Cariplo (Cassa di Risparmio delle Provincie Lombarde) : expert on 
social and cultural activities (2.6.93). 
Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze: external relations manager 
responsible for cultural and artistic activities (1.6.93). 
cassa di Risparmio di Prato: senior manager (1.6.93). 
Cassa di Risparmio di Puglia: senior bank official (15.2.93). 
cassa di Risparmio di Reggio Emilia: official responsible for 
organising cultural activities (3.6.93). 
Cirio Bertolli de Rica: senior external relations manager 
(11.5.93). 
CITER: senior consultant involved with the Committee for Young 
Entrepreneurs (Comitato) (27.5.93). 
Comerint: senior manager involved with the Committee for Young 
Entrepreneurs (Comitato) (21.5.93). 
Comitato per lo Sviluppo di Nuova Imprenditorialitat Giovanile: 
senior official (18.2.93). 
Comitato per lo Sviluppo di Nuova Imprenditorialitaf Giovanile: 
senior official involved in liaising with companies (13.5.93). 
COMOI: senior manger that has organised fund raising events for 
the company (26.1.93). 
Coop Nordemilia: senior manager for consumer and social 
activities (3.6.93). 
Coopsette: official from the Employee Services Department 
(3.6.93). 
Elea (Olivetti): senior manager involved with the Committee for 
Young Entrepreneurs (Comitato) (20.5.93). 
ENEA: senior scientist and researcher into fuel cell plants 
(12.5.93). 
ENI: external relations manager responsible for publications and 
education links (5.2.93). 
ENI: human resources manager responsible for administering social 
programmes for employees (Iniziative Sociale Centralizzate) 
(5.2.93). 
ENI: senior officials of the Sicurezza sul Lavoro,, Igiene,, 
Qulaita e Ambiente (Environmental Safety Department) (11.2.93). 
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ENI: external relations managers involved in art and cultural 
sponsorships (19.5.93). 
Fiat: public affairs manager (29.9.92). 
Fiat: senior manager form the Human and Industrial Relations 
Department (2.2.93). 
Fiat: official involved in the education liaison scheme (Fiat per 
i Giovani) (2.2.93). 
Fiat: senior external relations manager responsible for 
environmental policy (14.5.93). 
Fondazione Adriano Olivetti: executive director (26.5.93). 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Puglia: director of the 
foundation (17.2.93). 
Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli: senior manager (14.5.93). 
Fondazione Italiana per il Volontariato: manager responsible for 
external relations (19.2.93). 
Fondazione Sanpaolo di Torino (Istituto Bancario San Paolo di 
Torino): senior official of the foundation attached to the Turin 
public law bank (20.5.93). 
Fratelli Dioguardi: senior manager (17.2.93). 
Fratelli Dioguardi: senior manager engaged in coordinating social 
affairs (7.6.93). 
Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino: official responsible for 
cultural support (20.5.93). 
Isvor Fiat: senior manager that has contributed to the Committee 
for Young Entrepreneurs (Comitato) (14.5.93). 
Isvor Fiat: researcher involved with the Committee for Young 
Entrepreneurs (Comitato) (14.5-93). 
Italian Communist Party: expert on the cooperative movement in 
Italy and Emilia-Romagna (8.2.93). 
Main Management: senior consultant (27.1.93). 
Monte del Paschi di Siena: senior representative of the office 
of the secretary general and expert on the banks social and 
cultural activities (4.6.93). 
Olivetti: senior manager involved in organising cultural 
activities for the company (9.2.93). 
Olivetti: cultural and social activities manager 
for Ivrea 
(26.5.93). 
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Olivetti: external relations manger and expert on Olivetti's 
cultural activities (28.5.93). 
Procter & Gamble Italia: manager involved in charitable fund 
raising campaigns (4.2.93). 
SIP: higher education liaison officer (4.2.93). 
SIP: senior manager from the External Relations, Communications 
and Publicity Department (11.2.93). 
SIP: officials involved in establishing links with higher 
education institutions in Apulia (17.2.93). 
SIP: industrial relations, research and projects manager 
(19.2.93). 
SIP: senior manager for external relations responsible for social 
telecommunications initiatives (21.5.93). 
SIP: external relations for the region of Apulia, responsible for 
lialsing with schools (31.5.93). 
SNAM: senior manager involved in social activities (17.5.93). 
SNAMPROGETTI: senior manager for administering social activities 
(24.5.93). 
SPI: executive director (4.2.93). 
SPI: executive director (12.5.93). 
Studio Lentati: head of the management consultancy group 
(29.1.93). 
Telethon: organisational director (18.5.93). 
University of Ancona University: expert on the Italian voluntary 
sector (18.2.93). 
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